Corruption has been a major obstacle to economic growth around the world. In this paper, we examine how firms interact with corrupt government officials either to minimize the impact of corruption on their operations or to maximize their benefit of paying a bribe. Our estimates show that firms know exactly what they need and use their limited resources to bribe only relevant government authorities. In other words, firms are rational bribers who know exactly what they need and optimize their bribes (...) to fulfill that need. This type of intentional bribery could be reduced by enhanced institutional environments and improved openness of the economy. (shrink)

Corruption has been a major obstacle to economic growth around the world. In this paper, we examine how firms interact with corrupt government officials either to minimize the impact of corruption on their operations or to maximize their benefit of paying a bribe. Our estimates show that firms know exactly what they need and use their limited resources to bribe only relevant government authorities. In other words, firms are rational bribers who know exactly what they need and optimize their bribes (...) to fulfill that need. This type of intentional bribery could be reduced by enhanced institutional environments and improved openness of the economy. (shrink)

Corruption as a non-market strategy for firms has gained increasing attention in the field of strategy management. However, the effect of corruption on innovation is unclear, especially in the context of transition economies. Using institutional theory, we examine the relationship between corruption and new product innovation and identify the contextual conditions of the relationship. Using the World Bank Enterprise Survey data from China, our empirical results show that corruption has a positive effect on firms’ new product innovation. Moreover, we find (...) that policy instability and competitive threats from the informal sector positively moderate the relationship between corruption and new product innovation. Using post hoc analysis, we find that the potentially positive effect of corruption on new product innovation is the consequence of inherent institutional weaknesses in transition economies; as the level of institutional development increases, the effect of corruption on firms’ new product innovation will gradually decrease. Overall, our findings provide new insights into understanding corrupt behaviors in transition economies and present managerial implications for firms’ ethical dilemmas in a transition economy context. We argue that the key to overcoming these ethical dilemmas lies in promoting pro-market institutional reform to reduce the potential benefits of corruption. (shrink)

Although the same environmental regulations apply to all regions in China, legal enforcement can be different due to local economic development priorities. There is still a lack of knowledge about how regional disparities affect the operating performance results of the implementation of corporate environmental management practices, thus providing little information for foreign companies when they invest and develop their production base in China. To fill this research gap, this paper collects data from the Fortune 500 Chinese firms to investigate the (...) moderating role of regional disparities in affecting the performance results of corporate environmental management efforts based on the institutional theory. The disclosed corporate environmental responsibility practices serve as proxy to represent corporate environmental management practices. Content analysis approach was applied to collect and analyze CER practices published in the corporate reports of Chinese manufacturers. The results show that CER has a positive impact on operating income, while regional disparities influence the relationship between CER and corporate operating income. Specifically, CER and operating income are positively related in Eastern China; on the contrary, they are negatively related in Western China. This paper adds to the body of knowledge about environmental discrepancies in the same emerging economy, and provides insights for systematic consideration in terms of the issues of government environmental regulations and corporate environmental strategies. (shrink)

Our paper draws attention to a neglected channel of corruption—the bribe payments by state-owned enterprises. This is an important phenomenon as bribe payments by SOEs fruitlessly waste national resources, compromising public welfare and national prosperity. Using a large dataset of 30,249 firms from 50 countries, we show that, in general, SOEs are less likely to pay bribes for achieving organizational objectives owing to their political connectivity. However, in deteriorated institutional environments, SOEs may be subjected to potential managerial rent-seeking behaviors, which (...) disproportionately increase SOE bribe propensity relative to privately owned enterprises. Specifically, our findings highlight the importance of fostering democracy and rule of law, reducing prevalence of corruption and shortening power distance in reducing the incidence of SOE bribery. (shrink)

This study attempts to advance knowledge in the area of controversial advertising by examining the antecedents and consequences of controversial advert perceptions in the context of social media, and particularly social networking sites. Specifically, we explore how ethical judgement and religious commitment shape controversial advert perceptions leading to attitudes towards the advert, brand attitudes and purchase intentions. Our results indicate that when a SNS advert is judged to be ethically acceptable, the level of perceived advert controversy is lower. However, the (...) impact of ethical judgement on controversial advert perceptions becomes significant and positive when intrapersonal commitment and interpersonal religious commitment are introduced as moderators. This result implies that the level of religious commitment changes the ethical judgement–controversial advert perceptions relationship. The results also highlight that controversial advert perceptions negatively influence attitude towards the advert. The study contributes to the limited knowledge on controversial advertising on SNS, yielding significant and relevant implications for academics and advertisers alike, in their effort to improve advertising effectiveness without offending or alienating target audiences. (shrink)

Extant research concludes that family firms are less likely to bribe due to reputation concerns. However, such conclusions are, to a certain extent, inconsistent with the intuition and observation that some family firms can be aggressive bribers. This study employs a restricted-extended framework of socioemotional wealth model to reconcile this inconsistency. We propose family management, on the one hand, results in reputation preservation willingness; while on the other hand, results in an abuse of trust between family members and superior ability (...) to hide bribery secrets. Integrating the willingness and ability mechanisms leads to an inverted U-shaped relationship between family management and bribery. Further, family firm political connection and province-level anti-corruption investigation play moderation role on the inverted U-shaped main effect. An empirical analysis of Chinese listed firms from 2006 to 2017 supports our hypotheses. (shrink)

Multinational corporations dominate the global business arena, but new expectations for MNC boards call to question how they might effectively manage global stakeholder relationships in this new era of accountability. Uniting political behavior theory, which describes a board’s international political orientation, and global operating governance systems outlining a set of board behaviors, we develop a typology of four types of boards. We then provide recommendations for the development of an integrative governance structure, taking into account the mechanisms, structure, endorsements, and (...) codes of conduct that MNCs can use to promote ethical behavior across MNC horizons. (shrink)

This study investigates the influence of formal and informal institutions on firm innovation in transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEs) by explicitly differentiating between corruption and bribery as distinct informal institutions. We integrate institutional theory and legitimacy theory to explain that the failure of formal institutions creates an environment of corruption which encourages firms to use bribes to facilitate economic exchange. We test our hypotheses on the innovation performance of a sample (n = 1603) of firms in 11 (...) CEEs. The results show that weak rule of law and ineffective business regulations in CEEs propagate the perception of corruption that inhibits firm innovation. However, the use of bribery enables firms to transform this environment of corruption into innovation outcomes. The policy and managerial implications of our research for differentiating between corruption and bribery and our findings that bribery acts as the glue that binds formal and informal institutions are fully discussed. (shrink)