Abstract
Xenophanes famously noted that if horses could draw, they would draw their gods as horses. This connection between those who depict the gods and how the gods are depicted is posed as part of a critical theological program. What follows is an argumentative reconstruction of how these observations determine the extent and content of Xenophanes’ theological reforms. In light of the strength of the critical epistemic program, it is likely Xenophanes posed ambitious theological reforms.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See, for example, Zeller (1980 [1882]: 41), Scoon (1928: 49), Kirk and Raven (1962: 169), Ring (1987: 38), Lesher (1992: 99), Robinson (2008: 487). I will be using Diehls-Kranz’s numbering system for the fragments, so B15 and 16 are fragments that DK assess the source (in this case, Clement) as quoting Xenophanes accurately.
Aikin 2012
Clement, as noted by Lesher (1992: 91), states the implied conclusion: ‘each paints their [the gods’] forms exactly as their own’ (7:22). Lesher calls the view the ‘isomorphism thesis’ (1992: 92), one which he takes to be from the fact that Ethiopia was the southernmost nation known to the Greeks and Thrace the northernmost. From this, it comes to the view that every mortal being, from pole to pole, does the same thing. It will be clear in Section 5 why I think the correlation needn’t be strictly isomorphism, since not all the similarities are morphic, and so I will not use Lesher’s term.
See McKirahan, who extends the thought as ‘More relevant to our purposes is that [B16] implies: we Greeks think the gods have the appearance of Greeks, yet all other peoples portray the gods as having the distinctive characteristics of themselves….’ (1994: 61)
Robinson (2008: 487) also reads B16 to yield the data for B15’s counterfactual and reductio.
Consider the depictions of Aslan in C.S. Lewis’s Chronicles of Narnia, for example.
Take Herodotus, a century later, who observes that ‘all men are equal in knowledge of the divine’ (Histories 2:3).
The resistance to such overpopulation of gods (the inclination we might call theological parsimony) in Greek thought is expressed in the regular move of identifying gods in other cultures with Greek gods that played analogous roles. Herodotus, for example, applies the parsimony rule to his discussion of Egyptian gods and goddesses, saying Horus is Apollo, Isis is Demetr, Boubastis is Artemis, and Ammon is Zeus (Histories II.156). This said, there is an unfortunate heterogeneity of the individual gods themselves with regard to their distinct tasks. A case in point is the Athenian variety of Zeuses: Zeus Hypatos, Zeus Olympios, Zeus Soter, Zeus Basileus, and Zeus Naios, whom all seem to be thought of as separate entities (See Mikalson 1983: 71).
Jaeger calls the conflicted view consequent of failing to do this, ‘double entry bookkeeping’ (1968: 41).
Again, it is unclear how far Xenophanes can be interpreted taking this full step with the second stage of reform. See, for example, Burnet (1920, 128) who holds that Xenophanes does not go this far. But, again, the question is how ambitious his views were.
Granger notes this potential inconsistency, too: ‘Xenophanes, however, does not altogether free his conception of divinity from anthropomorphic features. Hi one greatest god is presumably just and good’ (2013: 242).
See, for example, Fränkel, who holds that Xenophanes makes ‘the chasm between the here and the beyond unbridgeable’ (1974:130). Sextus Empiricus clearly takes Xenophanes along these skeptical lines. Another who takes this more skeptical (or epistemically modest) interpretation is Lesher (1992, 2009)
Lesher (2013) goes so far as to suggest the option (as a humorous aside) that Xenophanes, like Kant, may have had his dogmatic and then critical periods. The positive theology belongs to the former; the critical program belongs to the latter.
Jaeger, too, sees that Xenophanes uses the criterion of whether something is fitting (ἐπιπρέπει) as a criterion for theological acceptability. This requirement he calls ‘the demand for the utter sublimity of the Godhead’ (1968:49).
A further point is that this line of interpretation mutes Xenophanes’ other focal views on politics and critique of social norms in F2/B2 and is positive views on physics in A24, B27, and B33 (to be discussed later). This seems far too much of a sacrifice for mere theological consistency.
In this regard, there is some rapprochement between what I’ve called the crypto-skeptical and optimistic readings of Xenophanes’ epistemology. Denying that we can have certain truths (saphes) is not equivalent to saying that all beliefs are on rational par.
References
Aikin, S. (2012). Pregnant premise arguments. Informal Logic, 32, 2.
Aikin, S. (2014). Xenophanes’ high rationalism: on fragment 1. Epoche, 19, 1.
Barnes, J. (1979). The presocratic philosophers. New York: Routledge.
Bowra, C. M. (1938). Xenophanes, fragment 1. Classical Philology, 33, 353–367.
Burnet, J. (1920). Early Greek philosophy (3rd ed.). New York: Macmillan.
Dawkins, R. (2006). The god delusion. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Dewey, J. (1935). A common faith. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Durkeim, E. (1915). The elementary forms of religious life. London: Allen and Unwin.
Eisenstadt, M. (1974). Xenophanes’ proposed reform of Greek religion. Hermes, 102, 142–150.
Granger, H. (2013). “Xenophanes’ positive theology and his criticism of Greek popular religion.”. Ancient Philosophy, 33, 235–271.
Harris, S. (2006). Letter to a Christian nation. New York: Knopf.
Hitchens, C. (2007). God is not great. Boston: Twelve Publishers.
Jaeger, Werner (1967). The theology of the early Greek philosophers. Oxford University Press.
Kirk, G.S. and Raven, J.E. (1962). The presocratic philosophers. Cambridge UP.
Lesher, J. (1992). Xenophanes of colophon. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Lesher, J (2009). “Xenophanes of colophon.” In: G. Oppy and N. Trakasis, (eds), The history of western philosophy of religion, Vol. I. Acumen.
Lesher, J. (2013). A systematic xenophanes? In J. McCoy (Ed.), Studies in philosophy and the history of philosophy (pp. 77–90). Washington D.C: Catholic University Press of America.
McKirahan, R.D. (1994). Philosophy before Socrates. Hackett.
Mikalson, J. D. (1983). Athenian popular religion. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Mogyorodi, E. (2002). “Xenophanes as philosopher: Theology and theodicy.” In Qu’est-ce que la Philosophie Presocratique? Ed. A. Laks. Presses Univeritaires du Sptentrion. 253–286.
Onfray, M. (2005). Atheist manifesto. New York: Arcade Publishing.
Ring, M. (1987). Beginning with the pre-Socratics. Palo-Alto: Mayfield Publishing.
Robinson, J. M. (1968). Greek philosophy. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Robinson, T.M. (2008). Presocratic theology. In The Oxford handbook of presocratic philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. 485–500.
Scoon, R. (1928). Greek philosophy before Plato. Princeton UP.
Zeller, E. (1980 [1883]). Outlines of the history of Greek philosophy. Trans. L.R. Palmer. New York: Dover.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Aikin, S.F. So What If Horses Would Draw Horse Gods?. SOPHIA 55, 163–177 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-015-0476-y
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-015-0476-y