Abstract
In a paper in this journal, Neil Levy challenges Nicholas Agar’s argument for the irrationality of mind-uploading. Mind-uploading is a futuristic process that involves scanning brains and recording relevant information which is then transferred into a computer. Its advocates suppose that mind-uploading transfers both human minds and identities from biological brains into computers. According to Agar’s original argument, mind-uploading is prudentially irrational. Success relies on the soundness of the program of Strong AI—the view that it may someday be possible to build a computer that is capable of thought. Strong AI may in fact be false, an eventuality with dire consequences for mind-uploading. Levy argues that Agar’s argument relies on mistakes about the probability of failed mind-uploading and underestimates what is to be gained from successfully mind-uploading. This paper clarifies Agar’s original claims about the likelihood of mind-uploading failure and offers further defense of a pessimistic evaluation of success.
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Notes
Kurzweil (2005) argues that technological improvement is exponential.
See Hajek (2008) for a very useful account of Pascal’s Wager.
The view that we are essentially human organisms is defended in Olson (1997).
For extensive presentation of this view, see de Grey and Rae (2007).
Thanks to Mark Walker for making this point.
These possibilities are explored in chapter 15 of Nussbaum (1992).
References
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Neil Levy and Mark Walker for very helpful discussion of this paper.
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This paper is a response to Neil Levy’s paper: “Searle’s wager” (AIS Vol. 26.4).
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Agar, N. On the irrationality of mind-uploading: a rely to Neil Levy. AI & Soc 27, 431–436 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-011-0333-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-011-0333-7