The classical Confucian philosopher Xunzi proposed a naturalistic virtue ethics account of ritual: rituals are practices that channel human emotion and desire so that one develops virtues. In this paper I show that William of Auxerre’s Summa de Officiis Ecclesiasticis can be understood as presenting a similar account of ritual. William places great emphasis on the emotional power of the liturgy, which makes participants like the blessed in heaven by developing virtue. In other words, he has a virtue ethics of (...) ritual closely aligned with that of Xunzi. Xunzi’s writings on ritual illuminate and enrich one’s reading of the Summa de Officiis. But unlike Xunzi, William is not a naturalist with regard to ritual: although much of William’s language about the causal power of liturgy can be explained in Xunzian terms, Christian liturgy has an irreducible supernatural element. (shrink)

Le mot 社群 ( she qun, communauté, au sens de la Gemeinschaft allemande) n’était certes pas une problématique traditionnellement confucéenne. La compréhension éthique générale de la Chine antique reposait sur 三纲五常 ( san gang wu chang ; les trois disciplines et les cinq justes relations interpersonnelles). Les religions, associations et académies non dominantes étaient plus proches du concept de communauté. Les concepts occidentaux modernes de la sociologie ont été introduits pour la première fois en Chine à la fin du xix (...) e siècle, mais les intellectuels les comprenaient certes différemment, en fonction des valeurs traditionnelles locales, et en réponse à la nécessité de renforcer l’État chinois. L’idée moderne de communauté et le concept de société avec lequel on la contrastait n’ont été popularisés en Chine qu’à l’époque de l’industrialisation, à partir de la fin des années 1970. (shrink)

In this paper, I introduce what I call relational virtue and defend it as an important subcategory of virtue. In particular, I argue that it offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate relationships such as parent-child relationship or friendship. After briefly sketching what I mean by relational virtue, I show why it is a virtue and in what sense we can meaningfully distinguish it from other sorts of virtue. I then describe some distinctive features of (...) relational virtue in more detail and discuss their implications. Next, I present filial piety as the paradigmatic example of relational virtue. I argue that a child s being filial should be understood as an appropriate response to her parent s being virtuous as a parent. I conclude by showing how my relational virtue theory of filial piety can avoid the difficulties faced by previous theories of filial piety such as gratitude theory and friendship theory. (shrink)

As recorded in the Analects, Kongzi (Confucius) held that using punishment to influence ordinary citizens will do little to develop a sense of shame (chi 恥) in them. This term is usually taken to refer to a sense of shame described here as “ autonomous,” understood as a predisposition to feel ashamed when one does something wrong because it seems wrong to oneself, and not because others regard it as wrong or shameful. Historically, Confucian philosophers have thought a great deal (...) about the habits and character traits necessary for someone to have a sense of shame that is truly autonomous. The article looks at their views on this matter and shows how they help to articulate the hypothesis that coercive punishments undermine or work at cross-purposes with the cultivation of an autonomous sense of shame. It then uses this analysis to explicate the proposal that governing people by cultivating a sense of shame is to be preferred to governing by threat of punishment. It concludes by weighing its merits as a view about effective governance, observing that its strength and plausibility depends on whether we take the threat of punishment to be direct or indirect. (shrink)

This paper discusses Confucian notions of moral autonomy and moral agency that do not follow strict and ideal notions of autonomy that one can find in many Western theories of moral philosophy. In Kantian deontology, for example, one's autonomy, specifically one's rational will to follow universal moral rules, is a necessary condition of moral agency and moral responsibility. In Confucian moral philosophy, however, this type of strict moral autonomy is rarely observed. A Confucian moral agent is often depicted as a (...) partially heteronomous individual who often accepts and follows others' moral authority and considers external contingencies in her moral deliberations. Yet active moral agency is maintained in Confucian philosophy. In this paper, I will explain and analyze a partially heteronomous but active form of moral agency in Confucian moral philosophy. First, I will survey different notions of moral autonomy and explore philosophical theories of partial autonomy and heteronomy. Second, I will discuss, on the basis of interactive, responsive, and situated notions of the self, how Confucian moral agency can be explained without strict standards of autonomy. In Confucianism, morality or virtuosity reflects the relational, responsive, and situated nature of human being that resonates with other human beings and their environmental contingencies. Mencius, for example, acknowledges and discusses interactive or relational nature of moral action and the dependency of the moral self on external conditions of life without giving up active moral effort and full moral responsibility. Third, based on my analysis of moral autonomy and responsibility in early Confucian philosophy, I will argue that Confucian moral philosophy provides a unique way of understanding moral agency, not through self-enclosed independency but through relational and interactive interdependency of communal agency. (shrink)

How should we understand the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names (zhengming): what does it mean that an object’s name must be in accordance with its reality, and why does it matter? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by advocating a novel interpretation of the later Confucian, Xunzi’s account of the doctrine. Xunzi claims that sage-kings ascribe names and values to objects by convention, and since they are sages, they know the truth. When we misuse (...) names, we are departing from a sagely convention of naming. As sagely convention determines moral truth, departure from the linguistic convention of the sages is a departure from moral truth. On my interpretation of Xunzi, the rectification of names is not a doctrine about what is true, but a doctrine about how we aim at truth. We are aiming at descriptive truth when our language conforms to the correct name of an object according to what I call ‘Confucian conventionalism’. When we correctly aim at descriptive truth we can aim at moral truth. Therefore, I claim that the doctrine of the rectification of names is concerned with discerning the literal accordance of language with an object (what is descriptively, linguistically true), to determine what is normatively, or morally, true. According to Xunzi, moral truth is grounded in linguistic truth. (shrink)

Much of the literature exploring Chinese international student engagement with critical thinking in Western universities draws on reductive essentialisations of ‘Confucianism’ in efforts to explain cross-cultural differences. In this paper I review literature problematising these tendencies. I then shift focus from inferences about how philosophy shapes culture and individual students, toward drawing on philosophy as a ‘living’ resource for understanding and shaping the ideal of critical thinking. A cross disciplinary approach employs historical overview and philosophical interpretation within and beyond the (...) Confucian tradition to exemplify three types of criticality common in Chinese philosophy. These are criticality within tradition, criticality of tradition, and critical integration of traditions. The result is a refutation of claims or inferences (intentional or implicit) that Chinese philosophy is not conducive to criticality. While this paper focuses ontypesof criticality, it also reveals a commonmethodof criticality within Chinese philosophy, in the form of ‘creation through transmission’. This resonates with recent research calling for less confrontational and more dialogical engagement with critical processes. However, I also draw attention to examples of confrontational argumentation within Chinese philosophy, which may provide valuable resources for educators and students. Finally, I conclude careful and explicit consideration is needed regarding the types of criticality sought within Western universities to prevent educators and students from ‘speaking past’ one and other instead of ‘speaking with’ one and other in critical dialogue. (shrink)

Music, alongside ritual, plays an important role in Confucian moral education. Among all the Confucians, Xunzi gives music the most radical ability to transform people, and this is striking given his pessimistic view of human nature. Though he set the standard for Chinese aesthetics for millennia, there is no systematic account that brings together Xunzi’s various commitments: that only music from virtuous previous dynasties are morally conducive, that music can bring about lasting character change, that even those uninterested in moral (...) cultivation can benefit from music, and that the junzi (“gentleman”) and the xiaoren (“petty man”) derive joy in different ways while listening to music. In this article, I explain why currently existing accounts cannot capture all the commitments, and I turn to analytic aesthetics to provide a new Dual-Process Model of Xunzi’s philosophy of music. Jenefer Robinson’s discussions of “the Jazzercise effect” and emotional misattribution will be key in the new account. (shrink)

Distributive justice is generally important to persons in society. This was widely recognized by early Confucian thinkers, particularly Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, in ancient China. Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi had developed, in varying degrees and with different emphases, their respective conceptions of distributive justice to address the relevant social problems in their times. These conceptions not only are intrinsically valuable political thoughts, but may prove useful in dealing with current or future social issues. Thus in this essay, first I provide (...) a detailed interpretation of each of those thinkers’ conceptions of distributive justice, then I combine some essential elements of those conceptions to form a general and coherent conception, which is called a complex Confucian conception of distributive justice, and finally I evaluate this conception by considering some of its implications and limitations, in theory and in practice. This aims mainly at exploring the meaning and practical bearing of basic Confucian conceptions of distributive justice. (shrink)

Ancient Chinese and Greek thinkers alike were preoccupied with the moral value of music; they distinguished between good and bad music by looking at the music’s effect on moral character. The idea can be understood in terms of two closely related questions. Does music have the power to affect the ethical character of either listener or performer? If it does, is it better as music for doing so? I argue that an affirmative answers to both questions are more plausible than (...) it might seem at first. (shrink)

As Confucian political thought is adapted to modern circumstances, the question of free expression merits more attention. Most contemporary Confucian political theorists accept a right to political...

At present, there is a wide divergence in attitudes toward free speech in countries strongly influenced by Confucianism. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have fairly robust rights of free expression. Mainland China does not, strongly restricting speech that the government judges threatens State interests. I argue that although traditional Confucian scholars supported many restrictions on expression, Confucian philosophers actually have good reason to want to protect expression about values. Subsequently, I consider how to address the problem of disinformation while preserving this (...) Confucian right to free expression. I focus on the case of Taiwan, as the Confucian state facing the most serious disinformation campaigns from China. The goal of government and civil society actors has been to focus on correcting disinformation while preserving free access to information, though laws do provide for civil and even criminal penalties for intentional spread of false information. As many democratic societies are facing the problem of concerted disinformation campaigns that aim to sow confusion and increase discord among the populace, Taiwan’s successes here are worth studying. Yet the Confucian cultural background means people accept more government involvement in defining what is true and false than may be the case elsewhere, and the right to free speech is less absolute. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 568-579, May 2022. At present, there is a wide divergence in attitudes toward free speech in countries strongly influenced by Confucianism. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have fairly robust rights of free expression. Mainland China does not, strongly restricting speech that the government judges threatens State interests. I argue that although traditional Confucian scholars supported many restrictions on expression, Confucian philosophers actually have good reason to want to protect expression about values. Subsequently, (...) I consider how to address the problem of disinformation while preserving this Confucian right to free expression. I focus on the case of Taiwan, as the Confucian state facing the most serious disinformation campaigns from China. The goal of government and civil society actors has been to focus on correcting disinformation while preserving free access to information, though laws do provide for civil and even criminal penalties for intentional spread of false information. As many democratic societies are facing the problem of concerted disinformation campaigns that aim to sow confusion and increase discord among the populace, Taiwan’s successes here are worth studying. Yet the Confucian cultural background means people accept more government involvement in defining what is true and false than may be the case elsewhere, and the right to free speech is less absolute. (shrink)

Feminized AIs designed for in-home verbal assistance are often subjected to gendered verbal abuse by their users. I survey a variety of features contributing to this phenomenon—from financial incentives for businesses to build products likely to provoke gendered abuse, to the impact of such behavior on household members—and identify a potential worry for attempts to criticize the phenomenon; while critics may be tempted to argue that engaging in gendered abuse of AI increases the chances that one will direct this abuse (...) toward human beings, the recent history of attempts to connect video game violence to real-world aggression suggests that things may not be so simple. I turn to Confucian discussions of the role of ritualized social interactions both to better understand the roots of the problem and to investigate potential strategies for improvement, given a complex interplay between designers and device users. I argue that designers must grapple with the entrenched sexism in our society, at the expense of “smooth” and “seamless” user interfaces, in order to intentionally disrupt entrenched but harmful patterns of interaction, but that doing so is both consistent with and recommended by Confucian accounts of social rituals. (shrink)

Our paper is intended to follow the streams of thought along Chinese classicism that fostered hostility towards literary culture and merged into Han Feizi's work, by mid-3rd Century BC. On the one hand, Confucian tradition was prone to an elitist and anti-democratic approach to government, and set a precedent for mistrust in the use of eloquence and bookish culture. On the other, Taoism developed a theoretical contempt towards intellectualism, material culture, and scientific and technical progress, going as far as to (...) fancy unlettered utopias. On the basis of sheer utility and functionality, the Legalist school, whose latest link is represented by Han Feizi, would be receptive to both streams and take mistrust in traditional literary culture to its height. Assimilation of these ideas by Qin Shihuang, the First Emperor, led to implementation of anti-literary radicalism by banning any freedom of speech and, ultimately, by burning books and erudites. Mutatis mutandis, we suggest that a connection may be drawn between that historical process and today's Neoliberal hostility towards the Humanities. (shrink)

In this article, I present a model of four dimensions for the idea of learning in the classical Confucian perspective. This model is intended to capture the most essential four aspects of learning which explain why self-cultivation of a human person toward an end of self-fulfillment and social transformation of humanity is possible. I shall also show how this model illuminates all basic uses of the term ‘xue’ in the Analects and thus leads to a more coherent understanding of the (...) Confucian moral and ethical philosophy than have been previously done. A copingstone principle of sincerification is also suggested for enabling the advancement of a person to a higher status of life such as junzi and shengxian. (shrink)

Confucian democrats hold that the roles of Confucian political leaders must be rethought, just as the modern Confucian polity must shift from a monarchy to a constitutional democracy. This does not mean that modern Confucians must turn their backs on traditional Confucian views of leadership, however: the key traditional insights are still important, although to some degree they take on new significance in the new context of modern democratic Confucianism. Drawing on recent work by Joseph Chan and Elton Chan, I (...) begin by outlining a traditional Confucian view of the ‘inspirational’ leader. Next, I unpack and then critique Jiwei Ci’s argument that Confucian leadership rests on an ‘identification model’ of agency that is incompatible with democracy. Third, I build on some of the argument from my book Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy: Toward Progressive Confucianism to the effect that modern Confucians need to resolve a tension within traditional Confucianism by embracing a person-based democracy instead of mass-based authoritarianism. Finally, I conclude by making explicit why Confucian democracies still need leaders playing roles that are very much in the spirit of traditional Confucian leadership. (shrink)

This paper investigates Mencius’s notion of sympathy from the perspective of evolutionary biology. First, I point out that Mencius and evolutionary biologists concur that humans are endowed with a unique ability to sympathize with others beyond kin and friends. Subsequently, I offer an analytic account from an evolutionary perspective on how this ability emerged and developed as an innate human quality—especially referencing recent theories that state that cooperation is a crucial factor that helped foster such a quality. Further, this paper (...) addresses in-group/out-group distinction in terms of the scope of sympathy. In particular, I respond to Donald Munro’s thesis that this distinction serves as a critical boundary for the workings of sympathy. Finally, I show that Mencius’s (and other Confucian thinkers’) thoughts on sympathy are not only compatible with modern evolutionary discourses but also contribute to the psychological mechanisms that may have enabled humans to regard others with sympathetic concern. Thus, this essay sheds light on the mechanisms of sympathy that Mencius and other Confucian thinkers illustrated as identifying oneself or one’s kin with others. I then surmise that such mechanisms most likely emerged as a fundamental psychological principle for humans initially reaching out to others. (shrink)

What can remain unchanged while the Ru tradition (Confucianism) is continually passed down generationally and passed on geographically to non-Chinese Asian countries and beyond? Does the answer to this question hinted by the tradition itself, viz., the ethic of Three Guides and Five Constant Virtues, still work in contemporary society? As intrigued by these fundamental questions on Ruism, scholars have debated on the nature of the ethic and its adaptability to the contemporary world. One side of scholars condemned it as (...) an outdated, premodern ethic of power which urges unconditional obedience to hierarchy, while another side championed it as a modern ethic which aims to strengthen the autonomy of each individual in reciprocal relationships. While presenting two cases of Ru business practice, viz., Shibusawa Eiichi in Meiji Japan and Peter Drucker in the contemporary U.S., the article treats the controversial ethic as a hypothesis, and assesses it using an empirical method to reinforce views of scholars who have furnished a favorable interpretation of the ethic. (shrink)