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K. Brad Wray (2009). The Epistemic Cultures of Science and WIKIPEDIA: A Comparison.

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  1. Trustworthiness and Truth: The Epistemic Pitfalls of Internet Accountability.Karen Frost-Arnold - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):63-81.
    Since anonymous agents can spread misinformation with impunity, many people advocate for greater accountability for internet speech. This paper provides a veritistic argument that accountability mechanisms can cause significant epistemic problems for internet encyclopedias and social media communities. I show that accountability mechanisms can undermine both the dissemination of true beliefs and the detection of error. Drawing on social psychology and behavioral economics, I suggest alternative mechanisms for increasing the trustworthiness of internet communication.
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    Back to Basics: How Technology and the Open Source Movement Can Save Science.David Koepsell - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (3):181-190.
    The recent debate arising from leaked emails from a UK-based research group working on the issue of climate change is another in a long string of historical lapses that periodically threatens public confidence in the institutions and methods of science. As with other similar events, it did not have to happen. What should concern us is that the accepted methods and practices of science have once again to be shown to be too easily set aside, ignored, or broken due to (...)
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    Epistemic Vigilance and Epistemic Responsibility in the Liquid World of Scientific Publications.Gloria Origgi - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (3):149-159.
    In this paper I try to challenge some received views about the role and the function of the traditional academic practice of publishing papers in peer?reviewed journals. I argue that our publishing practices today are rather based on passively accepted social norms and humdrum work habits than on actual needs for communicating the advancements of our research. By analysing some examples of devices and practices that are based on tacitly accepted norms, such as the Citation Index and the new role (...)
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    Scientific Publications 2.0. The End of the Scientific Paper?Gloria Origgi & Judith Simon - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (3):145-148.
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    A Socio-Epistemological Framework for Scientific Publishing.Judith Simon - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (3):201-218.
    In this paper I propose a new theoretical framework to analyse socio?technical epistemic practices and systems on the Web and beyond, and apply it to the topic of web?based scientific publishing. This framework is informed by social epistemology, science and technology studies (STS) and feminist epistemology. Its core consists of a tripartite classification of socio?technical epistemic systems based on the mechanisms of closure they employ to terminate socio?epistemic processes in which multiple agents are involved. In particular I distinguish three mechanisms (...)
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    The Entanglement of Trust and Knowledge on the Web.Judith Simon - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 12 (4):343-355.
    In this paper I use philosophical accounts on the relationship between trust and knowledge in science to apprehend this relationship on the Web. I argue that trust and knowledge are fundamentally entangled in our epistemic practices. Yet despite this fundamental entanglement, we do not trust blindly. Instead we make use of knowledge to rationally place or withdraw trust. We use knowledge about the sources of epistemic content as well as general background knowledge to assess epistemic claims. Hence, although we may (...)
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