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Husker du?

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Abstract

Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker’s account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory.

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Robert Audi, John Barker, Sven Bernecker, Becko Copenhaver, and Fred Dretske. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Pacific Division Meetings of the APA in San Francisco in 2010. I benefited from feedback from the audience and from Sven in preparing the written version.

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  1. Department of Linguistics and Cognitive Science, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, 19716, USA

    Fred Adams

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  1. Fred Adams
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Correspondence to Fred Adams.

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Adams, F. Husker du?. Philos Stud 153, 81–94 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9663-4

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