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Nick Zangwill (1992). Variable Realization: Not Proven.

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  1.  18
    A Dynamic Version of Hylomorphism.Sylvain Roudaut - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (1):13-36.
    This paper presents a version of hylomorphism that intends to solve problems faced by contemporary hylomorphism. After showing that attempts to understand form as sets or relation of essential properties fail at taking into account the dynamic development of substances, the paper suggests another version of hylomorphism able to solve these difficulties. A functionalist version of hylomorphism is then defended: the best way to understand how form can be present throughout all the developmental stages of a substance is to understand (...)
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  2.  32
    The Special Science Dilemma and How Culture Solves It.Marion Godman - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.
    I argue that there is a tension between the claim that at least some kinds in the special sciences are multiply realized and the claim that the reason why kinds are prized by science is that they enter into a variety of different empirical generalizations. Nevertheless, I show that this tension ceases in the case of ‘cultural homologues’—such as specific ideologies, religions, and folk wisdom. I argue that the instances of such special science kinds do have several projectable properties in (...)
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  3. Mind-Brain Correlations, Identity, and Neuroscience.Brandon N. Towl - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):187 - 202.
    One of the positive arguments for the type-identity theory of mental states is an inference-to-the-best-explanation (IBE) argument, which purports to show that type-identity theory is likely true since it is the best explanation for the correlations between mental states and brain states that we find in the neurosciences. But given the methods of neuroscience, there are other relations besides identity that can explain such correlations. I illustrate some of these relations by examining the literature on the function of the hypothalamus (...)
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  4.  79
    Has the Last Decade of Challenges to the Multiple Realization Argument Provided Aid and Comfort to Psychoneural Reductionists?John Bickle - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):247 - 260.
    The previous decade has seen renewed critical interest in the multiple realization argument. These criticisms constitute a "second wave" of challenges to this central argument in late-20th century philosophy of mind. Unlike the first wave, which challenged the premise that multiple realization is inconsistent with reduction or type identity, this second wave challenges the truth of the multiple realization premise itself. Since psychoneural reductionism was prominent among the explicit targets of the multiple realization argument, one might think that this second (...)
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  5.  54
    The Individualism-Holism Debate on Intertheoretic Reduction and the Argument From Multiple Realization.Julie Zahle - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1):77-99.
    The argument from multiple realization is currently considered the argument against intertheoretic reduction. Both Little and Kincaid have applied the argument to the individualism-holism debate in support of the antireductionist holist position. The author shows that the tenability of the argument, as applied to the individualism-holism debate, hinges on the descriptive constraints imposed on the individualist position. On a plausible formulation of the individualist position, the argument does not establish that the intertheoretic reduction of social theories is highly unlikely. Nonetheless, (...)
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  6.  69
    Supervenience, Reduction, and Infinite Disjunction.Nick Zangwill - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (1-2):321-330.
    Can a certain sort of property supervene on another sort of property without reducing to it? Many philosophers find the superveniencel irreducibility combination attractive in the philosophy of mind and in moral philosophy (Davidson 1980 and Moore 1903). They think that mental properties supervene upon physical properties but do not reduce to them, or that moral properties supervene upon natural properties without reducing to them. Other philosophers have tried to show that the combination is ultimately untenable, however attractive it might (...)
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  7. Supervenience, Reduction, and Infinite Disjunction.Nick Zangwill - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (1-2):151-164.
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  8.  72
    Good Old Supervenience: Mental Causation on the Cheap.Nick Zangwill - 1996 - Synthese 106 (1):67-101.
    I defend the view that strong psychophysical superveniences is necessary and sufficient to explain the causal efficacy of mental properties. I employ factual and counterfactual conditionals as defeasible criteria of causal efficacy. And I also deal with certain problems arising from disjunctive and conjunctive properties.
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  9. Supervenience, Reduction, and Infinite Disjunction.Nick Zangwill - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):321-30.
    Can a certain sort of property supervene on another sort of property without reducing to it? Many philosophers find the superveniencel irreducibility combination attractive in the philosophy of mind and in moral philosophy. They think that mental properties supervene upon physical properties but do not reduce to them, or that moral properties supervene upon natural properties without reducing to them. Other philosophers have tried to show that the combination is ultimately untenable, however attractive it might initially appear. Thus Ted Honderich (...)
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  10.  69
    Supervenience and Anomalous Monism: Blackburn on Davidson.Nick Zangwill - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (1):59-79.
    In his paper "Supervenience Revisisted", Simon Blackburn redeployed his novel modal argument against moral realism as an argument against Donald Davidson's position of 'anomalous monism' in the philosophy of mind (Blackburn 1985).' I shall assess this redeployment. In the first part of this paper, I shall lay out Blackburn's argument. In the second and longer part I shall examine Davidson's denial of psychophysical laws in the light of this argument.
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