Clinical fields of the “sciences of the mind” (psychotherapy, psychiatry, etc.) lack integrative conceptual frameworks that have explanatory power. Mainly descriptive-classificatory taxonomies like DSM dominate the field. New taxonomies such as Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) aim to collect scientific knowledge regarding “systems” for “processes” of the brain. These terms have a supradisciplinary” meaning if they are considered in context of Systems Science. This field emerges as a platform of theories like general systems theory, catastrophe theory, synergetics, chaos theory, etc. It (...) provides a lot of abstract concepts, constructs, methods and models. We assume that these tools also enable theoretical integration in the diversified field of clinical practice in the sciences of the mind. Additionally, systems thinking in clinical psychology improves conceptual links to currently network-oriented neurobiology. However, clear definitions of systemic terms are necessary to emerge from their mainly metaphorical use. Here we revise mainly terms like “structure”, “process” and “dynamics” as they are used already in psychology, psychoanalysis, psychopathology and psychiatry in an ill-defined way. For instance, affective-cognitive structures like “life space” or “object representations” can be seen as products of mental processing. These structures, in turn, modulate dynamics of mental processes. Additionally, we suggest a coupled network concept of emotions and motivations as the main subsystem that modulates mental dynamics that results in a qualitative systemic model of the mind. Finally, we assume that a revisited systemic approach could improve interdisciplinary understanding of the mental. ystem for mental dynamics. In this context, we assume that a revisited systemic approach could improve interdisciplinary understanding of the mental. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of the object of psychology in the context of recent attempts in philosophy of mind to restore the concept of the soul in the framework of a strong anthropological dualism. After an historical and philosophical explanation of the modern dismissal of the human soul as the object of psychology, this article provides a critical examination of the new turn to dualism by reference to an exemplary case. It is shown that apriorism and spiritualism are the (...) two fundamental problems that explain neodualism’s inefficacy to provide a convincing argument for the restoration of the substantial soul as the object of psychology. Finally, certain guidelines for a new approach to this question are proposed in rudimentary form. (shrink)

A widespread perspective describes emotions as distinct categories bridged by fuzzy boundaries, indicating that emotions are distinct and dimensional at the same time. Theoretical and methodological approaches to this perspective still need further development. We conceptualize emotions as overlapping networks of causal relationships between emotion components—networks representing distinct emotions share components with and relate to each other. To investigate this conceptualization, we introduce network analysis to emotion research and apply it to the reanalysis of a data set on multiple positive (...) emotions. Specifically, we describe the estimation of networks from data, and the detection of overlapping communities of nodes in these networks. The network perspective has implications for the understanding of distinct emotions, their co-occurrence, and their measurement. (shrink)

The bipolar type systems in the sense ofKretschmer, Jaensch, Jung and psychology of form current in presentday psychology are subjected to criticism from the point of view of their practical utility for the diagnosis of human beings, since they are unable to do justice to the complexity of human nature. The author sees two chief problems in the concept of type. According to their function, types are comparable with ultimate forms in which conclusions are drawn from a number of familiar (...) characteristics as to the simultaneous occurrence of the remaining characteristics which are more difficult to apprehend empirically. Their nature places types in close analogy to forms and melodies. Assignment to certain types is not a mere classification, but a heuristic speculation. The response of primitive organisms to complexes of characteristics represents a phylogenetically older form of typological conclusion. Special emphasis is laid upon the intimate relation existing between the typological method of apprehension and the active side of organisms. Brief reference is made to the way in which types can be statistically derived, the apriority problem of the type and the transmission of types by heredity.Les systèmes de types bipolaires usuels dans la psychologie actuelle d'aprèsKretschmer, Jaensch etJung et la psychologie de la structure de formes sont soumis à une critique établie du point de vue de son application pratique au diagnostic humain, car ils ne permettent pas de venir à bout de la nature humaine. L'auteur voit dans la notion des types deux problèmes principaux: d'après leur fonction les types sont comparables à des syllogismes dans lesquelles à l'intérieur d'une série de caractères associés on déduit d'un certain nombre de caractères connus la présence de caractères individuels difficiles à saisir empiriquement. D'après leur nature les types sont en analogie avec les figures et les mélodies. L'ordonnancement des types n'est pas une simple classification mais une entreprise heuristique. La recherche des complexes de caractères dans les organismes primitifs représente une forme phylogénétiquement ancienne de la déduction typologique. La relation étroite entre le mode de conception typologique et la manière d'agir des organismes est particulièrement souligné. La déductibilité statistique, la question d'apriorité des types et leur hérédité sont brièvement effleurées. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the study of the emotions in Edith Stein’s early work On the Problem of Empathy. After presenting her work embedded in the tradition of the early phenomenology of the emotions, I shall elaborate the four dimensions of the emotional experience according to this authoress, the link between emotions and values and the phenomenon of the living body. I argue that Stein’s account on empathy remains incomplete as long as we ignore the complex phenomenology of emotions (...) underlying her work. (shrink)

The dualism of emic and etic plays a crucial role in the emergence of three culturally informed approaches of psychology: cross-cultural psychology , cultural psychology and indigenous psychologies , a distinction largely accepted nowadays. Similarities and/or differences between these positions are usually discussed either on the level of phenomena or theory. In this paper, however, the discussion takes place on a meta-theoretical or epistemological level, which is also emerging elsewhere. In following several earlier papers of the author, first, four perspectives (...) are distinguished that underlie present day psychology. Second, these are used as a framework for linking them to the three “camps”. This analysis will show that these perspectives are characterized by different underlying worldviews, interests as well as methodical preferences. Third, it is claimed that this level of discussion is quite fruitful for the ongoing discourse on the three camps, but also helps one to understand, why the duality between emic and etic approaches is—implicitly or explicitly—at the core of these discussions, because their relevance turns out to differ in the three camps. In that sense, the emic/etic duality is used here as a “litmus test” to exemplify these deeper differences between the camps, thereby highlighting them. Fourth, in order to overcome not only the dilemma between the unique and general in psychology, but also to clarify the relation between the individual and culture it is proposed that psychology should take human action as its unit of analysis, thereby connecting historically to the early beginnings of psychology at the end of the 19th century. It will be argued that a culture inclusive action theory may overcome this tension and may help to integrate western and other indigenous psychologies, and hence it could be advantageous to integrate CP and IPs as well. This is possible because the proposed theory hopefully provides a universal framework for psychological concepts, yet allows for their culture specific expression. (shrink)