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David Wiggins (1997). Sortal Concepts: A Reply to Xu.

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  1.  62
    Felt Reality and the Opacity of Perception.Jérôme Dokic & Jean-Rémy Martin - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):299-309.
    We investigate the nature of the sense of presence that usually accompanies perceptual experience. We show that the notion of a sense of presence can be interpreted in two ways, corresponding to the sense that we are acquainted with an object, and the sense that the object is real. In this essay, we focus on the sense of reality. Drawing on several case studies such as derealization disorder, Parkinson’s disease and virtual reality, we argue that the sense of reality is (...)
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  2.  11
    Identifying and Counting Objects: The Role of Sortal Concepts.Nick Leonard & Lance J. Rips - 2015 - Cognition 145:89-103.
    Sortal terms, such as table or horse, are count nouns (akin to a basic-level terms). According to some theories, the meaning of sortals provides conditions for telling objects apart (individuating objects, e.g., telling one table from a second) and for identifying objects over time (e.g., determining that a particular horse at one time is the same horse at another). A number of psychologists have proposed that sortal concepts likewise provide psychologically real conditions for individuating and identifying things. However, this paper (...)
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  3.  12
    Comparative Metaphysics: The Development of Representing Natural and Normative Regularities in Human and Non-Human Primates.Hannes Rakoczy - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):683-697.
    How do human children come up to carve up and think of the world around them in its most general and abstract structure? And to which degree are these general forms of viewing the world shared by other animals, notably by non-human primates? In response to these questions of what could be called comparative metaphysics, this paper discusses new evidence from developmental and comparative research to argue for the following picture: human children and non-human primates share a basic framework of (...)
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  4. The Sortal Dependence of Demonstrative Reference.Imogen Dickie - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):34-60.
    : ‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. Section 1 distinguishes two sortalist views. Section 2 argues that one of them is false. Section 3 argues that the other is true. Section 4 uses the argument from Section 3 to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism from examples where we seem (...)
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  5.  37
    Why and How Not to Be a Sortalist About Thought.Rachel Goodman - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):77-112.
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  6.  28
    Ape Metaphysics: Object Individuation Without Language.Natacha Mendes, Hannes Rakoczy & Josep Call - 2008 - Cognition 106 (2):730-749.
  7.  58
    Sortals for Dummies.John E. Sarnecki - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (2):145-164.
    Advocates of sortal essentialism have argued that concepts like “thing” or “object” lack the unambiguous individuative criteria necessary to play the role of genuine sortals in reference. Instead, they function as “dummy sortals” which are placeholders or incomplete designations. In disqualifying apparent placeholder sortals, however, these philosophers have posed insuperable problems for accounts of childhood conceptual development. I argue that recent evidence in psychology demonstrates that children do possess simple or basic sortals of physical objects or things. I contend that (...)
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  8.  79
    A Study in the Cognition of Individuals' Identity: Solving the Problem of Singular Cognition in Object and Agent Tracking.Nicolas Bullot - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):276-293.
    This article compares the ability to track individuals lacking mental states with the ability to track intentional agents. It explains why reference to individuals raises the problem of explaining how cognitive agents track unique individuals and in what sense reference is based on procedures of perceptual-motor and epistemic tracking. We suggest applying the notion of singular-files from theories in perception and semantics to the problem of tracking intentional agents. In order to elucidate the nature of agent-files, three views of the (...)
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  9. Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
    In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical (...)
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    Tracing the Identity of Objects.Lance J. Rips, Sergey Blok & George Newman - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (1):1-30.
    This article considers how people judge the identity of objects (e.g., how people decide that a description of an object at one time, t₀, belongs to the same object as a description of it at another time, t₁). The authors propose a causal continuer model for these judgments, based on an earlier theory by Nozick (1981). According to this model, the 2 descriptions belong to the same object if (a) the object at t₁ is among those that are causally close (...)
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  11.  68
    Is the Object Concept Formal?Roberto Casati - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (3):383–394.
    This review article explores several senses in which it can be held that the (actual, psychological) concept of an object is a formal concept, as opposed, here, to being a sortal concept. Some recent positions both from the philosophical and psychological literature are analyzed: Object-sortalism (Xu), quasi-sortalist reductive strategies (Bloom), qualified sortalism (Wiggins), demonstrative theories (Fodor), and anti-sortalism (Ayers).
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  12.  49
    Objects and Attention: The State of the Art.Brian Scholl - 2001 - Cognition 80 (1-2):1-46.