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Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument

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Abstract

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of the no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)–(3) make the difference between prediction and accommodation, and account for the confirming power of theoretical virtues such as non ad-hocness, non-fudging, non-overfitting, independence and consilience. I thus show that functional novelty (a) avoids the deductivist objections to predictivism, (b) is a gradual notion, in accordance with the common intuition that confirmation comes in degrees, and (c) supports the no miracle argument, so vindicating scientific realism.

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Notes

  1. Lyons (2002) has countered that even particular claims which were essential in deriving novel predictions have been shown to false. For a discussion and a reply see (Alai 2013).

  2. The predictivism–deductivism debate has been sketched in Lakatos (1970, 123–124), Musgrave (1974, 1–3), Lipton (1991, ch. 10), Barnes (2008, ch. 1), etc.

  3. In fact, what is commonly called deductivism should be called more precisely ‘consequentialism’, for consequences can be both deductive and inductive (as was brought to my attention by an anonymous reviewer for this Journal). This sense of ‘deductivism’ is altogether different from two others: (1) Alan Musgrave’s idea that induction is really a form of deduction with an implicit epistemic premise (its opposite being inductivism), and (2) Popper’s theory of empirical control (see Grunbaum, Salmon (eds.) 1988). I owe this distinction to Howard Sankey.

  4. The presupposition of earlier theories by the theorist or by her method does not launch an infinite regress, since the earliest, “take-off” theories were introduced without relying on previous theories or on theory-dependent methods (Barnes 2008, 146–155).

  5. Musgrave (1974, § 2) and Barnes (2008) speak of a “paradox”, and Lipton (1991) of a “puzzle”.

  6. See Gardner (1982, 1-ff), Leplin (1997, Chaps. 2, 3), Barnes (2008, Chap. 1).

  7. Zahar (1973 §1.1). See Gardner (1982, p. 2), Maher (1993, p. 339).

  8. Tacitly and perhaps unconsciously: see Gardner (1982, p. 3), Leplin (1997, p. 50).

  9. “So long as e was not used in constructing … theory T, then … there is no question of any reduction of support …” Worrall 2005, 818; see also ibid., 819, etc.); “… the crucial difference is that in cases of little or no support, certain aspects of the theory were fixed precisely to yield the phenomenon at issue” (Scerri and Worrall 2001, 423); predictions give little support when “the fact was both known and used in the construction of the theory” (ibid., 424; also 426, etc.).

  10. I owe this suggestion to Vincenzo Fano.

  11. For this distinction and the related problems, see Lipton (1991, 177–183).

  12. This solution of the twin scientists paradox is similar, although standing on a more complete basis, to that proposed by Lipton himself: (1991, 182).

  13. As conceded by Scerri and Worrall (2001, 423); see also Worrall (1978, 50–51, 68).

  14. Scerri and Worrall (2001, 440). Instead Leplin (1997) ignores the role of auxiliary assumptions.

  15. Like the melting point of a metal in future occasions is extrapolated from the same value in observed occasions.

  16. It might be suggested that given the holistic nature of confirmation, this regress will eventually involve all the available empirical data. I don’t know if this must necessarily be the case.

  17. As Worrall suggests in (2006, 39).

  18. Whewell (1858, 86–88). This was brought to my attention by an anonymous reviewer for this Journal.

  19. One juror, Poisson, wrote: “The theory of emission and that of waves both encounter great difficulties; time and the future work of physicists and mathematicians will perhaps end by settling these doubts …” (cited in Worrall 1989b, 140).

  20. The gap between the objective support of d to T, and our subjective assessment of it has been discussed by Lipton (1991, 177–183).

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Acknowledgments

I have greatly benefited from comments and suggestions by Anjan Chakravartty, Vincenzo Crupi, Dennis Dieks, Michel Ghins, F.A. Muller, Howard Sankey and two Referees for this Journal. I am particularly grateful to my colleagues Vincenzo Fano and Gino Tarozzi for frequent discussions and useful advices.

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  1. Department of Basic Sciences and Foundations, Università di Urbino “Carlo Bo”, Palazzo Albani, 61029, Urbino, Italy

    Mario Alai

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Alai, M. Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument. Erkenn 79, 297–326 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9495-7

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