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Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat

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Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. Richard Fumerton has defended PIJ by appeal to examples, and recently Adam Leite has argued that this principle is supported by considerations regarding the nature of responsible belief. In this paper, I defend a form of externalism against both arguments. This form of externalism recognizes what I call the phenomenon of reflective defeat: if one is justified in not believing that E makes probable P, then this defeats whatever justification one has for believing P upon the basis of E. I argue that this modified version of externalism has the virtue of accommodating the intuitions that motivate internalism, without the cost of the vicious regress that makes internalism so unattractive.

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Notes

  1. As stated, PIJ only identifies two necessary conditions on inferential justification—it does not state whether they are jointly sufficient. This allows for the possibility of different forms of internalism depending upon whether additional conditions are imposed. For example, some internalists may require that E in fact support or make probable P. Others may eschew this additional requirement.

  2. See Fumerton (1995, 86) and (1985, 39–40).

  3. See Fumerton (2006, 105), and also Greco (2000b, 370–371).

  4. As Fumerton notes, there is no problem with the application of PIJ to deductive inference (1995, 190). Plausibly, one can have a priori non-inferential knowledge that P&Q entails Q. And since entailment is the limit of making probable, when it comes to deductive inference one can satisfy PIJ. So the skepticism to which PIJ leads is skepticism about non-deductive inferential justification. That’s bad enough.

  5. Fumerton argues that the only interpretation under which this is possible is the Keynesian theory of probability, according to which relations of probability are analogous to relations of deductive entailment that can be known a priori. However, he admits that it is not at all plausible that we have such a priori knowledge: “I cannot quite bring myself to believe that I am phenomenologically acquainted with the internal relation of making probable,” (1995, 218).

  6. Bergmann (2005) defends a similar view. There are two important differences. First, Bergmann is not concerned with PIJ, but with any higher-order requirement imposed by internalism. Second and more importantly, on Bergmann’s account it is one’s disbelieving or withholding belief that functions as a defeater of one’s justification, regardless of whether that attitude is justified. This departs significantly from DEFEAT. While the two positions are consistent, DEFEAT does not entail that if one unjustifiably disbelieves that one’s reasons are good that that this functions as a defeater of one’s reasons. Nor does Bergmann’s account entail that if one merely possesses justification for disbelieving that one’s reasons are good, without so disbelieving, then one possesses a defeater of those reasons.

  7. “Let us say that a belief that P is inferentially justified if its justification is constituted by the having of at least one belief other than P,” (1995, 56). “[E]ngaging in conscious consideration of some set of premises on the way to reaching a conclusion that is consciously thought of as following from those premises is not a necessary condition for the justification supporting that belief to be inferential,” (1995, 39).

  8. See his (1995), chapter 2, and especially chapter 7, in which he expresses his view that if we lack non-inferential justification for believing probability claims, then we are not justified in believing claims about the external world.

  9. See Senor (1996) for the prima/ultima facie distinction.

  10. “As I’m using the locution, S can be justified in believing P on the basis of E even though S is not justified in believing P on the basis of his entire body of evidence.” (2004a, 162).

  11. Doxastic justification is typically analyzed in terms of propositional justification. For an account that reverses that analysis, see Turri (2010). For further discussion of the basing relation, see Korcz (1997).

  12. For example, in explaining why he accepts PIJ, he states, “If asked why the conditional is true—indeed necessarily true—it is tempting to suggest that it describes that of which having evidence consists. As I said, one can make the claim initially plausible simply by looking at the ways in which it seems appropriate to challenge someone’s claim to have good (epistemic) reasons for believing something,” (1995, 86).

  13. Here are three additional pieces of evidence. First, Fumerton also states that epistemologists should be interested “primarily, or even exclusively,” in propositional justification (1995, 92), (2006, 39). Second, one of his most recent formulations of PIJ is clearly stated in terms of propositional justification: “To have justification for believing P on the basis of E one must have not only (1) justification for believing E, but also (2) justification for believing that E makes probable P,” (2006, 39, my emphasis). Finally and most conclusively, in a personal correspondence, Fumerton has confirmed that he intended PIJ to apply primarily to propositional justification and derivatively to doxastic justification.

  14. In the original passage, Fumerton used “C” to refer to the conclusion in question. I have changed the “C” to a “P” in the passage so that it is consistent with the way he formulates PIJ.

  15. Other forms of externalism include Greco’s agent reliabilism (2000a, 2010) and Bergmann’s proper function account (2006).

  16. Any discussion of process reliabilism invites the question of how we are to type the specific processes that give rise to the belief. If there is no solution to this problem, then process reliabilism should be rejected. But that issue is a very different point of contention between internalists and externalists than the one that is the focus of this paper. For the present purpose of determining what reliabilism implies about the case of the hypnotized believer, one must simply rely on what seems to be the most plausible description of the process being used. Even internalists must do so, insofar as they hold that reliabilism has incorrect implications about the case.

  17. “Person S is ex ante justified in believing p at t if and only if there is a reliable belief-forming operation available to S which is such that if S applied that operation to his total cognitive state at t, S would believe pat t-plus-delta (for a suitably small delta) and that belief would be ex post justified.” (1979, 21)

  18. Cases of deviant causation show this. Fumerton offers an example: “if I justifiably believe E and justifiably believe that E makes probable P, and this somehow causes my psychiatrist to use hypnosis to induce my believing P, many philosophers would still refuse to regard my belief as justified,” (1995, 92).

  19. This example is a modified version of one provided by Christensen (2010, 187).

  20. See Pollock (1986, 37–9).

  21. Thanks to Mylan Engel for discussion of these issues.

  22. One reason for thinking that Leite would not endorse my version of ARB is that it supports strong inferential internalism. However, in response to the regress problem for internalism, Leite seems to advocate weak inferential internalism (2008, 434–5). But if Leite prefers the weak position, then he will have to reject my version of ARB. See “Reflective Defeat, Reflective Individuals, and the Regress” below.

  23. However, it is worth noting what Leite emphasizes here. Namely, that one is not required to have justification for claims about one’s beliefs, or about one’s being justified (2008, 430). There are different kinds of level ascent.

  24. See Fumerton (1995, 64) and Leite (2008, 421, 430).

  25. One anonymous referee asks how considerations of epistemic responsibility apply to propositional justification. Specifically, suppose that one has not even considered P, but one has propositional justification for believing that one lacks justification for believing P. Given that one has not in fact taken any attitude towards P, it may seem that considerations of epistemic responsibility simply do not apply. Response: the claim is that believing P in those circumstances would be irresponsible. In general, I take it that if one has undefeated propositional justification for believing P, then one is in a position to responsibly believe P. In contrast, if one’s propositional justification for believing P is defeated, then one is not in a position to responsibly believe P.

  26. See Goldman (1986, 62), Greco (2010, 165), Bergmann (2005, 424–6) and (2006, 163–168).

  27. Leite grants that children and non-human animals cannot meet internalist requirements, but doesn’t think that this is relevant to the kind of justification that we have (2008, 422). Recently, Fumerton has suggested that there might be two concepts of justification, one “ideal” (i.e. internalist) and the other “derivative” (i.e. externalist) in order take the edge off of his skeptical position that we never possess ideal internalist justification (2004b, 82–4), (2006, 114–115).

  28. For a clear statement of this position, see Greco (1999, 281–284) and (2000b, 370–372).

  29. Hookway (2000b, 396–7), Rhoda, (2008, 219–223) and Leite (2008, 434–5).

  30. For further discussion of weak internalism, see Alexander (forthcoming).

  31. This is the reason, mentioned in footnote 21, for thinking that Leite might not endorse my formulation of ARB. And yet, that formulation seems very much in the spirit of the considerations that Leite offers on behalf of internalism.

  32. See for example Sosa (1997a, b, and 2004).

  33. Thanks to two anonymous referees for pressing this point.

  34. For further discussion, see Alexander (forthcoming).

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to Mylan Engel, Kelly Becker, Tony Smith, and three anonymous referees for this journal for very helpful comments and discussion.

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Alexander, D. Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat. Philosophia 40, 497–521 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9344-3

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