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  1. Perception and Action: On the Praxial Structure of Intentional Consciousness.Panos Theodorou - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):303-320.
    Progressively Husserl started referring to the whole sphere of the life of intentional acts in terms of praxis. Perception, imagination, judgement, scientific consciousness, etc., are all seen as practices. What is the meaning of this move? A seemingly self-evident possibility is that intentionality is praxial, because even perception is not completely free from empty intending moments that demand fulfilment; and all fulfilment is attained by means of bodily activities that enable our senses to acquire the relevant contents. I reject this (...)
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