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  1. Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Colorado
    Cognitive scientists have revealed systematic errors in human reasoning. There is disagreement about what these errors indicate about human rationality, but one upshot seems clear: human reasoning does not seem to fit traditional views of human rationality. This concern about rationality has made its way through various fields and has recently caught the attention of philosophers. The concern is that if philosophers are prone to systematic errors in reasoning, then the integrity of philosophy would be threatened. In this paper, I (...)
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  • Conditionals: A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics, and Inference.Philip Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (4):646-678.
    The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a (...)
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  • Mental Models and Logical Reasoning Problems in the GRE.Yingrui Yang & P. N. Johnosn-Laird - 2001 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 7 (4):308.
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  • Strategies in Syllogistic Reasoning.Monica Bucciarelli & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1999 - Cognitive Science 23 (3):247-303.
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  • Naive Causality: A Mental Model Theory of Causal Meaning and Reasoning.Eugenia Goldvarg & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2001 - Cognitive Science 25 (4):565-610.
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  • On Imagining What is True (and What is False).Patricia Barres & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2003 - Thinking and Reasoning 9 (1):1 – 42.
    How do people imagine the possibilities in which an assertion would be true and the possibilities in which it would be false? We argue that the mental representation of the meanings of connectives, such as "and", "or", and "if", specify how to construct the true possibilities for simple assertions containing just a single connective. It follows that the false possibilities are constructed by inference from the true possibilities. We report converging evidence supporting this account from four experiments in which the (...)
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  • An Antidote to Illusory Inferences.Carlos Santamaria & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2000 - Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):313 – 333.
    The mental model theory predicts that reasoners normally represent what is true, but not what is false. One consequence is that reasoners should make "illusory" inferences, which are compelling but invalid. Three experiments confirmed the existence of such illusions based on disjunctions of disjunctions. They also established a successful antidote to them: Reasoners are much less likely to succumb to illusions if the inferences concern disjunctions of physical objects (alternative newspaper advertisements) rather disjunctions of the truth values of assertions. The (...)
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  • Illusory Inferences: A Novel Class of Erroneous Deductions.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Fabien Savary - 1999 - Cognition 71 (3):191-229.
  • Illusions and Models: A Reply to Barrouillet and Lecas.P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2000 - Cognition 76 (2):175-178.
  • Strategies in Sentential Reasoning.Jean-Baptiste Van der Henst, Yingrui Yang & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2002 - Cognitive Science 26 (4):425-468.
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  • Illusions in Reasoning.Sangeet S. Khemlani & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):11-35.
    Some philosophers argue that the principles of human reasoning are impeccable, and that mistakes are no more than momentary lapses in “information processing”. This article makes a case to the contrary. It shows that human reasoners commit systematic fallacies. The theory of mental models predicts these errors. It postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities to which the premises of an inference refer. But, their models usually represent what is true in a possibility, not what is false. This (...)
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  • A Re-Examination of Illusory Inferences Based on Factual Conditional Sentences.Paolo Cherubini, Alberto Mazzocco, Simona Gardini & Aurore Russo - 2001 - Mind and Society 2 (2):9-25.
    According to mental model theory, illusory inferences are a class of deductions in which individuals systematically go wrong. Mental model theory explains them invoking the principle of truth, which is a tendency not to represent models that falsify the premises. In this paper we focus on the illusory problems based on conditional sentences. In three experiments, we show that: (a) rather than not representing models that falsify the conditionals, participants have a different understanding of what falsifies a conditional (Experiment I); (...)
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