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Dean Zimmerman (2002). The Constitution of Persons by Bodies.

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  1.  57
    Mental Excess and the Constitution View of Persons.Robert Francescotti - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):211-243.
    Constitution theorists have argued that due to a difference in persistence conditions, persons are not identical with the animals or the bodies that constitute them. A popular line of objection to the view that persons are not identical with the animals/bodies that constitute them is that the view commits one to undesirable overpopulation, with too many minds and too many thinkers. Constitution theorists are well aware of these overpopulation concerns and have gone a long way toward answering them. However, there (...)
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  2.  28
    The Constitution Relation and Baker’s Account of It.Marta Campdelacreu - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):1-19.
    A traditional argument based on Leibniz’s Law concludes that, for example, a statue and the piece of marble of which it is made are two different objects. This is because they have different properties: the statue can survive the loss of some of its parts but the piece of marble cannot. Lynne Rudder Baker adds that the piece of marble constitutes the statue. In this paper I focus on what I think is the most powerful objection to Baker’s account of (...)
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  3.  84
    Pereboom's Robust Nonreductive Physicalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):736-744.
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  4.  17
    Persons and Mysterianism.Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (1):165-188.
    The aim of this paper is to argue against the widely held view that our concept of person is purely mental. Utilizing an Anscombian scenario, in which reports on one’s own actions are made on the basis of observation, I argue that such “pilots in their ships,” as it were, cannot self-ascribe bodily properties. The mere fact that we feel in our bodies unlike pilots in their ships cannot generate the intuition that we are bodily: as long as we conceive (...)
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  5.  7
    Georg Gasser and Matthias Stefan (Eds), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 268 Pp., £55.00 (US$ 95.00), ISBN 978‐1‐107‐01444‐2. [REVIEW]Andrea Bottani - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):611-617.
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  6.  79
    A Critique of Baker’s Constitution View.Joseph Jedwab - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):47-62.
    The paper presents, motivates, critiques, and proposes revisions to Baker’s Constitution View, which includes her definitions of constitution, derivative features, and numerical sameness. The paper argues that Baker should add a mereological clause to her definition of constitution in order to avoid various counterexamples.
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  7. Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age.Lynne Baker - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):47-59.
    Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the (...)
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  8. Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity.Christopher Buford - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):197-209.
    Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account. Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’ that is essential to understanding personal identity (...)
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    Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons.David B. Hershenov - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (2):291.
    ABSTRACT: There are some problems with Lynne Baker’s constitution account of personal identity that become evident when we consider brain transplant thought experiments and two kinds of rare cases of conjoined twins — the first appears to be one organism but two persons and the second seems to involve two organisms associated with one person. To handle the problems arising from brain transplants, the constitution theorist must admit an additional level of constitution between the organism and the person. To resolve (...)
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  10.  40
    The SameP-Relation as a Response to Critics of Baker's Theory of Constitution.Tomasz Kakol - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5-6):561-579.
    According to the so-called "standard account" regarding the problem of material constitution, a statue and a lump of clay that makes it up are not identical. The usual objection is that this view yields many objects in the same place at the same time. Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution is a recent and sophisticated version of the standard account. She argues that the aforementioned objection can be answered by defining a relation of being the same P as (sameP). In (...)
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  11. The Constitution Question.Ryan Wasserman - 2004 - Noûs 38 (4):693 - 710.
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