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Crispin Wright (2004). I—Crispin Wright: Warrant for Nothing ?

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  1.  2
    Why Reid Was No Dogmatist.Mark Boespflug - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.
    According to dogmatism, a perceptual experience with p as its content is always a source of justification for the belief that p. Thomas Reid has been an extant source of inspiration for this view. I argue, however, that, though there is a superficial consonance between Reid’s position and that of the dogmatists, their views are, more fundamentally, at variance with one another. While dogmatists take their position to express a necessary epistemic truth, discernible a priori, Reid holds that if something (...)
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  2.  54
    The Intelligibility of Metaphysical Structure.Peter Finocchiaro - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Theories that posit metaphysical structure are able to do much work in philosophy. Some, however, find the notion of ‘metaphysical structure’ unintelligible. In this paper, I argue that their charge of unintelligibility fails. There is nothing distinctively problematic about the notion. At best, their charge of unintelligibility is a mere reiteration of previous complaints made toward similar notions. In developing their charge, I clarify several important concepts, including primitiveness, intelligibility, and the Armstrong-inspired “ontologism” view of the world. I argue that, (...)
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  3.  11
    Inquiry And The Transmission Of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  4.  7
    Failures of Warrant Transmission: The Role of Presupposition.Thomas Lockhart - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    In this paper, I examine Crispin Wright’s most recent attempt to introduce a diagnostic tool for predicting failures of warrant transmission, the so-called ‘Revised Template’. I show that the Revised Template does not, in fact, generate the predictions about warrant transmission failure that Wright thinks it does. I argue that the failure lies, in large part, with the definition of the technical notion ‘presupposition’ which the Revised Template deploys. Through a consideration of Wright’s own ‘general motivation’ for the Revised Template, (...)
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  5.  8
    Fundamental Disagreements and the Limits of Instrumentalism.John Pittard - forthcoming - Synthese.
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  6. Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:110-133.
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...)
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  7.  7
    World‐Pictures and Wittgensteinian Certainty.Hiroshi Ohtani - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (1-2):115-136.
    Although certainty is a fundamental notion in epistemology, it is less studied in contemporary analytic epistemology than other important notions such as knowledge or justification. This paper focuses on Wittgensteinian certainty, according to which the very basic dimension of our epistemic practices, the elements of our world-pictures, are objectively certain, in that we cannot legitimately doubt them. The aim of the paper is to offer the best philosophical way to clarify Wittgensteinian certainty, in a way that is consonant with Wittgenstein's (...)
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  8.  10
    Précis of Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):217-234.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 217 - 234 The paper presents the key themes of my _Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology_. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, epistemic relativism, the closure principle, the transmission of warrant principle, as well as on the applications of the extended rationality view to the case of the principle of the uniformity of nature, testimony, and the justification of basic laws (...)
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  9.  6
    Moore’s Proof, Perception, and Scepticism.Simon Dierig - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):552-576.
    _ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 4, pp 552 - 576 Two major arguments have been advanced for the claim that there is a transmission failure in G.E. Moore’s famous proof of an external world. The first argument, due to Crispin Wright, is based on an epistemological doctrine now known as ‘conservatism’. Proponents of the second argument, like Nicholas Silins, invoke probabilistic considerations, most important among them Bayes’ theorem. The aim of this essay is to defend Moore’s proof against these two (...)
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  10.  2
    Intuition et lois logiques.Patrice Philie - 2017 - Philosophiques 44 (1):73-83.
    PATRICE PHILIE | : Cet article a pour objectif d’examiner le rôle des intuitions dans le cadre du problème de la justification des lois logiques de base. Une revue des différentes conceptions de l’intuition permet de mettre les choses en place et d’identifier la conception qui convient le mieux au problème — c’est une conception modale qui sera retenue. Je soumettrai ensuite cette conception à un examen critique, lequel se fera en deux temps. D’une part, il s’agira de montrer la (...)
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  11.  32
    Faith and Reason.Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81:101-118.
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  12.  41
    Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):211-224.
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  13.  30
    How to Perceive Reasons.Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):77-88.
    This paper deals with the question whether, and to what extent, perceptions can provide a justification for our empirical beliefs. In particular, it addresses the issue of whether they need to be conceptualized by a subject in order to play a justificatory role. It is argued that the conditions under which a subject can have perceptual representational contents and those under which those representational contents can play a justificatory role differ. The upshot is that perception can provide justification only for (...)
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  14.  1
    Creencia no evidencial y certeza vital.Rafael Miranda Rojas - 2016 - Estudios de Filosofía 53.
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  15.  1
    Mediated Confirmation.Tomoji Shogenji - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv053.
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  16.  64
    How You Know You Are Not a Brain in a Vat.Alexander Jackson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2799-2822.
    A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a brain in a vat ; but she doesn’t panic. She sticks with her empirical beliefs, and as that requires, believes that she is not a BIV. (She does not inferentially base her belief that she is not a BIV on her empirical knowledge—she rejects that ‘Moorean’ response to skepticism.) Drawing on the psychological literature on metacognition, I describe a mechanism that’s plausibly responsible for a sensible (...)
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  17.  35
    Hinge Commitments Vis-À-Vis the Transmission Problem.Ladislav Koreň - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2513-2534.
    This study provides a critical appraisal of Duncan Pritchard’s argument to the effect that ability to preserve certain eminently plausible transmission and/or closure principles for knowledge serves as a powerful adequacy test on alternative accounts of so-called Wittgensteinian certainties or hinge commitments. I argue that Pritchard fails to establish this claim—the transmission test does not favour his favourite conception over alternative conceptions premised on the idea that hinge commitments are not supportable via evidential-cognitive routes.
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  18. Ornelas, Jorge; Cíntora, Armando . Dudas filosóficas. Ensayos sobre escepticismo antiguo, moderno y contemporáneo. México, Barcelona: UAM-Gedisa, 2014. 424 pp. [REVIEW]Vicente Raga Rosaleny - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (157):282-287.
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  19. Memory, Belief and Time.Brian Weatherson - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):692-715.
    I argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius’s Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.
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  20. What is Reliance?Facundo M. Alonso - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):163-183.
    In this article I attempt to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about reliance in a systematic way. I argue that reliance is a cognitive attitude that has a tighter connection to the guidance of our thought and action than ordinary belief does. My main thesis is that reliance has a ‘constitutive aim’: namely, it aims at guiding our thought and action in a way that is sensible from the standpoint of practical or theoretical ends. This helps explain why reliance (...)
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  21. What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
    If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source’s testimony on the matter of that source’s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity—bootstrapping and self-verification—I argue for a qualified version of (...)
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  22.  37
    Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):597-645.
    Although there has been a recent swell of interest in theories of truth that attempt solutions to the liar paradox and the other paradoxes affecting our concept of truth, many of these theories have been criticized for generating new paradoxes, called revenge paradoxes. The criticism is that the theories of truth in question are inadequate because they only work for languages lacking in the resources to generate revenge paradoxes. Theorists facing these objections offer a range of replies, and the matter (...)
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  23. If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.
    Perceptual dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P. But suppose Wishful Willy's desire for gold cognitively penetrates his perceptual experience and makes it seem to him that the yellow object is a gold nugget. Intuitively, his desire-penetrated seeming can't provide him with prima facie justification for thinking that the object is gold. If this intuitive response is correct, dogmatists have a problem. But if dogmatists have a (...)
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  24.  71
    Justification Magnets.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):93-111.
    David Lewis is associated with the controversial thesis that some properties are more eligible than others to be the referents of our predicates solely in virtue of those properties’ being more natural; independently, that is, of anything to do with our patterns of usage of the relevant predicates. On such a view, the natural properties act as ‘reference magnets’. In this paper I explore (though I do not endorse) a related thesis in epistemology: that some propositions are ‘justification magnets’. According (...)
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  25.  26
    Entitlement and Epistemic Upgrading.Alexander C. R. Oldemeier - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):436-446.
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  26. Bootstrap and Rollback: Generalizing Epistemic Circularity.Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):395-413.
    Reliabilists accept the possibility of basic knowledge—knowledge that p in virtue of the reliability of some belief-producing process r without antecedent knowledge that r is reliable. Cohen (Philos Phenomenol Res 65:309–329, 2002 , Philos Phenomenol Res 70:417–430, 2005 ) and Vogel (J Philos 97:602–623, 2000 , J Philos 105:518–539, 2008 ) have argued that one can bootstrap knowledge that r is reliable from basic knowledge. This paper provides a diagnosis of epistemic bootstrapping, and then shows that recent attempts at embracing (...)
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  27.  1
    This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox. Atkins - 2011 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):421.
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  28. Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
    What is the nature of the evidence provided by thought experiments in philosophy? For instance, what evidence is provided by the Gettier thought experiment against the JTB theory of knowledge? According to one view, it provides as evidence only a certain psychological proposition, e.g. that it seems to one that the subject in the Gettier case lacks knowledge. On an alternative, nonpsychological view, the Gettier thought experiment provides as evidence the nonpsychological proposition that the subject in the Gettier case lacks (...)
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  29.  14
    Introduction: The Providential Bad Luck of Justification.Anne Meylan - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):483-491.
  30. Moorean Responses to Skepticism: A Defense. [REVIEW]Tim Willenken - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.
    Few philosophers believe that G. E. Moore's notorious proof of an external world can give us justification to believe that skepticism about perceptual beliefs is false. The most prominent explanation of what is wrong with Moore's proof—as well as some structurally similar anti-skeptical arguments—centers on conservatism: roughly, the view that someone can acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of E only if he has p-independent justification to believe that all of the skeptical hypotheses that undermine the support (...)
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  31. Frictional Coherentism? A Comment on Chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa's Reflective Knowledge.Crispin Wright - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):29-41.
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  32.  25
    Pragmatic Scruples and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (3):365-380.
    ABSTRACT: Cheryl Misak has offered a pragmatic argument against a position she calls Scientific transcendentalists hold that truth is something different from what would be believed at the end of inquiry; more specifically, they adhere to a correspondence theory of truth. Misak thinks scientific transcendentalists thereby undermine the connection between truth and inquiry, for (a) pragmatically speaking, it adds nothing to truth and inquiry to ask whether what would be the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry are really true and (b) (...)
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  33. Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and a Priori Justification.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.
  34.  86
    Not Enough There There: Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):477-528.
    Begins by explaining then proving a generalized language dependence result similar to Goodman's "grue" problem. I then use this result to cast doubt on the existence of an objective evidential favoring relation (such as "the evidence confirms one hypothesis over another," "the evidence provides more reason to believe one hypothesis over the other," "the evidence justifies one hypothesis over the other," etc.). Once we understand what language dependence tells us about evidential favoring, our options are an implausibly strong conception of (...)
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  35.  10
    I—Duncan Pritchard: Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
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  36. Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
    It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy.
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