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  1. Using structural priming to test links between constructions: English caused-motion and resultative sentences inhibit each other.Tobias Ungerer - 2021 - Cognitive Linguistics 32 (3):389-420.
    Cognitive-linguistic theories commonly model speakers’ grammatical knowledge as a network of constructions related by a variety of associative links. The present study proposes that structural priming can provide psycholinguistic evidence of such links, and crucially, that the method can be extended to non-alternating constructions. In a comprehension priming experiment using the “maze” variant of self-paced reading, English caused-motion sentences were found to have an inhibitory effect by slowing down participants’ subsequent processing of resultatives, and vice versa, providing evidence that speakers (...)
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  • Grammatical dependencies shape compositional units in sentence production.Shota Momma - 2023 - Cognition 240 (C):105577.
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  • Finding your voice: Voice-specific effects in Tagalog reveal the limits of word order priming.Rowena Garcia, Jens Roeser & Evan Kidd - 2023 - Cognition 236 (C):105424.
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  • Lack of selectivity for syntax relative to word meanings throughout the language network.Evelina Fedorenko, Idan Asher Blank, Matthew Siegelman & Zachary Mineroff - 2020 - Cognition 203 (C):104348.
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  • The paradox of social interaction: Shared intentionality, we-reasoning, and virtual bargaining.Nick Chater, Hossam Zeitoun & Tigran Melkonyan - 2022 - Psychological Review 129 (3):415-437.
    Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common understanding of an ambiguous interaction. Yet how can shared intentionality arise? Many well-known accounts of social cognition, including those involving “mind-reading,” typically fall into circularity and/or regress. For example, A’s beliefs and behavior may depend on her prediction of B’s beliefs and behavior, but B’s beliefs and behavior depend in turn on her prediction of A’s (...)
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