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Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity.

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  1.  16
    Subjectivism, Instrumentalism, and Prudentialism About Reasons: On the Normativity of Instrumental Transmission.Arash Abizadeh - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    According to a subjectivist theory, normative reasons are grounded in facts about our desires. According to an instrumentalist theory, reasons are grounded also in facts about the relevant means to desired objects. These are distinct theories. The widespread tendency to conflate the normativity of subjective and instrumentalist precepts obscures two facts. First, instrumentalist precepts incorporate a subjective element with an objective one. Second, combining these elements into a single theory of normative reasons requires explaining how and why they are to (...)
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  2.  54
    Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
    Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism (EAP) is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright's Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar (...)
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  3.  24
    The Metaphysics of Truth, by Douglas Edwards.Mark Jago - forthcoming - Mind:fzy066.
    The Metaphysics of Truth, by EdwardsDouglas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 208.
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  4.  11
    The Function of Modal Judgment and the Kantian Gap.Jessica Leech - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    What is the function of modal judgment? Why do we make judgments of possibility and necessity? Or are such judgments, in fact, dispensable? This paper introduces and develops an answer to these questions based on Kant’s remarks in section 76 of the Critique of Judgment. Here, Kant appears to argue the following: that a capacity to make modal judgments using modal concepts is required for a capacity for objective representation, in light of our split cognitive architecture. This split cognitive architecture (...)
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  5.  12
    Theorizing About Truth Outside of One’s Own Language.Graham Seth Moore - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    A theory of truth is language-transcendent if it ascribes truth conditions to truth-bearers that are not expressible in (or translatable to) our natural language; a theory is language-immanent if it is not language-transcendent. In this paper, I argue for the following theses. (1) Whether the correct theory of truth is language-transcendent or language-immanent will have significant consequences for general philosophy. Prima facie, a language-transcendent theory is preferable. However, (2) language-transcendent theories tend to require substantive metaphysical commitments concerning truth. Deflationist theories (...)
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  6.  19
    Classical Harmony and Separability.Julien Murzi - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    According to logical inferentialists, the meanings of logical expressions are fully determined by the rules for their correct use. Two key proof-theoretic requirements on admissible logical rules, harmony and separability, directly stem from this thesis—requirements, however, that standard single-conclusion and assertion-based formalizations of classical logic provably fail to satisfy :1035–1051, 2011). On the plausible assumption that our logical practice is both single-conclusion and assertion-based, it seemingly follows that classical logic, unlike intuitionistic logic, can’t be accounted for in inferentialist terms. In (...)
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  7.  46
    An Account of Truthmaking.Noël Blas Saenz - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    In this paper, I both propose and discuss a novel account of truthmaking. I begin by showing what truthmaking is not: it is not grounding and it is not correspondence. I then show what truthmaking is by offering an account that appeals both to grounding and what I call ‘deep correspondence’. After I present the account and show that it is an account that unifies, I put it to work by showing how it can overcome an objection to truthmaking, how (...)
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  8.  9
    Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism.Graham Bex-Priestley - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1051-1063.
    If ethical expressivism is true, then moral judgements are motivational desire-like states and do not robustly represent reality. This gives rise to the problem of how to understand moral error. How can we be mistaken if there is no moral reality to be mistaken about? The standard expressivist explanation of moral doubt is couched in terms of our fear that our judgements may not survive improvements to our epistemic situation. There is a debate between Egan :205–219, 2007), Blackburn :201–213, 2009), (...)
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  9.  99
    Truth: Explanation, Success, and Coincidence.Will Gamester - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1243-1265.
    Inflationists have argued that truth is a causal-explanatory property on the grounds that true belief facilitates practical success: we must postulate truth to explain the practical success of certain actions performed by rational agents. Deflationists, however, have a seductive response. Rather than deny that true belief facilitates practical success, the deflationist maintains that the sole role for truth here is as a device for generalisation. In particular, each individual instance of practical success can be explained only by reference to a (...)
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  10.  22
    Perspectival Representation and Fallacies in Metaethics.Max Kölbel - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):379-404.
    The prevailing theoretical framework for theorising about representation construes all representation as involving objective representational contents. This classic framework has tended to drive philosophers either to claim that evaluative judgements are representations and therefore objective, or else to claim that evaluative judgements are not really representations, because they are not objective. However, a more general, already well-explored framework is available, which will allow theorists to treat evaluative judgements as full-fledged representations while leaving open whether they are objective. Such a more (...)
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  11. Truth and Assertion: Rules Vs Aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.
    There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. Puzzlingly, both views are supported by equally plausible (but apparently incompatible) linguistic data. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion, and pair this view with a non-factive rule. The resulting account is able to explain all the relevant linguistic data, (...)
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  12.  78
    A Notion of Logical Concept Based on Plural Reference.Carrara Massimiliano & Martino Enrico - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):19-33.
    In To be is to be the object of a possible act of choice the authors defended Boolos’ thesis that plural quantification is part of logic. To this purpose, plural quantification was explained in terms of plural reference, and a semantics of plural acts of choice, performed by an ideal team of agents, was introduced. In this paper, following that approach, we develop a theory of concepts that—in a sense to be explained—can be labeled as a theory of logical concepts. (...)
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  13.  29
    Contractualism as Restricted Constructivism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):571-579.
    Metaethics is often dominated by both realist views according to which moral claims are made true by either non-natural or natural properties and by non-cognitivist views according to which these claims express desire-like attitudes. It is sometimes suggested that constructivism is a fourth alternative, but it has remained opaque just how it differs from the other views. To solve this problem, this article first describes a clear constructivist theory based on Crispin Wright’s anti-realism. It then outlines an argumentative strategy that (...)
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  14.  2
    Conversations About Taste, Contextualism, and Non-Doxastic Attitudes.Marián Zouhar - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (3):429-460.
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  15.  63
    Making Sense of Logical Pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    The article is centered on the question of how best to understand the logical pluralism/logical monism debate. A number of suggestions are brought up and rejected on the ground that they render the debate trivial or otherwise philosophically uninteresting. One way to make philosophical good sense of the debate is to find a canonical purpose for logic such that the monist is someone who holds that some unique logic best serves this purpose and the pluralist holds that many logics do. (...)
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  16.  33
    Logical Pluralism and Normativity.Teresa Kouri Kissel & Stewart Shapiro - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications for our pluralism concerning normativity. Is there any normative role for logic, once we give up its universality? We discuss Florian Steingerger’s “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic” as a source for possible types of normativity, and then turn to our own proposal, which postulates that (...)
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  17. You Don't Say! Lying, Asserting and Insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an assertion is, and what can make it insincere. Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be false, or unwarranted): in the (...)
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  18.  41
    Lessons on Truth From Kant.Gila Sher - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):171-201.
    Kant is known for having said relatively little about truth in Critique of Pure Reason. Nevertheless, there are important lessons to be learned from this work about truth, lessons that apply to the contemporary debate on the nature and structure of truth and its theory. In this paper I suggest two such lessons. The first lesson concerns the structure of a substantive theory of truth as contrasted with a deflationist theory; the second concerns the structure of a correspondence theory of (...)
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  19.  25
    Normativity for Alethic-Logical Pluralists.Andy Demfree Yu - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    Differences among scientific, mathematical, and ethical subject matters motivate a pluralism where distinct domains of subject matter are associated with distinct truth properties and logics. However, it is unclear how such pluralism might accommodate potentially attractive epistemic norms, such as that one ought to believe only what is true, and that one ought to believe what is logically true. In this paper, I show how such pluralism can accommodate such norms by supplementing the account developed in Yu (2017a,b) with epistemic, (...)
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  20. Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:175-191.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth, as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to (...)
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  21.  13
    The Role of the Disquotational Schema in Wittgenstein's Reflections on Truth.Pasquale Frascolla - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (4):205-222.
    In the first paragraph, the focus is on the early Wittgenstein's conception of truth: the Disquotational Schema is shown to be derivable from the semantic and ontological principles of the picture theory. Then, the article scrutinises the way the Disquotational Schema provides the basis for what the later Wittgenstein takes as a philosophically appropriate description of the practice of making assertions. The general abstract notion of truth makes room for a situated notion of warranted assertibility as the key-notion. Last, the (...)
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  22.  6
    Mikko Salmela, True Emotions, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014, 191 Pp., US$135 , ISBN 9789027241597. [REVIEW]Michael Lacewing - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):257-265.
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  23. Deflationism, Conceptual Explanation, and the Truth Asymmetry.David Liggins - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):84-101.
    Ascriptions of truth give rise to an explanatory asymmetry. For instance, we accept ‘ is true because Rex is barking’ but reject ‘Rex is barking because is true’. Benjamin Schnieder and other philosophers have recently proposed a fresh explanation of this asymmetry : they have suggested that the asymmetry has a conceptual rather than a metaphysical source. The main business of this paper is to assess this proposal, both on its own terms and as an option for deflationists. I offer (...)
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  24.  35
    Substantivism About Truth.Gila Sher - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):818-828.
    Substantivism is a general philosophical methodology advocating a substantive approach to philosophical theorizing. In this article, I present an overview of this methodology with a special emphasis on the field of truth. I begin with a framework for understanding what is at stake in the substantivist–deflationist debate and describe the substantivist critique of deflationism. I then proceed to discuss contemporary substantivism as a positive methodology, present examples of recent substantivist theories of truth, delineate several principles of philosophical substantivism, and connect (...)
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  25.  3
    Sobre El Valor de la Verdad. Una Crítica a Richard Rorty.José Andrés Forero Mora - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (157):151-170.
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  26. The Cost of Truthmaker Maximalism.Mark Jago - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):460-474.
    According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. But these theories cannot (...)
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  27. Simplifying Alethic Pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
    What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination (...)
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  28. The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.
    We think of logic as objective. We also think that we are reliable about logic. These views jointly generate a puzzle: How is it that we are reliable about logic? How is it that our logical beliefs match an objective domain of logical fact? This is an instance of a more general challenge to explain our reliability about a priori domains. In this paper, I argue that the nature of this challenge has not been properly understood. I explicate the challenge (...)
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  29.  33
    The Duck Quacks Back: A Reply to A. Minh Nguyen.Rockney Jacobsen - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):655.
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  30.  80
    Legal Positivism and Legal Disagreements.José Juan Moreso - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (1):62-73.
    This paper deals with the possibility of faultless disagreement in law. It does this by looking to other spheres in which faultless disagreement appears to be possible, mainly in matters of taste and ethics. Three possible accounts are explored: the realist account, the relativist account, and the expressivist account. The paper tries to show that in the case of legal disagreements, there is a place for an approach that can take into account our intuitions in the sense that legal disagreements (...)
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  31. A Euthyphronic Problem for Kitcher's Epistemology of Science.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):205-223.
    Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.
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  32. On What It Takes for There to Be No Fact of the Matter.Jody Azzouni & Otávio Bueno - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):753-769.
    Philosophers are very fond of making non-factualist claims—claims to the effect that there is no fact of the matter as to whether something is the case. But can these claims be coherently stated in the context of classical logic? Some care is needed here, we argue, otherwise one ends up denying a tautology or embracing a contradiction. In the end, we think there are only two strategies available to someone who wants to be a non-factualist about something, and remain within (...)
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  33. Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):334-358.
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  34.  1
    The Quest for REALITY.Paul Horwich - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (1):5-16.
    A widespread concern within philosophy has been, and continues to be, to determine which domains of discourse address real, robust, not‐merely‐deflationary facts, and which do not. But a threat to the legitimacy of this concern is the extreme lack of consensus amongst philosophers on the question of how to tell whether or not a given domain is oriented towards ‘robust reality’. The present paper criticizes Kit Fine’s attempt to settle that question. This discussion is followed by some considerations suggesting that (...)
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  35.  2
    Metaethics, Agnosticism, and Logic.Sven Rosenkranz - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):47-61.
    In this paper, I present an argument for the revision of classical logic. The argument is based on the coherence of a metaethical position which is a species of agnosticism. According to this view, the debate between cognitivists and noncognitivists about moral discourse is unresolved. I argue that there is something at stake in this debate and so something one can coherently be agnostic about. The revisionary argument also draws on principles of epistemic closure. I make these principles explicit and (...)
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  36.  33
    Gardiner on Anti-Realism: A Defence of Dummett.Darragh Byrne - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):3-.
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  37.  1
    The Explainability of Intuitions.Nenad Miščević - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):43-70.
    Explaining intuitions in terms of “facts of our natural history” is compatible with rationally trusting them. This compatibilist view is defended in the present paper, focusing upon nomic and essentialist modal intuitions. The opposite, incompatibilist view alleges the following: If basic modal intuitions are due to our cognitive make‐up or “imaginative habits” then the epistemologists are left with a mere non‐rational feeling of compulsion on the side of the thinker. Intuitions then cannot inform us about modal reality. In contrast, the (...)
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  38.  71
    Epistemic Deflationism.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134.
    The aim of this paper is to look at what a parallel deflationist program might be in the theory of knowledge and examine its prospect. In what follows I will simplify matters slightly by focussing on empirical knowledge rather than knowledge in general, though most of what I have to say ought to be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to knowledge in general. Moreover,note that it is not my aim to offer a full defense of a particular deflationist theory of knowledge, which (...)
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  39.  5
    The Theory of Truth in the Theory of Meaning.Gurpreet S. Rattan - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):214-243.
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  40.  45
    On the Proposed Exhaustion of Truth.John Collins - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (4):653.
    Dans la première partie de cet article, je presente une thèse parapluie — la thèse de l'«exhaustion» — qui cerne bien l'élément central des diverses positions déflationnistes au sujet de la vérité : l'idée que le contenu du prédicat de vérité s'épuise entièrement dans le contenu de ce à quoi le prédicats'applique. Je soutiens que cette thèse n'est supportée que d'une manière triviale par l'idée courante que la vérite résiste à une analyse substantielle, car les prédicats en général ne se (...)
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  41.  14
    Two Arguments Against Disquotationalism.Douglas Patterson - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (2):99–108.
    Attempts to argue that the disquotational theory of truth is somehow self‐refuting have appeared largely unchallenged in the literature for some time now. Focusing on presentations by Anil Gupta and Crispin Wright, I contend that such arguments only undermine a view that nobody endorses. This done, I explain why it is fruitless to focus, as these arguments do, on deflationary accounts of the expressive function of the truth‐predicate. I then suggest a strategy for arguing against disquotationalism and other forms of (...)
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  42. Escape From Twin Earth: Putnam's 'Logic' of Natural Kind Terms.Carleton B. Christensen - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):123-150.
    Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , (...)
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  43.  27
    The Pragmatist's Troubles with Bivalence and Counterfactuals.Sean Allen Hermanson - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (4):669-690.
  44.  30
    Rorty, Sorge and Truth.Eva Picardi - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (3):431 – 439.
    Rorty's assessment of the origins of the analytic/continental divide is discussed and criticized on several grounds. Rorty's plea in favour of the philosophical quietism implicit in the pragmatists' dismissal of metaphysics rests on an uncritical faith in scientific progress. To emphasize the tensions implicit in the ideal of progress a novel interpretation of the significance of Faust's encounter with Sorge (Care) is offered and compared with Heidegger's construal of Sorge in Sein und Zeit . A better understanding of the analytic/continental (...)
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  45.  14
    Justification, Truth, and the Development of Science.Stephen Gaukroger - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (1):97-112.