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Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic, by John Woods, Springer, 2018

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Notes

  1. This and all subsequent unqualified page references are to Woods (2018).

  2. Woods, in his present naturalistic stance, is naturally unpersuaded by Routley and Meyer’s favoured approach: “Paraconsistent logics describe how formal logistic systems, not flesh-and-blood people, manage to spare themselves the perceived chaos of absolute inconsistency” (178).

  3. Indeed, Woods reveals elsewhere that “the working title of Truth in Fiction was Sherlock’s Member: An Essay on Truth in Fiction . . . I am a bit sorry now that I chickened out” (Woods 2019, 358).

  4. On Twitter, November 21, 2018. See also Uckelman (2018).

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Correspondence to Andrew Aberdein.

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Aberdein, A. Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic, by John Woods, Springer, 2018. Philosophia 49, 873–881 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00262-x

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