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Crispin Wright (ed.) (2001). Rails to Infinity.

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  1.  8
    A Quantum Measurement Paradigm for Educational Predicates: Implications for Validity in Educational Measurement.Ian Cantley - 2017 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 49 (4).
    The outcomes of educational assessments undoubtedly have real implications for students, teachers, schools and education in the widest sense. Assessment results are, for example, used to award qualifications that determine future educational or vocational pathways of students. The results obtained by students in assessments are also used to gauge individual teacher quality, to hold schools to account for the standards achieved by their students, and to compare international education systems. Given the current high-stakes nature of educational assessment, it is imperative (...)
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  2.  15
    Wittgenstein: Opening Investigations.Alexander Miller - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266).
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  3. What is the Normativity of Meaning?Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):219-238.
    There has been much debate over whether to accept the claim that meaning is normative. One obstacle to making progress in that debate is that it is not always clear what the claim amounts to. In this paper, I try to resolve a dispute between those who advance the claim concerning how it should be understood. More specifically, I critically examine two competing conceptions of the normativity of meaning, rejecting one and defending the other. Though the paper aims to settle (...)
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  4.  27
    Wittgenstein on Knowledge: A Critique.Raquel Krempel - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):723-734.
    My goal here is to assess whether Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical conception of a descriptive philosophy is in accordance with his philosophical practice. I argue that Wittgenstein doesn’t really limit himself to description when he criticizes Moore’s use of the verb “to know”. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues that Moore’s claims of knowledge are at odds with the everyday use of the verb “to know”, because, among other things, they don’t allow the possibility of justification. That is, Wittgenstein considers that proper, everyday (...)
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  5.  43
    Blind Rule-Following and the ‘Antinomy of Pure Reason’.Alexander Miller - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):396-416.
  6.  38
    Rule-Following and Consciousness: Old Problem or New?Alexander Miller & Ali Saboohi - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):171-178.
    It has recently been claimed that there is a “new hard problem” for physicalism. The new hard problem, according to Goff, is based on “semantic phenomenology”, the view that conscious perceptual experience represents linguistic expressions as having determinate meanings. Goff argues that Kripke’s rule-following argument demonstrates that it is particularly difficult for a physicalist to account for semantic phenomenology. In this paper, we argue that Goff’s discussion of semantic phenomenology fails to uncover a “new” hard problem for physicalism and there (...)
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  7.  35
    The Social Roots of Normativity.Glenda Satne - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):673-682.
    This paper introduces the Special Issue: ‘The Roots of Normativity. Developmental, Comparative and Conceptual issues’. The contributions collected in this volume aim to present a picture of contemporary accounts of normativity that integrate philosophy and developmental and comparative psychology and purport to provide the reader with new insights regarding a classical debate about what makes us human: being governed by norms and being able to orient ourselves in the light of them. This introduction presents a broad picture of the issues (...)
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  8.  59
    Horwich on Natural and Non-Natural Meaning.Steffen Borge - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (2):229-253.
    Paul Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning (UTM) depends on his rejection of Paul Grice’s distinction between natural and non-natural meaning and his Univocality of Meaning Thesis, as he wishes to deflate the meaning-relation to usage. Horwich’s programme of deflating the meaning-relation (i.e. how words, sentences, etc., acquire meaning) to some basic regularity of usage cannot be carried through if the meaning-relation depends on the minds of users. Here, I first give a somewhat detailed account of the distinction between natural and (...)
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  9. Kierkegaard and the Search for Self‐Knowledge.Daniel Watts - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):525-549.
    In the first part of this essay (Sections I and II), I argue that Kierkegaard's work helps us to articulate and defend two basic requirements on searching for knowledge of one's own judgements: first, that searching for knowledge whether one judges that P requires trying to make a judgement whether P; and second that, in an important range of cases, searching for knowledge of one's own judgements requires attending to how one's acts of judging are performed. In the second part (...)
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  10. How We Know What We Intend.Sarah K. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
    How do we know what our intentions are? It is argued that work on self-knowledge has tended to neglect the attitude of intention, and that an epistemological account is needed that is attuned to the specific features of that state. Richard Moran’s Authorship view, on which we can acquire self-knowledge by making up our minds, offers a promising insight for such an account: we do not normally discover what we intend through introspection. However, his formulation of the Authorship view, developed (...)
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  11. Self-Knowledge and Commitments.Annalisa Coliva - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):365 - 375.
    In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive (...)
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  12.  33
    The Duck Quacks Back: A Reply to A. Minh Nguyen.Rockney Jacobsen - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):655.
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  13.  51
    Primary Qualities, Secondary Qualities and the Truth About Intention.Alexander Miller - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):433 - 442.
    In this paper I will argue that Crispin Wright’s defence of the claim that the truth about intention is judgement-dependent is unstable because it can serve also to establish that the truth about shape is judgement-dependent, thereby violating his constraint that in developing the distinction between judgement-independent and judgement-dependent subject matters we have to be driven by the assumption that colour and shape will fall on different sides of the divide.
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  14.  48
    On the Division Between Reason and Unreason in Kant.Motohide Saji - 2009 - Human Studies 32 (2):201-223.
    This article examines Kant’s discussion of the division between reason and unreason in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View . On the one hand, Kant says that there is a normative, clear, and definite division between reason and unreason. On the other hand, Kant offers three arguments showing that we cannot draw such a division. First, we cannot explain the normative grounds for the division. Second, both reason and unreason are present in everyone to varying degrees in different (...)
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  15. On the Copernican Turn in Semantics.Cesare Cozzo - 2008 - Theoria 74 (4):295-317.
    Alberto Coffa used the phrase "the Copernican turn in semantics" to denote a revolutionary transformation of philosophical views about the connection between the meanings of words and the acceptability of sentences and arguments containing those words. According to the new conception resulting from the Copernican turn, here called "the Copernican view", rules of use are constitutive of the meanings of words. This view has been linked with two doctrines: (A) the instances of meaning-constitutive rules are analytically and a priori true (...)
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  16.  85
    Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language.Craig Stephen Delancey - 2007 - Synthese 154 (2):231-257.
    I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful (...)
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  17. Rule-Following Without Reasons: Wittgenstein's Quietism and the Constitutive Question.Crispin Wright - 2007 - Ratio 20 (4):481–502.
    This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct issues about (...)
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  18.  63
    Between Primitivism and Naturalism: Brandom's Theory of Meaning.Daniel Whiting - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (3):3-22.
    Many philosophers accept that a naturalistic reduction of meaning is in principle impossible, since behavioural regularities or dispositions are consistent with any number of semantic descriptions. One response is to view meaning as primitive. In this paper, I explore Brandom’s alternative, which is to specify behaviour in non-semantic but normative terms. Against Brandom, I argue that a norm specified in non-semantic terms might correspond to any number of semantic norms. Thus, his theory of meaning suffers from the very same kind (...)
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  19.  2
    Wright Et la Naturalisation de L'Intentionnalité. Étude Critique de Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth & Objectivity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, 549 Pages.Étude Critique de Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth & Objectivity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, 549 Pages. [REVIEW]Patrice Philie - 2004 - Philosophiques 31 (2):417-429.
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