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  1. Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate.Francesco Guala - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (1):1-15.
    Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms – “strong” and “weak” reciprocity – that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning (...)
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  • Triangulation across the lab, the scanner and the field: the case of social preferences.Jaakko Kuorikoski & Caterina Marchionni - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (3):361-376.
    This paper deals with the evidential value of neuroeconomic experiments for the triangulation of economically relevant phenomena. We examine the case of social preferences, which involves bringing together evidence from behavioural experiments, neuroeconomic experiments, and observational studies from other social sciences. We present an account of triangulation and identify the conditions under which neuroeconomic evidence is diverse in the way required for successful triangulation. We also show that the successful triangulation of phenomena does not necessarily afford additional confirmation to general (...)
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  • Esistono le convenzioni di Lewis?Francesco Guala - 2009 - Rivista di Estetica 41:141-159.
    Sei seduto di fronte allo schermo di un computer. Utilizzando il mouse, puoi scegliere fra due bottoni di colore (da sinistra a destra) Rosso e Blu. Nel frattempo altri due giocatori stanno affrontando la stessa decisione. Se sceglierete lo stesso colore, guadagnerete ciascuno dieci gettoni sperimentali, che saranno convertiti in denaro alla fine dell’esperimento. Purtroppo dovrete decidere simultaneamente, senza la possibilità di comunicare con gli altri membri del gruppo. Sai anche che ripe...
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  • Are there Lewis conventions?Francesco Guala - 2008
    David Lewis famously proposed to model conventions as solutions to coordination games, where equilibrium selection is driven by precedence, or the history of play. A characteristic feature of Lewis Conventions is that they are intrinsically nonnormative. Some philosophers have argued that for this reason they miss a crucial aspect of our folk notion of convention. It is doubtful however that Lewis was merely analysing a folk concept. I illustrate how his theory can (and must) be assessed using empirical data, and (...)
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