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  1. Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    It is a commonplace in epistemology that credences should equal known chances. It is less clear, however, that conditional credences should do so, too. Following Ramsey, this paper proposes a counterfactual interpretation of conditional probability which provides a justification for this equality without relying on the Principal Principle. As a result, we obtain a refined view of Bayesian inference where both learning and supposing have a place.
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  • Naive Probability: Model‐Based Estimates of Unique Events.Sangeet S. Khemlani, Max Lotstein & Philip N. Johnson-Laird - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (6):1216-1258.
    We describe a dual-process theory of how individuals estimate the probabilities of unique events, such as Hillary Clinton becoming U.S. President. It postulates that uncertainty is a guide to improbability. In its computer implementation, an intuitive system 1 simulates evidence in mental models and forms analog non-numerical representations of the magnitude of degrees of belief. This system has minimal computational power and combines evidence using a small repertoire of primitive operations. It resolves the uncertainty of divergent evidence for single events, (...)
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  • How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2018 - Noûs.
    According to an increasingly popular epistemological view, people need outright beliefs in addition to credences to simplify their reasoning. Outright beliefs simplify reasoning by allowing thinkers to ignore small error probabilities. What is outright believed can change between contexts. It has been claimed that thinkers manage shifts in their outright beliefs and credences across contexts by an updating procedure resembling conditionalization, which I call pseudo-conditionalization (PC). But conditionalization is notoriously complicated. The claim that thinkers manage their beliefs via PC is (...)
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  • The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (4):711-730.
    According to what is now commonly referred to as “the Equation” in the literature on indicative conditionals, the probability of any indicative conditional equals the probability of its consequent of the conditional given the antecedent of the conditional. Philosophers widely agree in their assessment that the triviality arguments of Lewis and others have conclusively shown the Equation to be tenable only at the expense of the view that indicative conditionals express propositions. This study challenges the correctness of that assessment by (...)
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  • Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief.Julia Staffel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.
    In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees (...)
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  • Descriptive Assessment of Jeffrey's Rule.Jiaying Zhao & Daniel Osherson - unknown
    Jeffrey (1983) proposed a generalization of conditioning as a means of updating probability distributions when new evidence drives no event to certainty. His rule requires the stability of certain conditional probabilities through time. We tested this assumption (“invariance”) from the psychological point of view. In Experiment 1 participants offered probability estimates for events in Jeffrey’s candlelight example. Two further scenarios were investigated in Experiment 2, one in which invariance seems justified, the other in which it does not. Results were in (...)
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  • On the Conjunction Fallacy and the Meaning of and , yet Again: A Reply To.Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2012 - Cognition 122 (2):123-134.
  • Updating: Learning Versus Supposing.Jiaying Zhao, Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori, Branden Fitelson & Daniel Osherson - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):373-378.
  • Indicatives, Concessives, and Evidential Support.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (4):480-499.