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Dan Zahavi (2008). Internalism, Externalism, and Transcendental Idealism.

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  1.  5
    Compatibility and Tensions Between Transcendental Idealism and Common-Sense Realism — Husserl and McDowell.Wenjing Cai - 2018 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 10 (1):88-99.
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  2.  55
    Brain, Mind, World: Predictive Coding, Neo-Kantianism, and Transcendental Idealism.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (1):47-61.
    Recently, a number of neuroscientists and philosophers have taken the so-called predictive coding approach to support a form of radical neuro-representationalism, according to which the content of our conscious experiences is a neural construct, a brain-generated simulation. There is remarkable similarity between this account and ideas found in and developed by German neo-Kantians in the mid-nineteenth century. Some of the neo-Kantians eventually came to have doubts about the cogency and internal consistency of the representationalist framework they were operating within. In (...)
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  3.  29
    Some Reflections on Husserlian Intentionality, Intentionalism, and Non-Propositional Contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.
    This paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In (...)
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  4.  79
    The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the ‘Inside–Outside’ Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW]Ciano Aydin - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):73-94.
    This paper explains why Clark’s Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist’s account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s (...)
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  5.  78
    Naturalized Phenomenology: A Desideratum or a Category Mistake?Dan Zahavi - 2013 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72:23-42.
    If we want to assess whether or not a naturalized phenomenology is a desideratum or a category mistake, we need to be clear on precisely what notion of phenomenology and what notion of naturalization we have in mind. In the article I distinguish various notions, and after criticizing one type of naturalized phenomenology, I sketch two alternative takes on what a naturalized phenomenology might amount to and propose that our appraisal of the desirability of such naturalization should be more positive, (...)
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  6.  34
    Intentionality and Presence: On the Intrinsic Of-Ness of Consciousness From a Transcendental-Phenomenological Perspective.Wolfgang Fasching - 2012 - Husserl Studies 28 (2):121-141.
    This paper discusses the nature of consciousness’ intrinsic intentionality from a transcendental-phenomenological viewpoint. In recent philosophy of mind the essentially intentional character of consciousness has become obscured because the latter is predominantly understood in terms of “qualia” or the “what-it-is-like-ness” of mental states and it is hard to see why such subjective “feels”, of all things, could bestow states with objective reference. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, this is an inadequate understanding of consciousness, which should instead be defined in (...)
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  7. The Extended Mind: Born to Be Wild? A Lesson From Action-Understanding. [REVIEW]Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):377-397.
    The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and (...)
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  8.  63
    Book Review of Lawrence Shapiro's Embodied Cognition. [REVIEW]Kristian Martiny - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):297-305.
  9. Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl's Account of Intentionality.Lilian Alweiss - 2009 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):53-78.
    There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl's early work the, Logical Investigations , and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Explanatory priority is assigned (...)
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