This article investigates a central yet perplexing term yiming in the ‘Qiwulun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi. Yiming describes a crucial way to detach from epistemic distinctions and debates. This term is often explained as ‘using ming’ or contradictorily as ‘stopping ming’. Yet neither of the two explanations can provide a full understanding of how yiming is adopted. I take three steps to explain yiming. First, taking an etymological approach, I argue that ming can be formulated as ‘X shining on Y’. (...) Second, I use the formula of ‘X shining on Y’ to account for yiming and argue that this term refers specifically to ‘using tian to shine on everything’. Third, I unpack a cluster of tian-associated metaphors, which provides a deep understanding of yiming as an ideal way to mental tranquility. (shrink)

Spinoza, as a monist and a rationalist, seems unlikely to have occasion to confront any form of the solipsism problem. However, a close examination of his epistemology reveals that he does in fact confront a very radical form of this problem, and offers an equally radical solution to it, derived from the very epistemological premises that make it a potential problem for him. In particular, we find that the conception of the mind as the “idea of the body,” premised on (...) the strict identity of mental modes (“ideas”) and extended modes (“bodies”) forecloses any possibility of awareness extending “beyond” the confines of the finite body, or of any idea being able to be about anything other than its own bodily mode: ideas can only be ideas “of” the body of which they are the idea, and hence the mind, as the idea of the body, cannot have any ideas “of” anything outside of the body. The solution comes from the “Common Notions” which establish the existence of the world outside the body not by “reaching” that world, but merely by establishing immanently the nature of the finite body qua finite body. This manner of instantiating an infinite externality of the body within the body itself, though highly exceptional in European intellectual history, bears interesting similarities to the solutions to distinct but parallel problems concerning the relation of the finite to the infinite found in Chinese thought, in particular in the Zhuangzi and in the Huayan and Tiantai schools of Buddhism. (shrink)

In this article, I re-examine political subjectivity by way of looking at the canonical text of Chinese Daoist philosophy – Zhuangzi. I trace the course of how the body is conceived in Zhuangzi and discuss its relation with the unmaking of personhood. I then look into ways in which the body–self nexus in Zhuangzi gives rise to new conceptualization of political relations. I argue that, in Zhuangzi, the body is conceived as spontaneous and dispossessed. The body as such foregrounds the (...) condition for unsettling subjectivity. In staging ambivalent subjectivities, Zhuangzi describes a mode of politics where political relations thrive on indeterminacy and uncertainty. I submit that the authors of Zhuangzi propose a depoliticizing approach to politics whereby ‘effortless action’ replaces established processes in reinventing new relations and subjects. (shrink)

This article is one of the author’s serial writings to assimilate Ricoeur’s three-fold ethical investigation into various areas of human acts of forgetting, including 1) the therapeutic or patholog...

In this article, I show how resources for an education for non-dichotomous thinking can be drawn from the two Daoist texts, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. Dichotomous thinking can be defined as thinking that considers things in terms of strict and even irreconcilable dichotomous oppositions. The authors of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are known for their criticism of such dichotomous thinking. At the same time however, these authors seem to fall into this very kind of thinking which they criticize. (...) That is to say, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi often promote adherence to conventionally ‘lower’ values over ‘higher’ ones. I believe though that this tension can be resolved if viewed through a pedagogical framework. Specifically, the adherence to ‘lower values’ can be seen as the initial step in the process of Daoist self-cultivation where one reduces the artificial distinctions one adheres to in order to prepare one’s disposition for union with Dao, which in turn entails non-dichotomous thinking. (shrink)

Critical readers can reasonably judge Zhuangzi’s 莊子 notion of wuwei 無爲 to offer a persuasive reply to Xunzi’s objection to Zhuangzi’s emphasis on living naturally, in light of recent theories of action. For Zhuangzi, self-cultivation is possible only when individuals attune themselves to the processes inherent in nature . Daoist wuwei depends crucially on two descriptive claims that Zhuangzi endorses and Xunzi rejects. The first claim, backed by Dreyfus’ theory of skill acquisition, is that views of self-cultivation which rely on (...) formulas and concepts stand opposed to the Way. The second claim, supported by Elster and Csikszentmihalyi’s theories of action, is that conscious deliberation is unable to facilitate self-cultivation. Zhuangzi’s normative vision requires that individuals indirectly create conditions for spontaneity, rather than pursue spontaneity directly, since any deliberate attempt at being spontaneous is self-defeating. (shrink)

How should we understand the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names (zhengming): what does it mean that an object’s name must be in accordance with its reality, and why does it matter? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by advocating a novel interpretation of the later Confucian, Xunzi’s account of the doctrine. Xunzi claims that sage-kings ascribe names and values to objects by convention, and since they are sages, they know the truth. When we misuse (...) names, we are departing from a sagely convention of naming. As sagely convention determines moral truth, departure from the linguistic convention of the sages is a departure from moral truth. On my interpretation of Xunzi, the rectification of names is not a doctrine about what is true, but a doctrine about how we aim at truth. We are aiming at descriptive truth when our language conforms to the correct name of an object according to what I call ‘Confucian conventionalism’. When we correctly aim at descriptive truth we can aim at moral truth. Therefore, I claim that the doctrine of the rectification of names is concerned with discerning the literal accordance of language with an object (what is descriptively, linguistically true), to determine what is normatively, or morally, true. According to Xunzi, moral truth is grounded in linguistic truth. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this study, I examine the Confucian influence upon An Inquiry into the Good, the first publication of Nishida Kitarō. Nishida’s student Kōsaka Masaaki depicts his mentor’s conception of the good in terms of realising the 'Mandate of Heaven'. Taking this to be indicative of the importance of Confucianism for Nishida’s early thought, I compare his philosophy of pure experience and ethical project of ‘self-realisation’ with corresponding ideas found in the Confucian corpus. I especially focus on the Great Learning and (...) Doctrine of the Mean as interpreted by the Neo-Confucian Wang Yang-Ming. This study builds upon the pioneering work of Michel Dalissier, Dermott Walsh and David Williams on the Kyoto School and Confucianism. My portrayal of Confucianism is indebted to the ‘philosophical’ translations of Roger Ames, David Hall and Henry Rosemont, Jr., which bring into relief the tradition’s ‘relational ontology’ that Graham Parkes teaches is shared by the Kyoto School. (shrink)

The seventh chapter of the Zhuangzi 莊子 contains a narrative about Liezi 列子, his teacher Huzi 壺子, and a physiognomist named Jixian 季咸. Traditionally, the story has been read as a didactic tale about how to become a true Daoist sage or as an illustration of attaining spiritual perfection. This essay will argue for an alternative reading of the story as a humorous parody about failed sages, and, at the same time, as an illustration of the benefits of a playful (...) facelessness—or genuine pretending. It thereby turns out to be a counterpart of the following narrative of Hundun 混沌 which completes the Inner Chapters. The story about Liezi’s retirement illustrates how his teacher Huzi remains unharmed by virtue of being a faceless “genuine pretender” whereas Hundun’s demise is due to his failure to maintain his facelessness. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDaoist ethics are difficult to pinpoint in a Western ethical framework. At times classic Daoist texts advocate for certain ways of life over others, yet at other times they rebel against the notions of right and wrong. This attitude about right and wrong, leads some to believe that Daoists are moral relativists who believe that right and wrong are merely an arbitrary valuing within the mind and that there is no justification for external moral critique. Others believe that there is (...) a Daoist ethic, but it advocates only not acting, in the literal sense, when we are faced with ethical choices. This paper attempts to show a coherent, universal ethic that can be inferred from a close reading of these texts. (shrink)

What is the viewpoint regarding the emotional lives of sages in the Zhuangzi 莊子? There are two conflicting positions in current scholarship: sages have emotions, and sages are without emotions. In this essay, we introduce these positions with their corresponding textual support and show that they are not satisfactory accounts. Specifically, we point out that the conflict arises as scholars adopt a static model of emotions. Thus, we propose that a better way to understand the emotional lives of sages is (...) to adopt a dynamic model of emotions characterized by the process of forgetting. Through the discussion of such a dynamic process, we show how conflicting textual evidence can be integrated into this dynamic process and, at the same time, be read consistently. Ultimately, we argue that the ideal emotional lives of sages in the Zhuangzi adopt a dynamic model of emotions characterized by the vacillation of activity of the mind between the state with and without emotions. (shrink)

This essay questions the meaning of be-ing and non-be-ing in the DDJ with regard to the root-source meaning of dao. I first explore the meaning of dao as the dark non-be-ing, revealing the connotations of the distinction between dao and things by comparison with some forms of Western metaphysics. The meaning of non-be-ing is elaborated in terms of the dynamic meanings of xu 虚 and chong 沖; The play between be-ing and non-be-ing is explored through the lens of yin and (...) yang qi thinking. Qi thinking determines the mutually manifest and mutually interpretive characteristic of be-ing and non-be-ing. Be-ing and non-be-ing thus understood is an ever-flowing and mutually transforming process that penetrates the different levels of dao, things and humans. In the last part I investigate the meaning of “Be-ing comes from non-be-ing”. (shrink)

It has often been said that the Zhuangzi 莊子 advocates political abstention, and that its putative skepticism prevents it from contributing in any meaningful way to political thinking: at best the Zhuangzi espouses a sort of anarchism, at worst it is “the night in which all cows are black,” a stance that one scholar has charged is ultimately immoral. This article tracks possible political allusions within the text, and, by reading these against details of social, political, and historical context, sheds (...) light on another strand of the Zhuangzi—one that questions prevailing normative values because it is fiercely critical of scholarly complicity with violent imperial territorial consolidation. (shrink)

Global metaphysical antirealism (or “antirealism”) is often thought to entail that the identity of each and every concrete entity in our world ultimately depends on us—on our adoption of certain social and linguistic conventions, for instance, or on our use of certain conceptual schemes. Drawing on the middle‐period works of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, I contend that metaphysical antirealism entails nothing of the sort. For Merleau‐Ponty, I argue, entities do not ultimately owe their identities to us, even though—as he puts it—their “articulations (...) are the very ones of our existence.” Once this is recognised, I maintain, certain interpretations of phenomenology are revealed to be caricatures and certain general objections to antirealism lose their force. (shrink)

This paper explores the compatibility between the Daoist art of emptying one’s heart-mind and the art of creating close relationships. The fact that a Daoist sage is characterized by an empty heart-mind makes him somewhat different from an average human being: since a full heart-mind is characteristic of the human condition, the sage transcends what makes us human. This could alienate him from others and make him incapable of developing close relationships. The research goal of this paper is to investigate (...) whether – in spite of being an unusual human being – a Daoist sage has the abilities necessary for creating close bonds with others. (shrink)

In much of modern scholarship, the notion of datong 大通 in Zhuangzi’s famous zuowang 坐忘 (sitting in disregard) passage is often interpreted as either Dao or a mental/spiritual state of an ideal person, a person who has obtained Dao. In either case, however, the association between datong and such interpretation lacks detailed justification resulting from an insufficiently understood relation between datong and its immediately preceding statements. Different from the more common readings, I propose a cognitive approach based on an image (...) schema related to non-obstruction. In order to demonstrate the philosophical importance of this schema, I will first briefly point out the problems of previous scholarship regarding the zuowang passage. Second, I will introduce the image schema related to non-obstruction based on a number of examples taken from the Zhuangzi. Finally, I will apply this methodology and introduce a cognitive experience-based interpretation of the zuowang passage. (shrink)

This essay examines the question of whether language, knowledge, and truth are possible in a world of relativism and flux, developing along a line of comparison between the Cratylus and Theaetetus of Plato on the one hand, and the Zhuangzi 莊子 of the Daoist philosophical tradition on the other. Against Plato’s image of “leaky pots” that symbolizes the impossibility of language in a state of flux, the Zhuangzi introduces “spillover-goblet words” that resist the language of necessity and essence by continually (...) emptying themselves out, only to be filled again with the always contingent. To put the ideas and metaphors of each of these perspectives into conversation, the essay drafts a comparison between two manners of animal classification, with classical taxonomy aligning with Platonism on the one hand, and the evolutionary science of “cladistics”—taxonomy based on ancestry—allying with Daoism on the other. In the end, it is Plato who is left holding his pejorative “leaky pots,” as under conditions of essential change it is putatively unchanging categories themselves that are shown to create the worst problems for knowledge. (shrink)

Playfulness and humor are often recognized as key components of the Zhuangzi. Despite this, the text itself is rarely read in a playful or humorous manner. It is commonly treated, even in its most...

This paper examines the role of the imagination in the Zhuangzi. There are many avenues through which the various types of imaginations in the Zhuangzi could be investigated, but this paper will concentrate on only one, namely the use of imagination to criticize Confucius’ way. Specifically, the Zhuangzi finds Confucius’ views on virtuosity, moral cultivation, and social roles to include exceedingly limited imagined restrictions. The Daoist classic thereby creates stories to inspire the imagination of its readers, with the goal of (...) broadening the ways in which people understand morality, society, and themselves. Accordingly, the Zhuangzi suggests that people can ‘zigzag’ through life, temporarily taking on different perspectives or roles, without cultivating a corresponding sense of self. Imagination is key for promoting this type of existential mode of existence—what the Zhuangzi calls ‘genuine’. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe perspective on zhi 知 is often identified as a key distinction between the Zhuangzi 莊子 and its most famous commentator, Guo Xiang 郭象. Many scholars who recognize this distinction observe that zhi almost always has negative connotations in Guo Xiang’s writing, whereas certain types of knowledge can be positive in the Zhuangzi In this way, Guo Xiang’s comments on zhi seem to stray from the ‘original meaning’ of the Zhuangzi, and are often dismissed as inaccurate mis-readings, imbued with mysticism (...) and relativism. However, by taking into consideration some aspects of Guo Xiang’s socio-historical context, and the larger structure of his complex philosophical system, we find a project quite distinct from that of the Zhuangzi. Like many other Wei-Jin period thinkers, Guo aims bridging some of the gaps the Daoist classic creates between itself and the Confucian tradition. This exposes Guo Xiang’s first goal, which,... (shrink)

1. It is common knowledge among scholars who are familiar with the Zhuangzi that Guo Xiang’s 郭象Commentary (henceforth the Commentary)1 written in the Xuanxue 玄學 era exerts tremendous influence on e...

Hick’s soul-making theodicy defends the omnipotence, omniscience, and all-goodness of God in the face of evil. It holds that the end of the creation process is the development of human beings into children of God. In order to achieve the end, an evil-dependent soul-making process must be employed. It then concludes that, because the end is so valuable, the omnipotent and omniscient creator’s not having prevented the existence of evil is morally justified and thus not in conflict with her being (...) all-good. In particular, God’s having created a world with evils and evil-dependent values, which may be called “an Irenaean world,” is morally justified. In the Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi holds that the actual world is, in reality, a world without evils and evil-dependent values, but with evil-independent values, which may be called “a Zhuangzian world,” while ordinary people mistakenly take the actual world to be an Irenaean world. In an insightful story in the Chapter “The Great and Venerable Teacher” of the Zhuangzi, he amounts to claiming that a Zhuangzian world is better than an Irenaean world. Without endorsing Zhuangzi’s two positions, I argue against Hick’s soul-making theodicy in this way: It is Hick’s burden to prove either that a Zhuangzian world is metaphysically impossible, or that the actual world, as an Irenaean world, is better than any Zhuangzian world. However, there are not any resources in his soul-making theodicy that can provide any such proofs. Therefore, Hick has not justified, nor rationally established, his soul-making theodicy. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, language is part of a social activity in both Wittgenstein and Xunzi 荀子, and for both clarification of language is central to their philosophical projects; the goal of this article is to explore the extent of resonance and discord that may be found when comparing these two philosophers. While for Xunzi, the rectification of names (zhengming 正名) is anchored in a regard for establishing, propagating, and/or restoring a harmonious social system, perspicuity is for Wittgenstein represented as a philosophical (...) end in itself. The article ventures study in particular the themes of perspicuity and aspect-perception in Wittgenstein together with the topics of correcting names and the cultivation of the heart-mind (xin 心) in the Xunzi. The aspiration of this project is to gain an overview of the role(s) of clarification projects in different philosophical traditions, all while not overlooking the different historical contexts and philosophical ends of these two philosophers. (shrink)

This paper attempts to draw a comparison between Derrida’s idea of “trace” (in connection to the more famous notions of différance, supplement, and deconstruction) and the idea of dao 道 in classica...

In this study, I clarify and defend the critique of the ‘sages’ and ‘robbers’ that is found in the _Zhuangzi_. As detailed in Chapter 8 of the _Zhuangzi_, both the (non-Daoist) ‘sages’ and ‘robbers’ are equally responsible for society’s ills. This is because both the ‘sages’ and ‘robbers’ are perceptually alienated from nature. This perceptual alienation involves the inability to perceive nature as fundamentally indeterminate (_wu_, 無). The Daoist alternative to the ‘sages’ and ‘robbers’ is to cultivate awareness of our (...) interdependence with nature. This study calls this process an ‘attunement to nature’ or, as Chapter 8 describes it, to not depart from ‘the actuality of their endowed circumstances’ (其性命之情) and to ‘see oneself when you see others/things’ (自見而見彼). Attunement involves an awareness of how nature primordially forms an indeterminate continuum (_wu_). (shrink)

Henri Bergson and William James were great admirers of each other, and James seemed to think he got valuable ideas from Bergson. But early critics were right to see in Bergson the antithesis of pragmatism. Unfolding this antithesis is a convenient way to study important concepts and innovations in Bergson's philosophy. I concentrate on his ideas of duration and intuition, and show how they prove the necessity of going beyond pragmatism. The reason is because knowledge itself goes beyond the utilitarian (...) limitations in which pragmatism confines it. Knowledge is more than utility, more than adaptation, more than pragmatism, because our cognitive powers prove capable of more than any naturally selected service to survival. (shrink)

The now-global phenomenon of Asian martial arts traces back to something that began in China. The idea the Chinese communicated was the dual cultivation of the spiritual and the martial, each perfected in the other, with the proof of perfection being an effortless mastery of violence. I look at one phase of the interaction between Asian martial arts and Chinese thought, with a reading of the Zhuangzi 莊子 and the Daodejing 道德經 from a martial arts perspective. I do not claim (...) that the authors knew about martial arts. It was not Daoist masters who took up martial arts, but martial arts masters who, at a specific time, turned to Daoism to explain the significance of their art. Today, though, Daoist concepts are ubiquitous in martial arts literature, and a reading of these classics from a martial arts perspective shows how they lend themselves to philosophical thinking about this practice. (shrink)

This essay will examine scholarly attempts at distilling a proto-ethical philosophy from the Daoist classic known as the Zhuangzi. In opposition to interpretations of the text which characterize it as amoralistic, I will identify elements of a natural normativity in the Zhuangzi. My examination features passages from the Zhuangzi – commonly known as the “knack” passages – which are often interpreted through some sort of linguistic, skeptical, or relativistic lens. Contra such readings, I believe the Zhuangzi prescribes an art of (...) living – or shù [術] – which incorporates a few motifs familiar to certain threads of philosophical naturalism. Building on existing scholarship which treats of the praxeology of the text, I argue that the naturalist themes present in the Zhuangzi support an unusual, but robust, view of moral expertise. (shrink)

In the present work I study Daoist philosophy in conjunction with the radical new philosophy of antinatalism, spearheaded by South African philosopher David Benatar. Although I am not claiming equivalence between the two, a meaningful communication emerges between the classical Chinese sources used here and the modern doctrine of antinatalism. I argue that both visions partake in a radical critique of consciousness according to which this faculty of the human mind is far from what it is often held to be. (...) In fact, it is perceived as a destructive and disruptive element of, and in, existence. Moreover, both offer a praxis of return that seeks to undo this disruption. In the case of Daoism, consciousness pushes humans ever farther away from the Dao. It is imperative to return from this exile, and to return to the Dao. This can, radically, only be achieved by the return from ‘ordinary’ conscious existence. This is the prerogative of sagehood. It will be shown that the trajectory of sagehood shares important parameters with the antinatalist quest to significantly challenge human hubris in the cosmos at large, and to reinstate cosmic humility. (shrink)

Posthumanist critics such as Braidotti—informed by the antihumanisms of Foucault, Irigaray, and Deleuze—seek to respond to advanced capitalism by promoting what they take to be a radical transformation of what it means to be “human,” a way of conceiving being human that is thoroughly and consistently post-anthropocentric. Braidotti calls out advanced capitalism’s global economy as being inconsistently post-anthropocentric. In response, I first lay out ways through which posthumanists can find corroboration in Asian religious thought, such as in Zhuangzi and classical (...) Chan (Zen) Buddhism. I simply put forth, basically side by side, posthumanist positions on subjectivity and flourishing and parallels in Zhuangzi and Chan. This may strike some as sophomoric, which is in part what I hope to illustrate: just how easy it is to find corroboration in these Asian religious resources. This leads to my second issue. Given such conveniently available resources, what might this tell us about limitations in posthumanist Humanities and posthumanist critical theory as developed so far? I seek to bring out both a possible covert form of Orientalism in posthumanism and a myopic methodology in excluding Religious Studies in general as paradigmatic of posthumanist Humanities. (shrink)

This paper examines the creation of Daoism in its earliest, pre-Eastern Han period. After an examination of the critical terms "scholar/master" and "author/ school", I argue that, given the paucity of evidence, Sima Tan and Liu Xin should be credited with creating this tradition. The body of this article considers the definitions of Daoism given by these two scholars and all of the extant texts that Liu Xin classified as "Daoist." Based on these texts, I then suggest an amended definition (...) of Daoism. In the conclusion, I address the recent claim that the daojia /daijiao dichotomy is false, speculating that disagreement over this claim arises from the context in which Daoism is considered: among the other pre-Qin "schools of thought" or among other world religion. (shrink)