Switch to: References

Citations of:

Idealization, epistemic logic, and epistemology

Synthese 191 (14):3351-3366 (2014)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Doxastic Logic: A New Approach.Daniel Rönnedal - 2018 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (4):313-347.
    In this paper, I develop a new set of doxastic logical systems and I show how they can be used to solve several well-known problems in doxastic logic, for example the so-called problem of logical omniscience. According to this puzzle, the notions of knowledge and belief that are used in ordinary epistemic and doxastic symbolic systems are too idealised. Hence, those systems cannot be used to model ordinary human or human-like agents' beliefs. At best, they can describe idealised individuals. The (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Boulesic-Doxastic Logic.Daniel Rönnedal - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (3):83.
    In this paper, I will develop a set of boulesic-doxastic tableau systems and prove that they are sound and complete. Boulesic-doxastic logic consists of two main parts: a boulesic part and a doxastic part. By ‘boulesic logic’ I mean ‘the logic of the will’, and by ‘doxastic logic’ I mean ‘the logic of belief’. The first part deals with ‘boulesic’ concepts, expressions, sentences, arguments and theorems. I will concentrate on two types of boulesic expression: ‘individual x wants it to be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Factive Knowability and the Problem of Possible Omniscience.Jan Heylen - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Famously, the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability is a deductive argument from the thesis that all truths are knowable to the conclusion that all truths are known. In this argument, knowability is analyzed in terms of having the possibility to know. Several philosophers have objected to this analysis, because it turns knowability into a nonfactive notion. In addition, they claim that, if the knowability thesis is reformulated with the help of factive concepts of knowability, then omniscience can be avoided. In this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation