Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-pftt2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-09T18:16:54.980Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Confirmation Theory, Order, and Periodicity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Peter Achinstein*
Affiliation:
The Johns Hopkins University

Abstract

This paper examines problems of order and periodicity which arise when the attempt is made to define a confirmation function for a language containing elementary number theory as applied to a universe in which the individuals are considered to be arranged in some fixed order. Certain plausible conditions of adequacy are stated for such a confirmation function. By the construction of certain types of predicates, it is proved, however, that these conditions of adequacy are violated by any confirmation function defined for the type of language in question.

Various possible solutions to these difficulties are explored and found tobe inadequate. In particular, a proposal which stems from the suggestion to restrict a fundamental principle of confirmation to hypotheses containing only non-positional predicates is cited. This proposal, however, is shown to prevent confirmation functions from taking periodicities into account, and so is deemed unsatisfactory. A general theorem is proved to the effect that if non-positional predicates are taken to satisfy the conditions of adequacy which have been formulated, then no periodicity predicates whatsoever (i.e., predicates used in formulating hypotheses which foretell periodicities) can be subject to these conditions, on pain of contradiction. Yet it seems that periodicity predicates must be subject to these conditions of adequacy if a confirmation function is to recognize periodic occurrences. Thus, an impasse seems to be reached.

In the final sections we consider the beginnings of one possible solution to these difficulties. Our proposal involves treating sets of individuals, rather than individuals themselves, as instances, of an hypothesis which predicts a periodicity. On this basis we formulate new conditions of adequacy which are free from the previous difficulties and which will permit a confirmation function that satisfies them to take periodicities into account.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1963

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

[1] Barker, S. F. and Achinstein, Peter. “On the New Riddle of Induction,” The Philosophical Review, 69 (1960), 511522.10.2307/2183485CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Carnap, Rudolf. The Continuum of Inductive Methods. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952.Google Scholar
[3] Carnap, Rudolf. Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950.Google Scholar
[4] Carnap, Rudolf. “On the Application of Inductive Logic,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8 (1947), 133147.10.2307/2102920CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[5] Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955. Chapter 3.Google Scholar
[6] Goodman, Nelson. “A Query on Confirmation,” The Journal of Philosophy, 43 (1946), 383385.10.2307/2020332CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[6a] Goodman, Nelson. “Positionality and Pictures,” The Philosophical Review, 69 (1960), 523525.10.2307/2183486CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[7] Hempel, Carl G.Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” Mind, 54 (1945), 126, 97121.10.1093/mind/LIV.213.1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[8] Kemeny, John G.A Logical Measure Function,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 18 (1953), 289308.10.2307/2266553CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[9] Putnam, Hilary. “A Definition of Degree of Confirmation for Very Rich Languages,” Philosophy of Science, 23 (1956), 5862.10.1086/287461CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[10] Putnam, Hilary. “‘Degree of Confirmation’ and Inductive Logic,” to appear in: Schilpp, Paul A. (ed.) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. New York: Tudor Publishing Co. (In preparation.)Google Scholar