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In Defense of Fanaticism

Ethics 132 (2):445-477 (2022)

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  1. Infinite Aggregation.Hayden Wilkinson - 2021 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    Suppose you found that the universe around you was infinite—that it extended infinitely far in space or in time and, as a result, contained infinitely many persons. How should this change your moral decision-making? Radically, it seems, according to some philosophers. According to various recent arguments, any moral theory that is ’minimally aggregative’ will deliver absurd judgements in practice if the universe is (even remotely likely to be) infinite. This seems like sound justification for abandoning any such theory. -/- My (...)
     
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  • Risk Aversion and the Not-so-Long Run.Hayden Wilkinson - manuscript
     
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  • Infinite Aggregation and Risk.Hayden Wilkinson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
    For aggregative theories of moral value, it is a challenge to rank worlds that each contain infinitely many valuable events. And, although there are several existing proposals for doing so, few provide a cardinal measure of each world's value. This raises the even greater challenge of ranking lotteries over such worlds—without a cardinal value for each world, we cannot apply expected value theory. How then can we compare such lotteries? To date, we have just one method for doing so (proposed (...)
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  • The Epistemic Challenge to Longtermism.Christian Tarsney - manuscript
    Longtermists claim that what we ought to do is mainly determined by how our actions might affect the very long-run future. A natural objection to longtermism is that these effects may be nearly impossible to predict -- perhaps so close to impossible that, despite the astronomical importance of the far future, the expected value of our present actions is mainly determined by near-term considerations. This paper aims to precisify and evaluate one version of this epistemic objection to longtermism. To that (...)
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