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Deleting the Subject: A Feminist Reading of Epistemology in Artificial Intelligence

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Abstract

This paper argues that AI follows classical versions of epistemology in assuming that the identity of the knowing subject is not important. In other words this serves to `delete the subject'. This disguises an implicit hierarchy of knowers involved in the representation of knowledge in AI which privileges the perspective of those who design and build the systems over alternative perspectives. The privileged position reflects Western, professional masculinity. Alternative perspectives, denied a voice, belong to less powerful groups including women. Feminist epistemology can be used to approach this from new directions, in particular, to show how women's knowledge may be left out of consideration by AI's focus on masculine subjects. The paper uncovers the tacitly assumed Western professional male subjects in two flagship AI systems, Cyc and Soar.

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Adam, A. Deleting the Subject: A Feminist Reading of Epistemology in Artificial Intelligence. Minds and Machines 10, 231–253 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008306015799

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