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Intransitivity and Vague Preferences

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness are applied to an example of vague preferences, but none of them provide a justification for the transitivity axiom.

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Correspondence to Jonathan Aldred.

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For helpful comments on earlier drafts and discussions of this material, I am very grateful to John Broome, Rosanna Keefe, Matthew Kramer, Stuart Rachels, Jochen Runde and Adrian Walsh. I owe a large debt to John O’Neill, who suggested an earlier version of the “Tragedy of the Disappearing Commons” example.

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Aldred, J. Intransitivity and Vague Preferences. J Ethics 11, 377–403 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-005-7977-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-005-7977-9

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