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  1. Is Conscious Will an Illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.
    In this essay I critically examine Daniel Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion developed in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will. I show that there are unwarranted leaps in his argument, which considerably decrease the empirical plausibility and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of willing, which are related to our general understanding of free will, moral responsibility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s account of conscious will. This (...)
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  • Is Conscious Will an Illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):59 - 70.
  • Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
    Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally responsible agency. (...)
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  • Free Will and the Unconscious Precursors of Choice.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):365-384.
    Benjamin Libet's empirical challenge to free will has received a great deal of attention and criticism. A standard line of response has emerged that many take to be decisive against Libet's challenge. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that this standard response fails to put the challenge to rest. It fails, in particular, to address a recent follow-up experiment that raises a similar worry about free will (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). In the second part, (...)
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  • Objections to the God Machine Thought Experiment and What They Reveal About the Intelligibility of Moral Intervention by Technological Means.Garry Young - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-16.
    The first aim of the paper is to proffer a series of objections to the God machine thought experiment, as presented by Savulescu and Persson, The Monist, 95, 399-421,. The second aim is to show that these objections must be overcome by any form of direct moral intervention by technological means, not just the God machine. The objections raised against the god machine involve questioning its intelligibility in light of established views on the relationship between beliefs, desires, intention and intentional (...)
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  • The Time Between Intention and Action Affects the Experience of Action.Mikkel C. Vinding, Mads Jensen & Morten Overgaard - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  • On the Alleged Illusion of Conscious Will.Marc van Duijn & Sacha Bem - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):699-714.
    The belief that conscious will is merely "an illusion created by the brain" appears to be gaining in popularity among cognitive neuroscientists. Its main adherents usually refer to the classic, but controversial 'Libet-experiments', as the empirical evidence that vindicates this illusion-claim. However, based on recent work that provides other interpretations of the Libet-experiments, we argue that the illusion-claim is not only empirically invalid, but also theoretically incoherent, as it is rooted in a category mistake; namely, the presupposition that neuronal activity (...)
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  • What is Consciousness For?Lee Pierson & Monroe Trout - manuscript
    What is Consciousness For? Lee Pierson and Monroe Trout Copyright © 2005 Abstract: The answer to the title question is, in a word, volition. Our hypothesis is that the ultimate adaptive function of consciousness is to make volitional movement possible. All conscious processes exist to subserve that ultimate function. Thus, we believe that all conscious organisms possess at least some volitional capability. Consciousness makes volitional attention possible; volitional attention, in turn, makes volitional movement possible. There is, as far as we (...)
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  • Intencionalnost i intencionalno djelovanje.Shaun Gallagher - 2006 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2):339-346.
    Oni koji tvrde da je slobodna volja iluzija, u krivu su. Oni temelje svoju tvrdnju na znanstvenom dokazu koji testira pogrešnu razinu deskripcije intencionalnog djelovanja. Kod slobodne volje ne radi se o podosobnim neuronskim procesima, mišićnoj aktivaciji, ili temeljnim tjelesnim pokretima, već o kontekstualiziranim djelovanjima u sistemu koji je veći negoli što to mnogi suvremeni filozofi uma, psiholozi i neuroznanstvenici smatraju. U ovome članku opisujem vrstu intencionalnosti koja ide s vježbom slobodne volje.Those who argue that free will is an illusion (...)
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  • Intentionalität und intentionales handeln.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):319-326.
    Diejenigen, die behaupten, der freie Wille sei Illusion, sind im Unrecht. Sie begründen ihre Behauptung auf einem wissenschaftlichen Beweis, der die falsche Ebene der Deskription des intentionalen Handelns testet. Der freie Wille bezieht sich nicht auf subpersonale neuronale Prozesse, Muskelaktivierung oder grundlegende Körperbewegungen, sondern auf kontextualisierte Handlungen in einem System, das größer ist als viele zeitgenössische Geistesphilosophen, Psychologen und Neurowissenschaftler annehmen. In diesem Artikel beschreibe ich die Art von Intentionalität, die mit der Ausübung des freien Willens einhergeht.
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  • A Model of the Hierarchy of Behaviour, Cognition, and Consciousness.Frederick Toates - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):75-118.
    Processes comparable in important respects to those underlying human conscious and non-conscious processing can be identified in a range of species and it is argued that these reflect evolutionary precursors of the human processes. A distinction is drawn between two types of processing: stimulus-based and higher-order. For ‘higher-order,’ in humans the operations of processing are themselves associated with conscious awareness. Conscious awareness sets the context for stimulus-based processing and its end-point is accessible to conscious awareness. However, the mechanics of the (...)
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  • Locating Volition.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):302-322.
    In this paper, it is examined how neuroscience can help to understand the nature of volition by addressing the question whether volitions can be localized in the brain. Volitions, as acts of the will, are special mental events or activities by which an agent consciously and actively exercises her agency to voluntarily direct her thoughts and actions. If we can pinpoint when and where volitional events or activities occur in the brain and find out their neural underpinnings, this can substantively (...)
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  • Action, Control and Sensations of Acting.Benjamin Mossel - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180.
    Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the (...)
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  • Neuroscience and Conscious Causation: Has Neuroscience Shown That We Cannot Control Our Own Actions?Grant S. Shields - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):565-582.
    Neuroscience has begun to elucidate the mechanisms of volition, decision-making, and action. Some have taken the progress neuroscience has made in these areas to indicate that we are not free to choose our actions . The notion that we can consciously initiate our behavior is a crucial tenet in the concept of free will, and closely linked to how most individuals view themselves as persons. There is thus reason to inquire if the aforementioned inference drawn by some might be too (...)
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  • The Neuroscientific Study of Free Will: A Diagnosis of the Controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.
    Benjamin Libet’s work paved the way for the neuroscientific study of free will. Other scientists have praised this research as groundbreaking. In philosophy, the reception has been more negative, often even dismissive. First, I will propose a diagnosis of this striking discrepancy. I will suggest that the experiments seem irrelevant, from the perspective of philosophy, due to the way in which they operationalize free will. In particular, I will argue that this operational definition does not capture free will properly and (...)
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  • Brain Signals Do Not Demonstrate Unconscious Decision Making: An Interpretation Based on Graded Conscious Awareness.Jeff Miller & Wolf Schwarz - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 24:12-21.
    Neuroscientific studies have shown that brain activity correlated with a decision to move can be observed before a person reports being consciously aware of having made that decision . Given that a later event cannot cause an earlier one , such results have been interpreted as evidence that decisions are made unconsciously . We argue that this interpretation depends upon an all-or-none view of consciousness, and we offer an alternative interpretation of the early decision-related brain activity based on models in (...)
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  • Probing Folk-Psychology: Do Libet-Style Experiments Reflect Folk Intuitions About Free Action?Robert Deutschländer, Michael Pauen & John-Dylan Haynes - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:232-245.
  • Understanding Volition.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):247-274.
    The concept of volition has a long history in Western thought, but is looked upon unfavorably in contemporary philosophy and psychology. This paper proposes and elaborates a unifying conception of volition, which views volition as a mediating executive mental process that bridges the gaps between an agent's deliberation, decision and voluntary bodily action. Then the paper critically examines three major skeptical arguments against volition: volition is a mystery, volition is an illusion, and volition is a fundamentally flawed conception that leads (...)
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  • Can Conscious Agency Be Saved?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):33-45.
    This paper is concerned with the role of conscious agency in human action. On a folk-psychological view of the structure of agency, intentions, conceived as conscious mental states, are the causes of actions. In the last decades, the development of new psychological and neuroscientific methods has made conscious agency an object of empirical investigation and yielded results that challenge the received wisdom. Most famously, the results of Libet’s studies on the ‘readiness potential’ have been interpreted by many as evidence in (...)
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