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Cilia Witteman & Andreas Glöckner (2010). Beyond Dual-Process Models: A Categorisation of Processes Underlying Intuitive Judgement and Decision Making.

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  1.  21
    The Moral Foreign-Language Effect.Heather Cipolletti, Steven McFarlane & Christine Weissglass - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):23-40.
    Many have argued that moral judgment is driven by one of two types of processes. Rationalists argue that reasoned processes are the source of moral judgments, whereas sentimentalists argue that emotional processes are. We provide evidence that both positions are mistaken; there are multiple mental processes involved in moral judgment, and it is possible to manipulate which process is engaged when considering moral dilemmas by presenting them in a non-native language. The Foreign-Language Effect is the activation of systematic reasoning processes (...)
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    Aiding Lay Decision Making Using a Cognitive Competencies Approach.A. J. Maule & Simon Maule - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  3.  37
    The Dual-Process Turn: How Recent Defenses of Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning Fail.Joshua Mugg - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):300-309.
    In response to the claim that the properties typically used to distinguish System 1 from System 2 crosscut one another, Carruthers, Evans, and Stanovich have abandoned the System 1/System 2 distinction. Evans and Stanovich both opt for a dual-process theory, according to which Type-1 processes are autonomous and Type-2 processes use working memory and involve cognitive decoupling. Carruthers maintains a two-system account, according to which there is an intuitive system and a reflective system. I argue that these defenses of dual-process (...)
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  4. Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From.Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.
    Intuitions play a central role in analytic philosophy, but their psychological basis is little understood. This paper provides an empirically-informed, psychological char- acterization of philosophical intuitions. Drawing on McCauley’s distinction between maturational and practiced naturalness, I argue that philosophical intuitions originate from several early-developed, specialized domains of core knowledge (maturational naturalness). Eliciting and deploying such intuitions in argumentative contexts is the domain of philosophical expertise, thus philosophical intuitions are also practiced nat- ural. This characterization has implications for the evidential value (...)
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  5.  24
    Why Do People Behave Immorally When Drunk?Joseph Heath & Benoit Hardy-Vallée - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):310-329.
    Alcohol intoxication is a major source of antisocial behavior in our society, strongly implicated in various forms of interpersonal aggression. Yet, moral philosophers have paid surprisingly little attention to the literature on alcohol and its effects. In part, this is because philosophers who have adopted a more empirically informed approach to moral psychology have gravitated toward moral sentimentalism, while the literature on alcohol intoxication fits very poorly with the sentimentalist account. Most contemporary research on the psychological effects of alcohol is (...)
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  6.  54
    Nietzschean Constructivism: Ethics and Metaethics for All and None.Alex Silk - 2015 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):244-280.
    This paper develops an interpretation of Nietzsche’s ethics and metaethics that reconciles his apparent antirealism with his engagement in normative discourse. Interpreting Nietzsche as a metaethical constructivist—as holding, to a first approximation, that evaluative facts are grounded purely in facts about the evaluative attitudes of the creatures to whom they apply—reconciles his vehement declarations that nothing is valuable in itself with his passionate expressions of a particular evaluative perspective and injunctions for the free spirits to create new values. Drawing on (...)
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  7. The Nature of Epistemic Feelings.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (2):1-19.
    Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...)
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  8.  3
    What is Adaptive About Adaptive Decision Making? A Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Account.Andreas Glöckner, Benjamin E. Hilbig & Marc Jekel - 2014 - Cognition 133 (3):641-666.
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  9.  1
    Thinking About Thinking: Implications of the Introspective Error for Default-Interventionist Type Models of Dual Processes.Laura F. Mega & Kirsten G. Volz - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  10.  17
    Unconscious Influences on Decision Making: A Critical Review.Ben R. Newell & David R. Shanks - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):1-19.
  11.  21
    The Speed of Metacognition: Taking Time to Get to Know One's Structural Knowledge.Andy D. Mealor & Zoltan Dienes - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):123-136.
    The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure , and guess responses were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. (...)
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  12.  24
    The Rationality of Different Kinds of Intuitive Decision Processes.Marc Jekel, Andreas Glöckner, Susann Fiedler & Arndt Bröder - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):147-160.
    Whereas classic work in judgment and decision making has focused on the deviation of intuition from rationality, more recent research has focused on the performance of intuition in real-world environments. Borrowing from both approaches, we investigate to which extent competing models of intuitive probabilistic decision making overlap with choices according to the axioms of probability theory and how accurate those models can be expected to perform in real-world environments. Specifically, we assessed to which extent heuristics, models implementing weighted additive information (...)
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  13.  4
    Conscious and Unconscious Thought in Artificial Grammar Learning.Andy David Mealor & Zoltan Dienes - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):865-874.
    Unconscious Thought Theory posits that a period of distraction after information acquisition leads to unconscious processing which enhances decision making relative to conscious deliberation or immediate choice . Support thus far has been mixed. In the present study, artificial grammar learning was used in order to produce measurable amounts of conscious and unconscious knowledge. Intermediate phases were introduced between training and testing. Participants engaged in conscious deliberation of grammar rules, were distracted for the same period of time, or progressed immediately (...)
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    The Role of Intuition and Deliberative Thinking in Experts' Superior Tactical Decision-Making.Jerad H. Moxley, K. Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness & Ralf T. Krampe - 2012 - Cognition 124 (1):72-78.
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  15.  88
    Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and Rationality in Moral Judgement.Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.
    Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance (...)
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  16.  65
    Homo Heuristicus Outnumbered: Comment on Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009).Benjamin E. Hilbig & Tobias Richter - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (1):187-196.
    Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) have argued for a “Homo heuristicus” view of judgment and decision making, claiming that there is evidence for a majority of individuals using fast and frugal heuristics. In this vein, they criticize previous studies that tested the descriptive adequacy of some of these heuristics. In addition, they provide a reanalysis of experimental data on the recognition heuristic that allegedly supports Gigerenzer and Brighton’s view of pervasive reliance on heuristics. However, their arguments and reanalyses are both conceptually (...)
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