Abstract
In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411–444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the double dissociation of knowledge-that and knowledge-how and that is also able to do explanatory work elsewhere.
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Adams, M.P. Empirical evidence and the knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction. Synthese 170, 97–114 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9349-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9349-z