Pedagogical situations require white lies: in teaching philosophy we make decisions about what to omit, what to emphasise, and what to distort. This article considers when it is permissible to distort the historical record, arguing for a tempered respect for the historical facts. It focuses on the rationalist/empiricist distinction, which still frames most undergraduate early modern courses despite failing to capture the intellectual history of that period. It draws an analogy with Michael Strevens's view on idealisation in causal explanation to (...) distinguish between myths and caricatures. Myths are distortions of the historical record that undermine students' understanding of the past, despite having other pedagogical benefits. Caricatures are distortions that either increase or are indifferent to understanding of the past. Mythmaking, the article argues, is unjustified. (shrink)

Although the notion of empiricism looms large in many histories of early modern philosophy, its origins are not well understood. This paper aims to shed light on them. It examines the notions of empirical philosopher, physician, and politician that are employed in a range of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century texts, alongside related notions (e.g. "experimental philosophy") and methodological stances. It concludes that the notion of empiricism used in many histories of early modern thought does not have pre-Kantian origins. It first appeared (...) and became widely used in late eighteenth-century Germany, in the course of the early debates on Kant's Critical philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A restricted interpretation of Humean methodology understands his experimentalism solely in terms of reducing epistemic statements to private sensory impressions accessible via introspection. My aim is to revise this interpretation by means of criticizing the connection it establishes between the maxim of not going beyond experience and the copy principle. I will show that this interpretation is inconsistent with the way Hume conceives the experimental method, since there is textual evidence to affirm that experience should not be understood in (...) terms of sensory impressions only, and that the science of human nature is not restricted to the study of the mental contents only, but it is nourished in the same way by the observation of social interaction. Finally, I will argue that the method Hume proposes does not prevent intersubjective verification of the empirical evidence, since the principle of sympathy enables the communication of mental states, which makes them devoid of their private character. (shrink)

U radu identificiramo transformacije od individualizacije i lokalizacije praksi nad konkretnom tjelesnošću do zbirnih političkih praksi nad tijelom-populacijom. Na taj način otvaramo genealoški, a ne historicistički pristup problemu erozije paleosimbolike i pojave diskurzivnosti tijela kroz diskontinuitet tijela i teksta. U procesima sveopće društvene deritualizacije, a ponajprije javne komunikacije, koja označava racionalizaciju zapadnjačkog društva, krajem 18. stoljeća pojavile su se nove forme iskaza: medicinski, psihijatrijski, pravni, pedagoški, psihološki, koji se grupiraju u tekst/znanje/moć. Oslanjajući se na analitiku moći Michela Foucaulta, u radu (...) analiziramo način na koji se paralelno s procesom deritualizacije kažnjavanja tijela deritualizirala čitava praksa iskazivanja: kroz pojavu nove tehnologije koja je bila uspostavljena putem mehanizama moći čiji su ulog bila ljudska tijela. U radu zaključujemo da jedna od genealoških linija umnožavanja praksi razdvajanja tijela i teksta od kraja 18. stoljeća vodi k jednom novom tijelu – k društvu. (shrink)