

# ***Something about Vagueness and Aesthetic Disagreement***

Thomas Adajian\*

*Department of Philosophy and Religion, James Madison University*

ABSTRACT. Vagueness has gotten some attention in aesthetics, but deserves more. Vagueness is universally acknowledged to be ubiquitous. It has played a substantive role in some recent writing on the definition of art. It has figured importantly in analyses of the concept of literature, and (in connection with a thought experiment of Arthur Danto's), of the ontology of art. Vagueness was a locus of contention in a debate between Alan Goldman and Eddy Zemach about the reality of aesthetic properties. This paper's aim is to advance that debate, by focusing on the relevance of vagueness to the familiar argument that moves from premises about aesthetic disagreement to the conclusion that aesthetic properties are not real. In what follows, it is argued that, vis-à-vis aesthetic disagreement, the vagueness of aesthetic properties can do important theoretical work for aesthetic realism.<sup>1</sup>

## ***1. Preliminaries***

For present purposes, realism about aesthetic properties is the view that at least one aesthetic property is real, and truly ascribed to something. Because Alan Goldman's view is discussed below, I adopt his definition: a

---

\* Email: [adajiatr@jmu.edu](mailto:adajiatr@jmu.edu)

<sup>1</sup> On vagueness and the definition of art, see Longworth and Scarantino 2010, and Adajian 2010. In the latter it is argued that art is best understood as a homeostatic property cluster kind, which is a concept originally developed to make sense of the historical nature of species, on the grounds that doing so allows a deep theoretical explanation of the obvious extensional vagueness of the set of artworks. On homeostatic property cluster kinds in ethics and biology, respectively, see Boyd 1988 and Boyd 1999. On the concept of literature, see Shusterman 1984. For the Danto case, see Gilmore 2009. For the disagreement between Goldman and Zemach, see Goldman 1995 and Zemach 1991.

property is real if the truth of its ascription is independent of the subject's evidence and system of beliefs.<sup>2</sup> Although there is, notoriously, controversy about which definition of vagueness is correct, there is consensus about three features of vague predicates. First, vague predicates are those centrally employed in sorites arguments, i.e., arguments by degrees that appear to be valid and to have true premises (e.g., 'a human one day is a child,' and a linking premise of some kind, e.g., 'if an  $n$  day old human being is a child, then that human being is also a child when it is  $n + 1$  days old') a false conclusion ('a human 30,000 days old is a child').<sup>3</sup> Second, vague predicates permit borderline cases. Third, vague predicates demonstrate tolerance to small changes.

## **2. Arguments from Disagreement**

A simple deductive argument from disagreement that occurs in both aesthetics and ethics goes like this:

- (1) All real properties are such that there isn't widespread disagreement among competent judges about whether or not they are, in particular cases, exemplified.
- (2) There is widespread disagreement about aesthetic properties.
- (3) So, aesthetic properties aren't real. (1, 2)<sup>4</sup>

The first premise is of interest here. It seems implausible, for the following reasons. Almost all properties are vague. So, probably, aesthetic proper-

<sup>2</sup> Goldman 1995, p. 27. Tilghman 2004, p. 250. In what follows, I'll speak loosely of both vague properties and vague predicates.

<sup>3</sup> Not all sorites arguments employ mathematical inductions, because not all vague predicates naturally admit a numerical treatment. This will be important below.

<sup>4</sup> Schematically, the argument from disagreement runs as follows: *All real properties are such that there isn't widespread disagreement about them. There is widespread disagreement about properties. So, properties aren't real.* In contemporary ethics, the argument from disagreement has been discussed extensively. Some standard work is collected in Gowans 2000. For the ethical version, and its connections with vagueness, see Shafer-Landau 1994, to which the present paper owes a great deal. There is much recent work in epistemology about disagreement. For a discussion of aesthetic disagreement, in an epistemological context, see Egan 2010. See also Bender 1996.

ties are vague. Consequently, if aesthetic properties are real, then probably they are vague. People tend to disagree about vague properties. So, if aesthetic properties were real, then we would expect there to be disagreement about them. And that is what we do find. Moreover, one competent speaker can faultlessly classify a borderline case as a positive instance while another competent speaker faultlessly classifies it as a negative instance.

The point may be put another way. The argument from disagreement's key premise, which states that real properties don't give rise to disagreement, badly needs support. The following, if sound, would provide that support: *All real properties are precise, and precise properties are such that there isn't widespread disagreement about them.* But, clearly, this won't do. Almost all predicates are vague. If being real requires being precise, then almost no properties other than mathematical ones are real. Shafer-Landau has made the same point in ethics: the view that only precise properties are real not only does away with moral properties, it brings with it an ontology much more sparse (and Pythagorean) than most people, including contemporary philosophers, are willing to accept.<sup>5</sup>

Some construe the argument from disagreement as an inference to the best explanation.<sup>6</sup> The striking fact to be explained is the existence, among confident and educated critics, of widespread disagreement. If the non-realist hypothesis were true, we would expect to observe this. If the realist hypothesis were true, then there is there is widespread error among competent judges. This would be surprising. So, the argument concludes, widespread lack of critical unanimity points towards non-realism.

But, again, the criticism goes, if aesthetic properties are real, then, probably, they are vague. Disagreement about vague properties is common, and, often, admissible. So, as long as the realist hypothesis isn't conjoined with implausible assumptions about the nature of aesthetic properties, the hypothesis that aesthetic properties are real actually predicts disagreement. Consequently, the fact that we observe critical disagreement doesn't favor the non-realist explanation.

---

<sup>5</sup> See Shafer-Landau 1994, p. 333. Many of the important points Shafer-Landau makes about the vagueness of moral properties hold for aesthetic properties.

<sup>6</sup> Goldman 1995, p. 29

### 3. *Against the Appeal to Vagueness*

Goldman, who is well-known as a defender of aesthetic relativism, rejects this appeal to vagueness. He writes:

Not all cases in which we find substantial disagreement without explicable error or defect clearly fall in the borderline areas between correct and incorrect application of their aesthetic terms. The situation is very different from ordinary cases of vagueness, as with red and orange or bald and hairy. In the area of aesthetic judgment, what one critic finds clearly powerful, another finds merely raucous or strident.... This lack of agreement as to where the borders lie prevents our relegating all persistent disagreement in ascriptions of aesthetic properties to the gray areas between properties and their neighbors. To do so would render too many confident judgments of educated critics about alleged clear-cut instantiations simply incorrect, without any explanation for why such mistakes should be made. ... Tchaikovsky's *Sixth* is either poignant or maudlin (if these properties are real) – there seems to be no gray area between these.<sup>7</sup>

This passage is not transparent. Here is an interpretation that takes seriously the talk of “clearly falling in borderline areas”:

- (1) If one competent critic judges  $x$  to be clearly  $F$  (e.g., *poignant*), and another competent critic judges  $x$  to be  $G$  (e.g., *maudlin*) they disagree about where the borders of  $F$ -ness lie.
- (2) If two critics disagree about where the borders of  $F$ -ness lie, then  $x$  doesn't clearly fall in the borderline area between correct and incorrect attributions of  $F$ -ness.
- (3) So, if one competent critic judges  $x$  to be clearly  $F$  (e.g., *poignant*), and another competent critic judges  $x$  to be  $G$  (e.g., *maudlin*), then  $x$  doesn't clearly fall in the borderline area between correct and incorrect attributions of  $F$ -ness. (1, 2)
- (4) Vagueness explains critical disagreements about  $x$  only if  $x$  clearly falls in the borderline area between correct and incorrect attributions of a property.

<sup>7</sup> Goldman 1995, pp. 32 – 33. Goldman's suggestion that what matters whether *all* cases in which there is substantial aesthetic disagreement fall in the borderline area sets the bar for the realist extremely (and unnecessarily) high.

- (5) So, the vagueness of aesthetic properties doesn't explain aesthetic disagreement. (3, 4)

There is good reason to reject the fourth premise. Vague properties, it is widely if not universally held, are higher-order vague. (A predicate is second-order vague if it has borderline cases of borderline cases.) Consider 'bald,' a paradigmatically vague predicate.

Suppose that Jones is a borderline case of a bald man – he is neither clearly bald nor clearly not bald. Smith has a few fewer hairs on his head than Jones. So Smith is a borderline case of a borderline case of a bald man – he is neither clearly a borderline bald man, nor clearly not a borderline bald man.) Aesthetic properties, if vague, are higher-order vague: they allow borderline cases of borderline cases. Borderline cases of borderline cases are themselves borderline cases. And it is characteristic of borderline cases that people disagree about them. So it is characteristic of borderline cases of borderline cases that people disagree about them. Such disagreements will focus on cases that are in the vague regions around the second-order borders. The argument's fourth premise says that vagueness explains only disagreements concerning things that clearly fall in the borderline area between correct and incorrect attributions of a property. But although borderline borderline cases, which involve second-order vagueness, don't clearly fall in the borderline area, disagreement about them *is* explained by vagueness. The fourth premise, consequently, is implausible.

Alternatively: Suppose that two people – it could even be Smith and Jones -- have slightly different, but non-aberrant notions about which shade is paradigmatically red. Smith thinks the shade  $red_S$  is the paradigm, whereas Jones thinks  $red_J$  is. Both  $red_S$  and  $red_J$  have borderline cases. If so, then Smith and Jones may disagree about whether a given color patch,  $x$ , is a borderline case of redness. Smith thinks  $x$  is paradigmatically red. If the fourth premise were correct, then the vagueness of 'red' doesn't explain their disagreement. But, in fact, their disagreement is explained by two things: the fact that Smith and Jones have differing (but not widely divergent) conceptions of paradigm redness, and the vagueness of ' $red_S$ ,' and ' $red_J$ '. There is no reason to think that aesthetic predicates differ in this regard from color predicates. So there is reason to reject the fourth premise.

A second interpretation of Goldman's argument avoids the objection from higher-order vagueness. On this reading, the reference to things *clearly* falling into borderline regions is dropped:

- (1) If one competent critic judges  $x$  to be clearly  $F$  (e.g., *poignant*), and another competent critic judges  $x$  to be  $G$  (e.g., *maudlin*) they don't agree about where the borders of  $F$ -ness lie.
- (2) If two competent critics don't agree about where the borders of  $F$ -ness lie – one holds, while the other denies, that  $x$  is within those borders – then  $x$  isn't a borderline case.
- (3) So, if one competent critic judges  $x$  to be clearly  $F$  (e.g., *poignant*), and another judges  $x$  to be  $G$  (e.g., *maudlin*), then  $x$  isn't a borderline case. (1, 2)
- (4) Vagueness explains the disagreement between a critic who holds that  $x$  is clearly  $F$  and a critic who holds that  $x$  is  $G$  about  $x$  only if  $x$  is a borderline case.
- (5) So, the vagueness of aesthetic properties doesn't explain aesthetic disagreement. (3, 4)

Objection: the existence of ordinary first-order vagueness provides reason to doubt the second premise. If being a borderline case required that there be agreement about the location of the borders, then, given widespread disagreement, there would be very few borderline cases. But vagueness requires borderline cases, and vagueness is ubiquitous. So it's false that there are very few borderline cases. So being a borderline case doesn't require agreement about the location of the relevant predicate's borders.

#### **4. Neighboring Properties**

A third interpretation of the argument emphasizes *neighboring properties*. (Recall that Goldman speaks, in the quotation above, of "properties and their neighbors.") Taking Goldman's musical example as representative, here it is:

- (1) Competent critics disagree over whether Tchaikovsky's *Sixth* is maudlin or poignant.

- (2) So, there is no gray area between being maudlin and being poignant. (1)
- (3) So, being maudlin and being poignant aren't neighboring properties. (2)
- (4) Vagueness explains critical disagreements between two competent critics over whether  $x$  is  $F$  or  $G$  only if ' $F$ ' and ' $G$ ' designate neighboring properties.
- (5) So, vagueness explains the disagreement between competent critics over whether Tchaikovsky's *Sixth* is poignant or maudlin only if being poignant and being maudlin are neighboring properties. (4)
- (6) So, vagueness doesn't explain the disagreement between someone who thinks Tchaikovsky's *Sixth* is maudlin and someone who thinks it is poignant. (3, 5)

This 'neighbors' version of the argument is more plausible than those considered above (although the inference from (1) to (2) fails). Evaluating it in a way that advances the discussion requires that richer account of vagueness be put into play. So the next two sections are devoted, respectively, to a sketch of the outline of such an account and to drawing out its implications for the case of aesthetic predicates.

### ***5. Some Salient Features of Vagueness...***

First, distinguish one-dimensionally vague predicates from multi-dimensionally vague predicates.<sup>8</sup> One-dimensionally vague predicates, like 'tall,' vary along a single dimension. Multi-dimensional predicates vary along more than one dimension: colors, for example, may vary along three dimensions: hue, brightness, and saturation. One dimensional vagueness may be either of a discrete sort, or not. So, "bald" and "heap" are usually taken to exhibit discrete degree vagueness, since there is a natural ordering in terms of the number of hairs and grains of sand. For each, given this natural numerical ordering, we can construct a sorites argument that appears to be valid, starting with premises that appear to be true ("an

<sup>8</sup> My discussion of vagueness follows Hyde 2008 (pp. 16 – 27), very closely.

adult with 140,000 hairs on his head is not bald” and a linking premise, whether mathematical induction-style or not) and ending up with a false conclusion (“an adult with no hairs on his head is not bald”). “Tall” exhibits non-discrete one-dimensional vagueness, since we could construct a sorites paradox in terms of continuous transformations rather than discrete transitions.

Second, distinguish *degree-vagueness* and *combinatory vagueness*. (This distinction cross-cuts the one-dimensional/many-dimensional distinction.) Predicates exhibit degree vagueness when they fail to draw sharp boundaries along the relevant dimension. “Bald,” for example, fails to draw sharp boundaries along the dimension of hair quantity, and hence exhibits degree vagueness. Combinatory vagueness exists when competent judges can disagree about the application of a term -- as, for example, when competent speakers can disagree about whether something is a religion -- because there is indeterminacy regarding what it to count as necessary and sufficient conditions for being a religion. That indeterminacy may be traced to several different kinds of reasons: (a) reasonable variation among competent speakers as to which exemplars of the relevant predicate are paradigmatic; (b) unclarity about the *weightings* of the various dimensions; (c) indeterminacy as to the *number*, and individuation, of the dimensions; (d) the degree vagueness (discrete or continuous) of one or more of the dimensions; (e) lack of a common metric for the various dimensions. There are probably others. There are, clearly, many ways for predicates to be combinatorially vague. (Probably, combinatorial vagueness is both combinatorially vague and degree-vague.) By way of example, consider ‘nice’ and ‘intelligent’: there are many different ways that people are nice, or intelligent; not every competent (a vague term) user is aware of all of them; there may be no clear-cut set of dimensions; there may be no clear way to weight the dimensions; competent speakers may faultlessly operate with different paradigms of niceness or intelligence; the individual dimensions may admit of degree; and so on.<sup>9</sup>

Third, all vague predicates are sorites-susceptible, not just one-dimensional predicates.<sup>10</sup> A multi-dimensionally vague predicate of degree might

<sup>9</sup> The *niceness* and *intelligence* examples are from Keefe 2000, p. 12.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Hyde 2008, p. 16.



itself have dimensions that were (discretely or otherwise) degree-vague. But even if a vague predicate involves a determinate number of dimensions, each of which is numerical, there may be no way of reducing those multiple numerical scales to a single numerical scale. The predicate ‘endangered species,’ for example, arguably involves several dimensions (species numbers, area and quality of habitat, rate of decline) each of which is arguably numerical, and it is not clear how to combine them in a meaningful fashion. But a sorites argument from endangered species to non-endangered species can be constructed.<sup>11</sup> Sorites arguments can also be constructed for combinatorially vague predicates all of whose dimensions (and recall that it may be indeterminate how many dimensions there are) are non-numerical, like ‘religion’:

Consider an example of transitions from Hinduism (with its ritualistic dress and behavior, belief in supernatural beings with special powers, the passion-play of good versus evil, and a catalogue of hymns and chants); through the passionate following of an Australian Rules Football team (with slightly less ritualistic dress and behavior, belief in players blessed with extraordinary if not superhuman powers, the various heroes and villains, and the various chants and team songs); to a casual children’s game of ball in a backyard. It is plausible that a sorites argument can be constructed here.<sup>12</sup>

Fourth, not all predicates order their ranges of significance in the same way. One-dimensional predicates order their range of significance in a linear way: their elements are arranged in a single line.<sup>13</sup> By contrast, multidimensional predicates *partially order* their ranges of significance. Partial orderings arrange their elements on several possibly branching lines. Partial orderings have the property of being *unconnected*. (A relation is unconnected just in case, for at least one pair of elements in the domain, neither

<sup>11</sup> Weber and Colyvan 2010, especially 312-324.

<sup>12</sup> Weber and Colyvan 2010, pp. 311 – 312. Alston 1967 seems to be the source of the widely-cited religion example.

<sup>13</sup> A relation is a linear ordering just in case it is transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric, and *connected*. A relation is connected (or *comparable*) just in case it or its converse holds between any two elements in the domain – in other words, every two elements have an order.

it nor its converse holds between them.) Given the combinatorial vagueness of ‘nice’, the *nicer than* relation in the domain of people can serve as an example of unconnectedness: there are pairs of nice people of whom the following is true: they are not equal in niceness, and neither is nicer than the other.<sup>14</sup> The unconnectedness of multidimensional combinatorially vague predicates will be significant below.

Finally, linear orderings (whose elements are arranged in a single line), and partial orderings – which branch – terminate in different ways. Maximum elements need to be distinguished from maximal elements. A *maximum* element is an element which is greater than every other element. By contrast, *maximal* elements are elements than which no connected element is greater. In linear orderings, there is no distinction between maximal elements and maximum elements: every linear ordering has exactly one maximum element, and exactly one maximal element, and they are one and the same. Partial orderings have non-linear branching structures. Hence they may have more than one maximal element. Partial orderings may, unlike linear orderings, lack a maximum element. So for partial orderings the maximum/maximal distinction does not collapse. This feature of partial orderings, and hence of combinatorially vague predicates, will be significant below.

## **6. ... and their Implications for Aesthetics**

First, clearly, the aesthetic predicates Goldman uses as examples – ‘poignant,’ ‘maudlin,’ ‘raucous,’ ‘powerful,’ ‘strident,’ – are multidimensional and combinatorially vague. ‘poignant’ and ‘raucous’ and ‘powerful,’ and many other aesthetic predicates, are like ‘nice’ and ‘intelligent’: there are many different ways to be poignant, raucous, powerful, and so on. Users of these and other aesthetic terms may be competent and yet unable to agree on which dimensions are more important than others, on the degrees of the various dimensions, on which cases are paradigmatic, on the number of dimensions, and so on. There is indeterminacy as to which conditions are necessary, and which sufficient, for being poignant, maudlin, powerful, raucous, and so on.

---

<sup>14</sup> Keefe 1998, p. 570.

Second, because aesthetic predicates are multidimensional and combinatorially vague, they partially order their ranges of significance. This is intuitive. Consider, for example, impressiveness, and the associated *is more impressive than* relation. Which is more impressive, Cantor's diagonal proof that the real numbers are uncountable, or St. Peter's basilica? Both are impressive. It seems wrong to say that either is more impressive than the other, and also wrong to say that the proof and the basilica are equally impressive.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, not all poignant artworks are comparable with respect to their poignancy. Which is more poignant, Chekhov's "The Lady with the Lapdog" or John Huston's film "The Dead"?<sup>16</sup> Recall, too, that, competent users of a combinatorially vague predicate may disagree faultlessly which exemplars are paradigmatic, because comparatives formed from aesthetic predicates (*more poignant than, more powerful than, etc.*) are partially ordered. This explains why competent users of aesthetic predicates can have different paradigms of poignancy. Partial orderings can have more than one maximal element, but need not have a maximum element. So a paradigm of poignancy may be maximally poignant – such that nothing poignant is more poignant than it – without being more poignant than every other poignant thing.

Third, sorites arguments can be generated for 'maudlin,' 'poignant,' 'powerful,' and other multi-dimensional aesthetic predicates. It is widely agreed that sorities susceptibility is sufficient for vagueness. So there cannot be any reasonable doubt that these aesthetic predicates are vague. We are now in a position to diagnose the problem with Goldman's 'neighbors' argument. As we have seen, he holds that 'poignant' and 'maudlin' aren't neighbors, on the grounds that there is no "gray area" between them. That is true, but only on a very narrow construal of what it is to be a neighbor, or a "gray area." Goldman appears to assume that vague predicates are one-dimensional.<sup>17</sup> He then apparently infers, on the assumption that only one-dimensional predicates are neighbors, that because aesthetic predi-

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Broome 1997. There are shades of red of which it isn't natural to say either that one is redder, or that they are equally red – scarlet and crimson, for example.

<sup>16</sup> If you don't like this example, pick your own.

<sup>17</sup> He instances "red" and "heap," which are often – but wrongly – taken to be one-dimensional, speaking of "ordinary cases of vagueness ...[like] red and orange or bald and hairy" (Goldman 1995, p. 32).

cates aren't one-dimensional, they can't be neighbors. Though valid, this is unsound. Multidimensional vague predicates are sorites-susceptible, aesthetic properties are multidimensional, and sorites-susceptibility requires neighbors. Not all neighbors, therefore, are one-dimensional.<sup>18</sup>

Goldman's argument can be reconstructed this way:

- (1) Aesthetic predicates like 'poignant' and 'maudlin' are not one-dimensional.
- (2) Only one-dimensional predicates are linearly related.
- (3) So, aesthetic predicates like 'poignant' and 'maudlin' are not linearly related. (2, 3)
- (4) Only linear-related predicates are neighbors.
- (5) 'Poignant' and 'maudlin' aren't neighbors. (3, 4)
- (6) The vagueness of a pair of predicates explains disagreement only if they are neighbors.
- (7) So, the vagueness of 'poignant' and 'maudlin' doesn't explain the disagreement about Tchaikovsky's *Sixth*. (5, 6)

Since (6) is false, the argument is unsound. The problem with Goldman's 'neighbors' argument may be seen in another way. Here is an argument that parallels the 'neighbors' argument:

- (1) One competent person may judge x to be a peninsula, and another judge x to be an iceberg.
- (2) So, there is no gray area between being a peninsula and being an iceberg. (1)
- (3) So, peninsula and iceberg aren't neighboring properties. (2)

---

<sup>18</sup> Weber and Colyvan 2010 defends a powerful general (topological) definition of the sorites, and correlatively, of vagueness, that applies to predicates of any dimensionality, and incorporates a generalized conception of neighborliness. Weber and Colyvan take this approach on the reasonable grounds (among others) that a definition of vagueness should illuminate other versions of the sorites paradox than the discrete numerical one that philosophers most often focus on. Given the actual rarity of discrete one-dimensionally vague predicates, this is a sensible strategy.

- (4) Vagueness explains disagreements between those who attribute clear F-ness to  $x$ , and G-ness to  $x$ , only if F-ness and G-ness are neighboring properties.
- (5) So, the disagreement between someone who thinks  $x$  is clearly a peninsula and someone who thinks  $x$  is an iceberg is explained by vagueness only if peninsula and iceberg are neighboring properties. (4)
- (6) So, the disagreement between someone who thinks  $x$  is a peninsula and someone who thinks  $x$  is an iceberg is not explained by vagueness. (3, 5)

This is defective, even setting aside the invalidity of the step from (1) to (2). ‘Island’ is a multidimensionally, combinatorially vague predicate. Being an island involves several dimensions: size, composition, connection to land, connection to the ocean floor, and others as well.<sup>19</sup> Icebergs are one kind of borderline case of islands, since some islands shade off into icebergs. Peninsulas are another kind of borderline case of islands, since some islands shade off into peninsulas. Those dimensions and the others combine in many complex ways. Clearly, the disagreement *is* explained by the vagueness of ‘island’ even though ‘iceberg’ and ‘peninsula’ are not “neighboring” -- in the narrow sense that requires that neighbors be connected by a linear numerical ordering. The disagreement between someone who identifies  $x$  as a peninsula and someone who identifies  $x$  as an iceberg can be explained by the multidimensional combinatorial vagueness of ‘island.’ This is so even though there is no unique unilinear “gray area” between being an iceberg and being a peninsula of the sort that there is between being tall and being not tall. Similarly, vagueness can explain the disagreement between someone who thinks Tchaikovsky’s *Sixth* maudlin and someone who thinks it poignant even if there is no “gray area” (of a linear sort) between them.

### **References**

Adajian, T. (2012). “Defining Art,” in Anna Christina Ribeiro (editor), *The*

<sup>19</sup> The island case is inspired by Sorensen 2010, which puts the example to different use.

- Continuum Companion to Aesthetics*. New York: Continuum.
- Alston, W. (1967) "Vagueness", in P. Edwards, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 8. New York: Macmillan.
- Bender, J. (1996). "Realism, Supervenience, and Irresolvable Aesthetic Disputes," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 54: 371-381
- Boyd, R. (1988). "How to be a Moral Realist," in Geoffrey Sayre McCord (editor), *Moral Realism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- (1999). "Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa," in Robert Wilson (editor), *Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Broome, J. (1997). "Is Incommensurability Vagueness?" in Ruth Chang, *Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Egan, A. (2010). "Disputing about Taste," in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (editors), *Disagreement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gilmore, R. (2009). "Aesthetic Sorites: A Peircean Resolution," *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 23: 128-136
- Goldman, A. (1995). *Aesthetic Value*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Goldstein, L. (1988). "The Sorites as a Lesson in Semantics," *Mind* 97: 447-455
- Gowans, G. , editor (2000). *Moral Disagreements: Classic and Contemporary Readings*. London: Routledge.
- Hyde, D. (2008). *Vagueness, Logic, and Ontology*. London: Ashgate.
- Keefe, R. (1998). "Vagueness by Numbers," *Mind*, New Series, 107: 565-579
- editor (2000). *Theories of Vagueness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Longworth, F. and Scarantino, A (2010). "The Disjunctive Theory of Art: The Cluster Account Reformulated," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 50: 151-167
- Shafer-Landau, R. (1994). "Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism, and Ethical Indeterminacy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54:

331-344

Shusterman, R. (1984). *The Object of Literary Criticism*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.Sorensen, R. (2010). "Borderline Hermaphrodites: Higher-Order Vagueness by Example," *Mind* 119: 393 – 408Tilghman, B. (2004). "Reflections on Aesthetic Judgment," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44: 248-260Weber, Z., and Colyvan, M. (2010). "A Topological Sorites," *The Journal of Philosophy* 107: 311 – 325.Zemach, E. (1991). "Real Beauty," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 16: 249 – 265