Abstract
In this paper I argue that Cartesian skepticism about the external world is self-defeating. The Cartesian skeptic holds that we are not justified in believing claims about the external world on the grounds that we cannot rule out the possibility of our being in a radical skeptical scenario. My argument against this position builds upon a critique of Wilson in Analysis, 72(4), 668–673 (2012). Wilson argues that the Cartesian’s skeptical reasoning commits him to mental state skepticism and that this undermines his ability to claim that he is truly skeptical about the external world. I show that Wilson’s argument does not succeed. She is correct that the Cartesian is committed to mental state skepticism. However, she is mistaken in thinking that there is anything incoherent about combining the Cartesian position that one ought to doubt external world claims with doubt about whether one is in fact such a skeptic. I propose an alternative explanation as to why mental state skepticism proves to be the Cartesian’s undoing. I suggest that mental state skepticism leads to epistemic skepticism and that this undermines the Cartesian’s position that belief about the external world is unjustified.
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Notes
The only other discussion of Wilson’s argument I am aware of is Avnur (2016), which anticipates one of the criticisms raised in my paper. As we will see in section 2, he agrees that pace Wilson there is nothing incoherent about holding that one ought to have doubts about the external world while nonetheless having doubts about whether one truly has such doubts. This commonality noted, the present paper extends the discussion in three ways. First, it adds to the critique of Wilson by showing that in addition she has failed to show that the Cartesian is committed to mental state skepticism. Second, it attempts to fix this weakness by offering a novel argument appealing to eliminitivism as a skeptical hypothesis. Third, in the final section it offers a novel argument explaining why the mental state skeptic is committed to epistemic skepticism, which provides an explanation as to why the Cartesian position is self-defeating that is superior to Wilson’s.
For an example of this reading see Vogel (2004, 426–429).
Rinard (2015) argues that the external world skeptic is committed to skepticism about the past and that this ultimately makes the position self-undermining. She argues that the skeptic’s argument is a complex one that involves a reliance on memory –– something the skeptic about the past cannot endorse.
This interpretation of Pyrrhonian skepticism is suggested by the opening of Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism:
“When people are investigating any subject, the likely result is either a discovery, or a denial of a discovery and a confession of inapprehensibility, or else a continuation of the investigation. . . Those who are called Dogmatists in the proper sense of the word think that they have discovered the truth — for example, the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics, among others. The schools of Clitomachus and Carneades, and other Academics, have asserted that things cannot be apprehended. And the Sceptics are still investigating.” Annas and Barnes (2000, 3)
Thus while the Cartesian — like the ancient Academic skeptics — will say that we are not justified in believing claims about the external world, the Pyrrhonian will withhold judgment about this epistemic matter. This is a common interpretation of the Pyrrhonian position. For example, this is how Sinnott-Armstrong (2004) contrasts the two views. “So called Cartesian skepticism is usually defined as a claim that nobody knows anything, at least about a large area (such as the external world.)” Pyrrhonians are more radical: “They do not deny Cartesian skepticism. Instead, the doubt of Pyrrhonians is so deep that they suspend belief about both Cartesian skepticism and its denial,” (4). Bett (2014) offers a similar contrast: “In as much as skepticism on the Cartesian understanding is a thesis (an epistemological thesis — but for the present point, the subject matter would make no difference), the Pyrrhonian skeptic would consider it just as much deserving suspicion as its negation,” (403). Finally, Wilson presents a similar interpretation according to which the Pyrrhonian holds that “one cannot know whether one can know.” (2012, 671). See also see Klein (2015) and Hazlett (2014, 16–18, 27–28).
Bostrom (2003) might come the closest. He argues that there is a non-negligible chance that we reside in a computer simulation.
Traditional epistemological internalists often accept this asymmetry. Internalists hold that whatever justifies one’s beliefs must be in some sense internal to the individual. For example, BonJour (1999) and Vogel (2005) hold that that belief about the external world is justified only inferentially by appeal to epistemically prior claims about one’s mental states. Similarly, Conee and Feldman (1985) hold that one’s ultimate evidence for any belief consists of one’s mental states. For further explanation of internalism, see section 3 below.
Russell (1912).
Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.
See BonJour (2010, 222–3).
For additional discussion of these competing conceptions of internalism see Pryor (2001, 103–9).
See Goldman (1979).
McCain (2014) is an example of such a restricted mentalist position. According to McCain a belief is justified insofar as it is supported by what one is currently aware of or what one could easily be aware of by reflection alone (2014, 31–53). For example, buried memories that could only be recalled given years of psychoanalysis do not bear on the justification of one’s beliefs.
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Thanks to an anonymous referee from Philosophia for valuable feedback on an earlier version of this paper.
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Alexander, D. Unreasonable Cartesian Doubt. Philosophia 45, 503–522 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9849-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9849-5