ABSOLUT I

(Very Rough Draft)

September 11, 2001

> "They wanted to know why I did what I did."
> —Bruce Springsteen, *Nebraska* lyrics

1 Introduction

A major topic to which John Perry devotes considerable space in his more recent writings is that of context. Due to his highly influential work on indexicals and the self, it might be said that context has always been a concern present in the background of nearly everything Perry said. While this is not incorrect, it is in his more recent writings that one sees a solid decision to come to terms with this crucial feature of language (and action). Some important papers of Perry treating or hinting at context in one way or another are listed in the References.

Having been especially influenced by Perry's "Indexicals and Demonstratives," in this paper I want to take a closer look at contexts for indexicals, more specifically, the indexical "I". I hope to show that this clearest case of an indexical poses a strange difficulty.[1] While I am not aware of a previous

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[1] Since this is a conference honoring John Perry, maybe the following anecdote is timely. Recently, in a conference where Perry was an invited speaker, I had the privilege of sitting next to him, listening to another invited speech. The speaker gave a particularly appealing and elegant logical theory of tense. During the Q&A session, having kept silent throughout the conference, I thought maybe I should ask a question. So I inquired whether the speaker had thought about a possible complication that may arise due to the presence of time zones, viz. "I will run yesterday," uttered by an athlete flying early in the morning from Amsterdam to London for a race taking place before midnight GMT. Perry liked my question and in his usual generous style commended me for asking it. I replied by noting that time zones are ever-present as examples in his work and that this is what reminded me of their applicability in the present circumstance. Perry smiled and said, "Well, I think the world is a pretty complicated place." I hope that this paper can be seen as yet another justification of Perry's remark.

discussion of this complication, I want to play it safe and do not want to claim novelty for it. As a matter of fact, I'll cite various—some recent, some not so recent—works which either treat the same theme or come very close to it.

2   Semantic relativism

X is a philosopher in search for an answer (or an approach) to a philosophical problem. The answer X prefers will in general depend upon the assumptions X has adopted in relation to his problem.

Similarly, Y is a semanticist in search of an interpretation of a certain expression. There is no objectively correct answer as to how the interpretation should be carried out, Y usually thinks.[2]

Peter Unger has done much to popularize this point of view. His renowned distinction between contextualism vs. invariantism addresses precisely this matter. According to Unger, when someone—say, a boy—states (pointing in the direction of a baseball field)

"That field is flat."

one means, for all we know, something like the following:

According to contextually relevant standards, that field is sufficiently close to being such that nothing could ever be flatter than it is.

This is the contextualist stance. In other words, for a contextualist, there is an implicit reference to a contextual standard in the above statement. In this view, 'what is said' by the boy is not itself a simple thing.

On the other hand, for an invariantist, no additional content about contextually relevant standards is needed. Thus, the above statement means that the field is perfectly (absolutely) flat. In this view, 'what is said' is more simply related to the boy's sounds.

3   Is "I" automatic and narrow?

With respect to contexts for indexicals, Perry emphasizes two distinctions. These together give rise to the four categories shown in Table 1.

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[2]One cannot help but cite an example from (Perry, 1997b): "She advocated subjective semantics in her UCLA dissertation."

1. (Narrow vs. Wide) Does designation depend on narrow or wide context?

2. (Automatic vs. Intentional) Is designation automatic (given meaning and public contextual facts) or does it depend in part on the intentions of the speaker?

Perry envisions the narrow context as consisting of constitutive facts about the utterance, e.g., the agent, time, and location. He then claims: "The clearest case of an indexical that relies only on the narrow context is 'I', whose designation depends on the agent and nothing else."

Perry envisions the wide context as consisting of the narrow facts plus anything else that might be relevant, according to the workings of a particular indexical. For example, when one says "It is yea big", one usually has his hands outstretched to a certain distance and this distance is a contextual factor for the indexical "yea."

By automatic, Perry means a designation which uses no intentions. An utterance of "yesterday" is a good example. Such an utterance designates the day before the utterance occurs, no matter what the speaker intends.[3]

Table 1. Types of indexicals[†]		
	Narrow	Wide
Automatic	I, now*, here*	tomorrow, yea
Intentional	now, here	that, this man, there

[†] [adapted from (Perry, 1997b)]

The designation of an utterance of "that field", on the other hand, is not automatic. The boy's intention is relevant. There may be two fields in the vicinity when he says, "That field is flat." Which of them he refers to depends on his intention.

Here's a crucial passage from (Perry, 1997b):

> The indexicals "I", "now", and "here" are often given an honored place as "pure" or "essential" indexicals. [...] In Table 1, this honored place is represented by the cell labeled "narrow" and "automatic". However, it is not clear that "now" and "here"

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[3]I think the famous Beatles song with the same title has a line that constitutes a clear counter-example. But I'll let that pass.

deserve this status, hence the asterisks. With "here" there is the question of how large an area is to count, and with "now" the question of how large a stretch of time. [...] It seems then that these indexicals really have an intentional element.

My question is: Does "I" really deserve its privileged status? Here's a scenario which, in my view, goes a long way to prove that it doesn't.

Suppose you're a famous movie actor. Being a close friend I come to your place and we put one of your classic movies on the video player and start to watch. You are playing a private eye in the movie. There comes a hair-raising scene where the psycho killer is in a hotel room and you, the private eye, are about to nail him down. But I don't yet know that. There is knock on door of the room occupied by the killer. The psycho, gun in hand, approaches the door to open it. I'm terribly excited. I gasp, "Gee, who's knocking at the door?" You answer: "I am".

I think this is a story which defeats the reflexivity of "I" in a rather natural way. (In other words, I think of this scenario not as a far-fetched, superficial case that semanticists are so fond of constructing.) Specifically, I think you—my actor friend—definitely meant the private eye when you used the word "I". It would only be by fiat to assume that you meant your true self when you uttered the words "I am".

But that's not all! Now consider the following not-so-far-fetched scenario which is a variant of the above. It differs from the original only in couple of details.

Prior to my asking the question "Gee, who's knocking at the door?" you—my actor friend—left the room temporarily to unleash the dog in the garden. Being a good host, you immediately wanted to join me but suddenly found the garden entrance locked by the wind. Meanwhile, I am watching the film, unaware of your absence. (After all, you were not watching the movie as closely as I was. Having watched it a dozen times you knew the whole thing like the back of your hand and therefore, you were attending to minor household chores like dusting the furniture.) The crucial moment arrives, and the window is open and you're able to hear me gasping. You go: "I am", once again.

Now in this case the use is indeed reflexive. However, not much can be done, I think, about this strange ambiguity.

4 Defeasibility

What does the counter-example of the preceding section really show? I'll now try to hypothesize an explanation.

Remember the DBA which is a time-honored principle underlying almost all of our practical reasoning, viz. reasoning essential for rational action. According to a fine formulation of it that is due to Kim (1996):

> [The desire-belief action principle (DBA)] If a person desires that p and believes that by doing A she can secure p, she will do A.

As an illustration, consider a typical linguistic situation. I see my mother leaving without an umbrella. I've just noticed that it has started raining. So I say, "Mom, it's raining." My reasoning is as follows. I believe that by uttering these words I can secure a certain kind of action on the part of my mother, e.g., taking an umbrella or postponing her walk in the woods.

Obviously, this 'positive' principle comes with a dual (Kim, 1996):

> [Defeasibility of mental-behavioral entailments] If there is a plausible entailment of behavior B by mental states $M_1, \ldots, M_n$, there is always a further mental state M_{n+1} such that $M_1, \ldots, M_n, M_{n+1}$ together plausibly entail not-B [failure to produce behavior B].

Let me quickly introduce *contextual feature* as a term of profession. Now, I think the following parallel principle can be stated:

> [Defeasibility of contextual interpretations] If there is a plausible interpretation K of a certain expression in the presence of contextual features $C_1, \ldots, C_n$, there is (always?) a further contextual feature C_{n+1} such that $C_1, \ldots, C_n, C_{n+1}$ together plausibly entail a different interpretation (not-K).

This would usually happen when the 'normal' context has relevant features $C_1, \ldots, C_n$ and not C_{n+1}.

I defer it to the full version of this paper to spell out the details of my scenario in the light of this defeasibility principle. But I think the general upshot of the scenario is clear.

5 Other Scenarios

5.1 Porter Jack

On a recent trip to Edinburgh, we ended up with a hotel room with a faulty window. Everyday we would return to our room late in the evening to find the window opened by the room service and immediately call the Reception to request someone to close it. In the numerous occasions we have done so, we were invariably sent a jovial Scotsman who would knock on our door and announce with a heavy accent: "Hello, I'm your porter Jack." We would then open the door and let him do the fixing.

We (I, my wife, and my daughter) simply loved this routine. So now we are back to Ankara and whenever one of us comes home late, we always reply to our daughter's query "Who is it?" (or rather, its Turkish equivalent) by saying "Hello, I'm your porter Jack."

Clearly, this cannot be regarded as sarcastically imitating someone; we all loved Jack. Rather, the whole sentence (known, for all practical purposes, only to the three of us) is more like a password to open the door.[4]

5.2 The silver screen

In Stalnaker (p. 40), the sentence "I am bald" is said by Charles Daniels. Stalnaker then claims (p. 41): "[In this case], there is a *systematic rule* matching a feature of the context (the speaker) with the singular term I."

Now consider the following exchange on late night TV:

- Jay Leno (to actor Jon Doe who is sporting a pigtail): Jon, I hear that in your upcoming movie you have a surprise for your fans. Tell us about it.

- Jon (smiling): I am bald.

Jon is playing Yul Brynner in this feature-length biography.[5]

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[4]Bianchi (2001) suggests a scenario where an intruder first watches a man (say, the husband) leave a house and then rings the doorbell. A woman (say, the wife) answers:

- Who's that?
- Honey, it's me. (or "I'm back") [said by the intruder in a voice imitating the husband's]

This intruder abuses "Porter Jack"!

[5]Also consider a variant where Jon is still an eligible bachelor in real life and tells Jay: "I'm getting married."

5.3 The phony inclusive

Predelli (1998a, p. 409, fn. 18) mentions an example due to Arnold Zwicky that the latter has dubbed the 'phony inclusive use of we'. When a waitress says "How are we today?" to a customer, what we have here is a display of intention to contain only the addressee (customer), and not the waitress herself.

Inspired by this example, consider the sentence "How am I doing today?", uttered by Yeltsin (in bed due to a terrible heart ailment) to a 'double' of his who's just going out to meet with the North Korean delegation. The intention of Yeltsin is to question the ability and preparedness of the double to play Yeltsin's part convincingly in the meeting and is more like "Are you ready to fool them?". (If there are several doubles, he might as well utter, "How are we doing today?" and the situation is similar to Zwicky's example.)

Kaplan says in "Demonstratives" (1989a, p. 491) that he considers 'I' as a pure indexical, viz. something for which "*no associated demonstration is required, and any demonstration supplied is either for emphasis or is irrelevant*" (his italics). He then adds (ibid., fn. 11): "I have in mind such cases as point at oneself while saying 'I' (emphasis) or pointing at someone else while saying 'I' (irrelevance or madness or what?)".

Now imagine a beat-up Yeltsin visiting the Madame Tussaud's London and admiring his shining waxwork with the words "I'm the most vigorous man here." (Pointing is not even necessary.)[6]

5.4 Delegation

The following excerpt is from Bezuidenhout (1997, pp. 216–217):

> [S]uppose the heads of departments of a large organization are at a meeting, and are trying to decide which departments should take on which of the tasks on the chairperson's 'to do' list. The chair reads out the first item on the list and one of the heads of department says 'I'll do that'. Here it is understood that she is

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[6]In all fairness, it must be pointed out that Kaplan (op. cit., fn. 13) carefully clarifies his position: "My semantical theory is a theory of word meaning, not speaker's meaning. It is based on linguistic rules known, explicitly or implicitly, by all competent users of the language." I appreciate that. But doesn't that bring us to the infamous semantics-pragmatics distinction? My aim is to investigate the actual circumstances that make understanding possible by all competent users of the language.

undertaking to do the task in her role as head of department. Presumably she will not carry out the task herself, but will delegate the work to one of her minions. On the other hand, if she sees a child struggling to lift a heavy object and responds 'I'll do that' she is saying that she will personally take over from the child to complete the task, not that she will find some underling to take over from the child.

5.5 Rebound

My wife always instructs our daughter to finish her homework as soon as our daughter returns from school. In various occasions I tried to lessen her agony by (seriously) telling my wife: "Oh, you're such a despot!" Regrettably, she never accepted this charge, arguing that she's doing this for our daughter's own good, etc., etc.

One day our daughter arrived and started to complain that she had a load of algebra assignments for the next day. My wife was not yet back from work. But the school year was coming to a close and I was somewhat worried about a poor math grade. So I unhesitatingly led her—notwithstanding her protests—to her study and set her to work.

When my wife arrived, my daughter ran to her and lamented about my ruthlessness. My wife hugged her and (eyeing me in perfect gravity) retorted: "Oh, I'm such a despot!"

I think this is a neatly put reaction to her frustration with my earlier accusations, and a clear effort to get even.

5.6 The appropriate answer

In his landmark paper "Pragmatics," Stalnaker gives the following Argument (p. 37):

> If O'Leary says "Are you going to the party?" and you answer, "Yes, I'm going," your answer is appropriate because the proposition you affirm is the one expressed in his question. On the simpler analysis, there is nothing to be the common content of question and answer except a truth-value. The propositions are expressed from different points of reference, and according to the simpler analysis, they are different propositions. A truth-value, of course, is not enough to be the common content. If O'Leary

asks "Are you going to the party?" it would be inappropriate for you to answer, "Yes, snow is white."

Now assume that O'Leary and you are watching a video of a film in which you are starring as a private eye (basically the same set-up as in my preceding scenario). As it happens you have been invited to a party both in the film and in real life. Then confusion follows. One might argue that "the party" is not a very definite description and that it must be made more specific, e.g., "the party that the senator is giving next week." Now, padding the scenario with enough boring details, it is obvious that such (more specific/informative) definite descriptions can still be defeated. Obviously, the source of the problem is not the definite description but rather the first person indexical.[7]

5.7 The bat people

Partee et al. (1990, p. 428):

> In such a *double-indexical interpretation* the indexical I, for instance, is interpreted by a function from contexts to the parameter s_c, the speaker at that context, and the extension of s_c is determined at an index by identifying it with the extension of the predicate *speaking* at that index.

In Partee et al. (1990, p. 429), the statement 'I am Robin' is taken to be informative in two different ways: "First, when it gives a hearer a new way of rigidly referring to the speaker when he is not present and second, when the hearer already has information about someone called Robin, but is not acquainted with him from his own experience. In the first case, the information stabilizes the character, in the second case it hooks up a stable content to the external context of use."

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[7]Stalnaker's passage is problematic for another reason. Assume that "snow is white" is an encoding for the sequence "I'm going" in the context of the film. This might have happened in various reasonable ways, e.g., maybe earlier in the film you've witnessed exchanges between a powerful boss and his associate, such as

- When are you going to bring the green plants [drug money]?
- Oh, sorry, chief, snow is white in an hour.
- Can't wait that long! I thought you've already put them in the vase [the safe].
- OK, boss, don't get upset, snow is white right now. (Rushes to leave the room.)

But, the above explanation is defeated by the following scenario. Suppose you are attending to a costume party as Robin, the young partner of Batman. You see Batgirl in the bar and approach her. You say: "Hi, I am Robin. May I buy you a drink?"

5.8   I'm about to be attacked

Inspired by Wettstein (p. 448, fn. 47).

There has been an unsuccessful attack on Yeltsin's life. KGB recorded the whole incident and he's watching it. There's a certain moment he utters: "I'm about to be attacked!"

There has been a successful attack on his life. But he was not in the car; his double was! Watching his unfortunate double stop breathing, he utters: "Now, I'm dead."

6   Related Work: A Brief Review

6.1   From the textbooks, etc.

Kamp (1990, p. 67):

> It has been suggested that all a semantic theory needs to say about 'I' is that the word refers in all cases in which it is used (except those where it appears inside direct quotation) to the person who uses it; and that is all there is to it. In a way this is clearly right.

Now contrast 'The speaker is the one who is speaking' with 'I am the one who is speaking'. The latter is declared to be a statement that may express new information to others beside oneself Partee et al. (1990, p. 428). To see this, consider yourself watching, together with a friend, an old video of you and your identical twin brother. You're muttering something in the video while your brother keeps silent. Your friend asks: "Which one is you?" You answer: "I am the one who is speaking."

Lyons (1996, p. 304):

> [I]nstead of saying *I am happy*, one could point to oneself and say *Happy*[.]

Lyons (1996, p. 305):

The first-person pronoun, 'I' in English, refers (normally) to the actual speaker: i.e., to whoever is speaking at that moment.

Higginbotham (1997, pp. 21-48):

[F]or [Reichenbach] a token τ of an indexical or demonstrative expression had for its reference an object $f(\tau)$, where f was determined by the meaning of the expression of which τ was a token. A simple example of the theory is that of tokens of the first-person singular pronoun 'I'. If I say, 'I have got through my root canal,' then the semantics of that whole utterance delivers the meaning that the speaker of τ, namely me, has got through his root canal, where τ is the very token of the first-person pronoun that I uttered, the function *the speaker of* playing the role of f.

6.2   Strawson on Wittgenstein

Strawson (1959, p. 95):

[Wittgenstein] is reported to have held that the use of 'I' was utterly different in the case of 'I have a toothache' or 'I see a red patch' from its use in the case of 'I've got a bad tooth' or 'I've got a matchbox'. He thought that there were two uses of 'I', and that in one of them 'I' was replaceable by 'this body'. So far the view might be Cartesian. But he also said that in the other use (the use exemplified by 'I have a toothache' as opposed to 'I have a bad tooth'), the 'I' *does not denote a possessor*, and that no Ego is involved in thinking or in having toothache; and referred with apparent approval to Lichtenberg's dictum that, instead of saying 'I think', we (or Descartes) ought to say 'There is a thought' (i.e. 'Es denkt').

6.3   Geach on Descartes

Geach (1992, pp. 117–119) [Section 26: The Fallacy of "Cogito Ergo Sum"]:

Let us begin by reminding ourselves how "I" is used in ordinary life with psychological verbs. If P.T.G. says "I see a spider" or "I feel sick", people will ordinarily think that the speaker who says

this, P.T.G., sees a spider or feels sick. The word "I", spoken by P.T.G., serves to draw people's attention to P.T.G.; and if it is not at once clear who is speaking, there is a genuine question "Who said that?" or "Who is 'I'?" Now consider Descartes brooding over his *poêle* and saying: "I'm getting into an awful muddle—but who then is this 'I' who is getting into a muddle?" When "I'm getting into a muddle" is a soliloquy, "I" certainly does not serve to direct Descartes's attention to Descartes, or to show that it is Descartes, none other, who is getting into a muddle. We are not to argue, though, that since "I" does not refer to the man René Descartes it has some other, more intangible, thing to refer to. Rather, in this context the word "I" is idle, superfluous; it is used only because Descartes is habituated to the use of "I" (or rather, of "*je*" and "*moi*") in expressing his thoughts and feelings to other people. In soliloquy he could quite well have expressed himself without using the first-person pronoun at all; he could have said: "This is really a dreadful muddle!", where "This" would refer to back to his previous meditations. [. . .] [W]hat is going to count as an allowable answer to the question "What is this 'I'?" or "Who then am I?" These questions might have a good clear sense in certain circumstances—e.g. if Descartes had lost his memory and wanted to know who he was ("Who am I?" "You are René Descartes"), or if he knew that somebody had said "I'm in a muddle" but not that it was himself ("Who is this 'I'?—who said he was in a muddle?" "You did"). The states of mind that would give the questions sense are queer and uncommon, but they do occur.

6.4 Harré on the psychology of personhood

Harré (1998, p. 56) notes that it has taken philosophers and linguists a rather long time to see that 'I' is not a tool for referring to oneself. He adopts an interesting stance (ibid., p. 57) by indexing the descriptive content of a first person utterance with the spatial location of the embodied speaker.[8] The speaker is simply taken as a thing amongst things. Thus "I will visit

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[8] "The body is the storm-center, the origin of coordinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience strain. Everything circles round it and is experienced from its point of view. The word 'I', then, is primarily a noun of position, just like 'this' and 'here'." These words of William James are quoted by Harré (op. cit., p. 55) in support of his view.

Amsterdam" places me in a particular setting in the future, whereas "I called Filip from the station" locates my embodied self at an earlier moment at a particular place in town. In an eloquent passage, this is summarized as follows (ibid., p. 56):

> Since the place of an utterance is generally and primordially the location of the embodied speaker, the singularity of the indexical reference of the first person and the uniqueness of human embodiment are intimately related. [...] For example the meaning of 'I' is completed on an occasion of use by local knowledge of the location of the body of the speaker. By virtue of that fact about its usage the situated use of 'I' indexes the empirical content of a descriptive statement with the spatial location of the embodied speaker.

Harré's most interesting contribution is his treatment of the so-called iterated 'I'. The iterated 'I' most naturally emerges in statements in which a perception report is present, viz.

- Alice: There is a Porsche. (= I can see a Porsche.)

- Bob: Are you sure it is a Porsche?

- Alice: Well, I think I can see it.

In this case, the last utterance of Alice is basically a qualifying clause within which her earlier perceptual claim is embedded.

Harré further notes (ibid., p. 61) the double indexical force of 'I'. According to him, 'I' not only indexes content with the spatial location of the speaker but it also indexes the social force of the same utterance with the moral position or standing of the speaker. Thus, consider the prediction "I am going to like it," said of a certain movie. This prediction would be weakened if the original utterance becomes "I think I'm going to like it," and it would be strengthened if the utterance becomes "I'm sure I'm going to like it." It may be said that in each case, the inner 'I' indexes the body centeredness of the claim while the outer 'I' take responsibility for what has been said in the embedded clause.[9]

Harré then makes interesting observations regarding the social function of 'I'. He rightfully reminds (ibid., p. 58) the social function of 'I'

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[9]Springsteen's "I did what I did" could probably be understood in the same vein.

in Japanese. For instance, the choice of *watakushi* rather than *watashi* as the first person expression indexes the social force of the utterance: while it pays respect to the addressee it goes on to simultaneously acknowledge the high standing of both. In other words, the pronoun not only serves to denote a person but also expresses a social relation—a pronoun of power and solidarity. Harré's view of the English (Indo-European) 'I' is also useful. Noting that a thought cannot be a memory of mine unless it is the thought of something I did or that happened to me, he regards 'I' (ibid., p. 138) as expressing the continuity of personhood in the narration that creates it.[10]

Finally, a related matter, i.e., pathologies of self, is studied by Harré in the context of pathologies of discourse. In cases of multiple personality disorder (MPD) a commonsense principle that can be summed up as "one person per body and one body per person" seems to be seriously violated. MPD phenomenon was first described in detail almost a century ago and since then there have been many instances. Paraphrasing the characterization of American Psychiatric Association (ibid., pp. 155–156) we obtain something like this: the existence and taking full control of within the person two or more distinct personalities, each with its own (persistent) pattern of perceiving and understanding the environment and self. Here is the famous case of Miss Beauchamp (ibid., p. 152):

> Under hypnosis she began to address remarks to and about herself, as if from the point of view of someone else. Later, as her condition developed she would address comments from the point of view of yet another 'person'. Prince [the psychiatrist] called these 'speakers' BI, BII and BIII. BII began to take on personhood as a characteristic pattern of pronoun usage marked a complementarity of address between her and BI, Miss Beauchamp proper. The 'I'–'you' pair shifted indexical reference from Miss Beauchamp to her alter ego[.]

Pronouns played a key role in remedying Miss Beauchamp's troubles. Prince reports (ibid., p. 153) that a cure was obtained "by the incorporation of the memories of each voice within a common autobiography, that is as a temporally coherent and continuous story as indexed by the pronoun 'I'. Tying some recollections to 'you' and 'she' had ceased."

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[10]Cf. Alistair MacIntyre: "In what does the unity of a single life consist? The answer is that its unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life."

7 Conclusion

Like Unger, I believe that neither contextualism nor invariantism is a definite semantic position one would like to adopt. Once again, when the boy says

"That field$_1$ is flat$_2$."

it is probably wiser to take a more invariantist stance regarding the first part and a more contextualist stance regarding the second. And I think this is also what we should do for "I" too, depending on its contexts of occurrence. In other words, does "I" really deserve the honored place in the given table of Perry? I think not.

Similar views were presented by – among others – Wettstein, Recanati, Predelli, Bianchi, and Corazza.

Bianchi (2001, p. 84):

> The reference of 'I' is not a direct function of the context of utterance (the semantic context); its context of interpretation is fixed by recognizing the utterance producer's intentions, hence by relying on pragmatic considerations. The rule associated with 'I' seems now to be
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>> "an occurrence of 'I' refers to the individual the producer of the utterance indicates as responsible for the utterance in the given context."
>
> We thus introduce an intentional factor in the very rule associated with 'I'.

Also witness Corazza et al. (forthcoming):

> The context or setting of a linguistic interchange plays a role in determining how the agent is determined. The agent of 'I', like the relevant contextual parameters such as the time and place, is best understood to be the *conventionally determined* agent, and the agent determined by convention may well be distinct from either the utterer or the producer of the token of 'I'.

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