**Gradations of Volition in St. Anselm's Philosophical Psychology:**

**An Essay in Honor of Father Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.**

“Student: Why does (a man) will? Teacher: Only because he wills. For (the) will has no other cause by which it is forced or attracted, but it is its own efficient cause, so to speak, as well as its own effect.”

St. Anselm, *On the Fall of Satan*

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**Introduction**

I demonstrate here that St. Anselm’s account of free will fits neatly into an Aristotelian conceptual framework. Aristotle’s four causes are first aligned with Anselm’s four senses of ‘will’**.**[[1]](#footnote-2) The volitional hierarchy Anselm’s definition of free will entails is then detailed, culminating in its reconciliation with Eudemonism.The Beatific Vision, as *summum bonum*,is shown to be the apex of that series of perfections.[[2]](#footnote-3)I conclude by explicating Anselm’s teleological understanding of sin by reference to his semantic recapitulation of Aristotle’s essence-accident distinction.

**Anselm’s Four Significates of ‘Will’**

Anything generated, according to Aristotle, will exist because of four causes or principles: matter, form, purpose, and agency.[[3]](#footnote-4) His paradigmatic applications of this etiology are to the coming to be of organisms and artifacts- substantial change- and their accidental, physical alterations. I shall extend it here to cover the accidental changes that occur mentally following the deliberations that Aristotle himself posits as antecedent to our voluntary behavior.[[4]](#footnote-5) Choices are said to be “made,” no different in this regard than alterations ensuant upon one’s bodily maturation, so the complex question must also be asked of them: from what, by what, as what, and for what do they arise? We should be able to learn how a human agent became willing to take a certain course of action, or ill/good willed, by determining such an accidental compound’smaterial, efficient, formal and teleological causes.[[5]](#footnote-6) Seen from the perspective of Aristotle’s assertion that “The stick moves the stone, the hand moves the stick, and the man moves the hand,” my contention is that the four causes enable us to analyze the volitional means by which one would initiate such a series of events.

Anselm, for his part, asserts that ‘will’ must be taken as having four interrelated “significates” or denotations.[[6]](#footnote-7) These distinctions correspond to those just adumbrated; a good sign of the Aristotelian background of the Father of Scholasticism’s thinking here. ‘Will’ signifies firstly the soul as “instrument-for-willing”: the substantial agent himself (will**a**) endowed, with the operational resources defined below, so as to be able to rationally determine a course of action- “will” in a second signification, will**c**,(commonly referred to as “choice”). Will**a**, thus, exerts “motive power,” posited by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* as the source of contingency in Nature.[[7]](#footnote-8) In *De Anima*,[[8]](#footnote-9) will**a** is what renders one a “human agent,” manifesting “rational, appetitive power.” Further, as the efficient cause of one’s wills**c**, will**a**engenders moral responsibility for such plans, the activities they guide, and both of their effects upon his character and the lives of others.

In serving as a will**c**’sprogenitor, will**a** performs its characteristicact, choosing/ willing**e,** that is, self-exercising so as to assume the state of reasonably preferring one intellectually determined means to an inherent objective (specified below) to another.Here we have the third, verbal, significate of ‘will’, will**a**’sself-actualization of a will**c**. (The difference between the three significates, Anselm says, corresponds to that between one’s visual apparatus, the sights it yields to one’s mind when active, and its operation so as to produce those visualizations.[[9]](#footnote-10)) From this basic mental act ensues the willingness**c** to engage in one purposive course of action, instead of an alternative thereto (for reasons that subjectively justify that choice without, *eo ipso*, being its causes): the will “as its own effect.”[[10]](#footnote-11) In sum, will**a** is that power of the soul whose exercise- willing**e**- brings a will**c** into being out of (the actualizations of) ‘will’ in its fourth, axiological *cum* motivational signification: will**a**’sdivinely instilled desires **(**will**dJ** andwill**dH**) for Justice and Happiness, as states of spiritual well-being brought about by the performance of acts of various types.[[11]](#footnote-12)These necessarily innate affections form the basis of the volitional hierarchy about to be detailed.

Anselm’s argument for inherent desires is cast in Aristotelian terms: “An unactuated capacity cannot move itself to act.” Applied by Anselm to volition: “Therefore, what wills nothing cannot move itself to will.”[[12]](#footnote-13) That is, will**a** *sans* will**d** would be unable to will**e**. Thus, attractionsmust be instilled in will**a**. A volitional *teleos*, **as** Aristotle understood as well, cannot be chosen; since choice, by its very nature, is between means to a *given* end.[[13]](#footnote-14) (We note in passing another remnant of Aristotelianism: immanent realism regarding universals: Justice and Happiness, analogically present in the sorts of actions realized to be effective thereunto.[[14]](#footnote-15))

The genus will**d**, is said by Anselm, to be “actuate(d)” with “determinate volition(s)” by (its) receptivity to intellectually proffered means of securing Justice and Happiness.[[15]](#footnote-16) The source of will**a**’s activity is, thus, its actualization as the inclinations will**ihm** and will**ijm.** That is, will**i**, as affinity to purposive activity, is will**a**‘s potential readiness to pursue the objects ofwill**dH** andwill**dJ –** *via* intellectually determined courses of action**.** Thus, will**i** may be construed, as a passive capacity, *a la* the Intellect in the case of perceptual universals**.** Ensconced volitionally, an axiological universal becomes the willingness**i** to execute a specific means thereto. Will**ihm** /will**ijm** is, thus,will**dH** / will**dJ** perfected.

Anselm deemed a dualistic conatus a prerequisite of moral responsibility for one’s wills**c** and ensuing actions and whatever effects the latter, in turn, cause.[[16]](#footnote-17) His insistence upon an axiological distinction within will**d** makes him an early, medieval proponent of what is now known as the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP):[[17]](#footnote-18) an agent, to qualify as either praiseworthy or blameworthy, must be able to will**d** distinct types of goods.[[18]](#footnote-19) Were we incapable of simultaneously willing**i** to means to both Happiness and Justice, willing**d** but one, we could hardly be said to be responsible for the willing**e** of our *idee fixe*: the resulting will**c** would be a *fait accompli*, that is, no will**c** at all! The capacity to will**d** dichotomous axiological alternatives is, thus, deemed by Anselm a prerequisite of moral agency.

By extension, a will**a**, who has had his *character* bestowed upon him by His Creator, in the form of a monistic will**d**, cannot be responsible for the type of person that he is. Such accountability would require that he exhibit that character *rather than* one featuring an opposed set of priorities- something that he could have also ended up adopting, given his basic conatus. But, were we only receptive to Happiness, we couldn’t help but being egoists. On the other hand, we would be axiologically determined to be virtuous *sans* a sense of our own well-being. And the satisfaction of the desire to be responsible for one’s character is necessary aspect of human freedom.[[19]](#footnote-20)

Deliberative dissonance signals a challenge for will**a** to meet on its own- a self-induced problem to resolve for credit- requiring it to nill**e** acts unattractive from the perspective of one of its wills**i** in order to retain its own integrity: wholeheartedness. The material cause of meritorious willing**e** could only be morally significant volitional impassewithin will**i**- will**2**, that is, contemporaneous wills**i** mutually exclusive as wills**c**,one of which is teleologically obligatory (as specified below). It is, then, a virtue of will**a** that it can stand in need of self-adjudication. Such a power renders character a matter of having sometimes to regain volitional integrity, *via* becoming one sort of agent rather than another. Being required in some situations to give ‘pride of place’ in will**c** to a pre-ordained priority of will**d**’s objects is what makes will**a** a fit object of approbation / reprobation.[[20]](#footnote-21) For our edification, Anselm presents along these lines the case of a man agonizing over lying or being executed: a will**a** struggling to bring himself towill**e** thewill**cjm** (telling the truth) while also willing**ihm** something incompatible thereto (to lie).[[21]](#footnote-22)

To reformulate, then, inlight of this dualistic understanding of motivation, Anselm’s third, active sense of ‘will’: will**e** is the reduction of will**ihm** / will**ijm to** will**chm** /will**cjm**. That is, will**a**’s characteristic act is the application of the form willingness**c** to (the matter that is) one of its wills**i**. In performing it, will**a** becomes either will**chm** orwill**cjm**. Will**e** satisfiesPAP because every will**chm** is *ipso facto*will**chm1 rather than / > hm2** orwill**chm>jm** andeverywill**cjm** is *ipso facto*will**cjm>hm,** orwill**cjm1>jm2**.[[22]](#footnote-23) We can safely ignore these elaborations here except, as we shall see, in the case of will**cjm>hm**. To answer, then, three of the four questions posed above, will**a** functions as the mental analog of, as Aristotle puts it, “a man in begetting his children”: willing**e** a will**cjm /** will**chm** out ofa will**ijm /** will**ihm**.[[23]](#footnote-24)

*Sans* such a reduction of itself, will**a** must remain intentionally undetermined, regardless of the strength of any will**i**. Until such time as will**a** terminates deliberation by willing**e**, it remains contingent what it will become as will**c**. Will**a**, thus, completely controls itself, no other power or agent can cause it to will**e** will**i** should it be unwilling**e** to do so on its own. Anselm is rightly adamant that should an agent be overcome by a particular temptation, the fault cannot lie in his volitional nature, which renders him morally indomitable.[[24]](#footnote-25) On the contrary, the cause of sin (as teleologically explicated above) could only be his failure to *fully exercise* his/will**a**’s absolute authority over will**ihm**: in a word, persevere in his will**cjm**. It is always an avoidable, self-induced, precipitous willing**e** of an illicit will**i**that leads to moral failure:[[25]](#footnote-26) e.g., deceit, in the case of the fraud. Deliberation also only yields a ranking of courses of action, according to their conduciveness to the objects of will**d**. The actual imposition of will**c**upon any one of them- willing**e**it- is solely the prerogative of will**a**. Even Grace, given that it is a gift- will**djmG**- would have to be inefficacious until assimilated by will**a**asawill**c** thereof (though irresistible as such in subsequent agency- that is, as motivation to will**e** and execute other wills**ijm**).[[26]](#footnote-27)

Rational, self-caused reduction of will**ihm** /will**ijm** to will**chm** /will**cjm**- willing**e**- is the “basic act,” sought by Arthur Danto and other philosophers, from which ultimate responsibility, for resulting neural processes, bodily movements, activities and the consequences thereof, is, thus, derived.[[27]](#footnote-28) Its performance- will**e**- renders will**a** an unmoved mover. Call this understanding of volitional autonomy the Principle of Absolute Self-Control/PASC.[[28]](#footnote-29) Vesting this originative power in agents themselves, rather than mental events of which they are merely subjects, makes Anselm, in contemporary philosophical terms, an “agent-causalist,” which, as alluded to above, is yet another element of Aristotle’s philosophical psychology.[[29]](#footnote-30)

As with cognition, in will**i** there is accidental identification of a particular mind and a universal of which it is a (mental) instance. But, unlike cognition, in will**c** there is *self*-incorporation of said universal: by will**a** as object thereof. The former is, thus, a passive, the latter an active, power. This distinction reflects the necessary connection between causation and responsibility, which Anselm must account for in order to justify eternal reward and punishment. Aristotle’s own discussion of voluntary behavior had already posited this affinity, albeit only in the case of temporal affairs.[[30]](#footnote-31) An agent is only responsible for that over which he has complete control, that is, he can bring about on his own, voluntarily.Were will**a** not *causa sui* of willing**e**, the former as human agent could never be the sole author of a will**c**. Given responsibility’s entailment of originative power, no appetitive agent could, then fail to be capable of initiating/willing**e** a series of morally significant mental acts and/or bodily movements forming an activity or project.[[31]](#footnote-32) For this reason, Anselm concurs once again with Aristotle, firmly rejecting any attempt to find a deeper explanation of volitional activity.[[32]](#footnote-33) In the case of Satan’s fall, there is said to be no other cause of his will**c** to rebel than his will**a**: hence, his complete culpability for his damnation.[[33]](#footnote-34)

It will be objected, however, that Aristotle treats efficient causes as external to that upon which they operate, *viz*., material causes. Agent and patient are never the same thing. But externality/internality is categorically relative, just as its logical correlate, unity. Aristotle and Anselm agree on this ontological principle.[[34]](#footnote-35) Will**a** and will**i** are one in power or faculty, the former receiving instances of the latter as states, but distinct as causes or principles thereof. Thus, they are external as causes while internal instrumentally: principles of a single, but multi-faceted, self-contained, self-determined system. That is to say, there is a sense in which agent and patient are one here and another one in which they are not. Will**a** and will**i** are of the same faculty- they are both volition. (To be more specific, the latter is manifests in the former as motivation.) Yet they are distinct as causes therein, to wit, that which actualizes versus that which is actualized: becoming one in the actualizing of will**c**. As Aristotle asserts: “Agent and patient are neither absolutely identical, nor sheerly distinct. They must be contrasted species of the same genus, opposed formations of the same matter.”[[35]](#footnote-36) Both causes, here, are generically volitional power; specifically they are potential versus actual will**c**, will**a** containing the latter as its form. As carpenter is carpentry in act, having in himself, as skill, what unformed wood lacks, but is receptive to; so will**a** may incorporatevarious means, to achieving the objects of its basic desires, as wills**c** thereof.

Returning to our explication, will**a**, as self-exercising, rational power, is free in the sense of satisfying PASC and PAP. But, according to Anselm, there is more to the essence of freedom of the will**a** than such ability. Something by way of a *teleos* or final cause must further perfect will**a** so that the faculty becomes morally significant. That is to say, though such a power would qualify as free, given many contemporary philosophers’ tendency[[36]](#footnote-37) to reduce volitional liberty to choice and sovereignty, it would be deemed incomplete, according to Anselm, for lacking a normative element by which to morally judge it issuances- wills**c**.

*Sans* a pre-deliberative, divinely infused prioritizing of the objects of will**d**,any will**c** of the will**i** of one of those values, rather than the other, would be arbitrary: lack justification.[[37]](#footnote-38)And, if we are to be moral agents, praiseworthy/blameworthy for our choices, the preferred good here would obviously have to be justice. Thus, unrankedwill**d** is perfected by (its supervenient property of) being naturally more attracted to Justice than Happiness. That is, will**dJ** is more acute than will**dH** (will**dJ>**will**dH** or will**u**, for short). This innate preference is will**a**’s “rectitude” or “uprightness.”[[38]](#footnote-39) It is an object of inherent self-knowledge and, as such, the basis of conscience: surety of obligation.

Free will, Anselm then tells us, is the will’s**a** ability to reaffirm that divinely established motivational hierarchy, thereby realizing its (divinely instilled, readily apprehended) purpose.[[39]](#footnote-40) That is, will**a**’s freedom is its power to realize the teleological perfection of itself by willing**e** will**cjmJ** on any occasion of will**i**. Will**cjmJ** is true or authenticwill**cjm**,as distinguished from the appearance thereof,will**cjmH**. For Anselm, truth is use in accordance with purpose**.** Will**a**’s freedom is, thus, a form of truth. It is justice being willed**e** for its own sake, rather than instrumentally, as required bywill**u.** Thathierarchy meanswill**a** is meant to be just in himself, not as a means to its other value. The self-actualization of this self-perfection (with the necessary, yet mysterious, help of will**djmG**) is the state of volitional rectitude or free will. Will**cjmJ** iswill**a** wholeheartedly willing**e,** thewill**c**,to abide in the statewill**u,** that is,in accord with one’s axiological nature**.** Sin is, thus,will**chm>j** or will**cjmh**, which, as St. Anselm notes, are really the same will**c**. Either one is the nill/will**~c** of will**u.**[[40]](#footnote-41)Therefore, original sin justly resulted in human nature’s loss ofwill**u** (which Christ’s Crucifixion restored).[[41]](#footnote-42)

A particular will**c** may be affirmed or regretted upon reflection. Decisions often come to be viewed retrospectively as wise or foolish**.** Will**a** is, thus, also the faculty enabling one to form one’s *character*, that part of one’s identity[[42]](#footnote-43) for which one is responsible. For it is *consistent* willing**e** of specific wills**im** that eventually renders will**a** a certain type of person (along with the wills**im** he routinely nills**e**): the author of his volitionally inherent tendencies.Will**a**, in thus establishing and sustaining the diachronic unity of such evaluative commitments, imposes upon them the formal cause Aristotle terms ‘habit’,[[43]](#footnote-44) which substantiates them as motivational constants.

Stabilized *via* prolonged reaffirmation, character or habitbecomesa suitable object of approbation and reprobation: virtue or vice/will**v**.[[44]](#footnote-45) Will**v**isthe form or “perfection” of will**c**, made up of second-order choices or wills**c2** of wills**c,** as well as nills**c**2 thereof (that is, wills**c2** of wills**chm** instead of wills**cjm**or vice-versa). As will**i** is the material cause of will**c**, so the latter is potential will**v.** In strengthening/attenuating will**dH /** will**dJ** and, thus,will**ihm /** will**ijm**, will**v,** in turn,influenceswill**c,** increasing the tendency of will**a** to will**e** in conformity to one’s most resolute wills**c2**.Character development is, thus, will**v** andwill**c,** amplifying each other, unto personhood: moral responsibility for that part of one’s identity will**a** has brought about. The virtuous or just will**a** wills**v** will**cjj;** the wicked or unjust man fails to develop that will**c2**.

To complete our volitional hierarchy, then, we must treatwill**vjmJ,** the purpose ofwill**a**, as having as *its* end the Beatific Vision**-** Will**bJ=H.**[[45]](#footnote-46)Only through teleological gradation, can we square Anselm’s definition of free will with the Aristotelian Eudemonism espoused by his fellow Doctor of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas, who (rightly) rejects the possibility of will**a** eschewing happiness. An Anselmian can accommodate this aspect of Aristotelian *cum* Thomistic axiology, with which attaching paramount importance to will**u** maintenancemight appear to be at odds, by positing the Beatific Vision as the ultimate perfection of will**a**, the potency of which is will**vjmJ**.Volition is to be exercised, in the way St. Anselm prescribes, so as to achieve the “purity of heart” receptive to moral perfection.Our ultimate end, thus, must be sought *via* the willingness**v** to forego temporal happiness should it be opposed to justice.[[46]](#footnote-47) Here we have further overlap between the two philosophies being discussed, since the admonition to seek happiness *via* other goods, such as moral virtue, always a struggle to acquire, is also to be found in Aristotle.[[47]](#footnote-48) Having disambiguated ‘will’, we can see that neither a dualistic conatus nor Justice ranking Happiness is inconsistent with Eudemonism. Will**a** willing**e** willing**vjmJ** leaves volition oriented to Happiness: yet the object of both will**rhm** and Will**bJ=H**. There is no nilling of Happiness here; only the rejection of a particular means thereto. Detours are not deviations.

That there are degrees of volition means that it is “analogical,” *a la* being, which is also graded: a hierarchy of relatives; all causally related to a single, *relatum* that, as their essential “focus,” makes them what they are (as in the case of bodily health and all the signs and facilitators thereof).[[48]](#footnote-49) The latter’s sharing of that entity, as essential subject and ultimate act, is the basis of paronymic predication thereto; its universality. Regular exercise is healthy because it promotes health; ditto rest, nourishment, physicians, and medicine. Will**d,** will**e,** etc. are all volition because oftheir participation inWill**bJ=H**,as various causes thereof**.** But, like I AM, the apex of the analogy of being, in Whom existence is indistinct from essence, the summit of the volitional hierarchy is axiologically unified. In the divine Will, Justice and Happiness are one. This unity, thus, renders a corresponding virtual oneness in the Beatific Vision: obviating the distinction between will**ijm** and will**ihm**. Nothing attractive to one receptor is unattractive to the other; neither one is receptive to an object to which the other is averse. *Ipso facto*, the possibility of will**2**, is nullified. We shall now see what this circumstantial upgrade implies about the relationship between free will and sin.

**Free Will and Sin**

Those, like Nash-Marshall, who maintain that the ability to sin is no part of free will, are correct:[[49]](#footnote-50) The essence of free will**a** is given in Anselm’s complete definition- its being able to retain justice for its own sake- which says nothing about sinfulness. But, then, it seems that sinners either must not enjoy the same type of freedom as their saintly friends in Paradise do or not transgress morality of their own free wills. Nash-Marshall, denying the left-disjunct here, maintains that we mistakenly posit PAP satisfaction as a necessary condition upon a free agency: **“**that choice and alternate possible courses of action are necessary requisites of freedom, presupposes that there can be no such thing as a perfect(ly) free being ... (that we should) not define freedom through a perfect instance of freedom: the freedom of a perfect rational being.”[[50]](#footnote-51) But, as noted above, in defining will**d**, clearly Anselm *is* concerned to explicate human freedom, the type an agent must strive to avoid losing to sin, in order to gain will**vj=h**, precisely because of his imperfect, fallen nature and circumstances. The struggle to preserve will**u** means that our place in Eternity, in relation to Perfect Freedom, will have been earned, not arbitrarily bestowed. Heaven and Hell make no sense *sans* moral responsibility, which, in turn, requires the ability to do otherwise. An agent cannot justifiably be punished or rewarded for his actions unless they were performed instead of other courses of conduct that he might have taken.[[51]](#footnote-52)

The duality of will**d** does not, moreover, entail the above dilemma. Instead, it means that the ability to sin is one of what medieval metaphysicians, following Aristotle, would have called free will’s “proper accidents”/”properties.” Thus, to apply one of Anselm’s own artfully drawn semantic distinction here, to say of free will that it is the ability to will**cjmJ** is to signify it (bring it to mind) *per se*- as it is in itself. To maintain, on the other hand, that it is also able to sin- will**cihm>ijm**- is to reference it *per aliud*, that is, according to something inessential to, but *attendant upon*, its essence.[[52]](#footnote-53) Sin, we should say, is the *incidental,* *unnatural* will**e** of will**a**. It is, as Aristotle would aver, a violation of its *teleos*- just like any other misuse of power. Will**a** sins/wills**cihm>ijm** by treating its sovereignty and dualistic conatus- necessary, but mere instrumental aspects of free will, as if they were all that there is to its nature, disregarding its purpose.That is, moral wrongdoing is avoidable self-debasement: the failure to preserve will**u** by willing**cijm>ihm** (on occasion of a will2).

Look at it this way: Let’s suppose that I use my pen to open a door lock. Now it is obviously true that, in some sense, that object is responsible for producing said effect. But it did not bring it about as a pen *per se*; but as a pointed object: better to simply say that a pointed object was used to open the lock, specifically, a pen. Being a pen entails being able to inscribe paper, which, in turn, entails being pointed; so being a pen entails being able to open (some) locks. And while there would be nothing wrong with so using a pen in a pinch, regular such employment would be to treat it as a key, which it only is *per aliud***.**

In the same way, being a free will, that is, being a faculty able to preserve its own rectitude, entails being able to sin. For, as PAP and PASC entail, without a dualistic conatus and self-control, there can be no temptations for a will**a** to resist, so as *maintain* its rectitude instead ofjust having it materially imposed, *via* motivational impoverishment**.** So, yes, we sin of our own free wills**a**; in fact, our sins *are* sins precisely because they are misuses of that faculty. But they are not committed by free will**a** as such, only the aspects of it that are being misused. Free will**a**, in sinning, is exercising itself as if it were a Nietzschean will-to-power.[[53]](#footnote-54) Thus, it is not acting integrally for disregarding the intellectually revealed, divinely imposed constraint placed upon its pursuit of happiness, will**u.**

Our free will itself, as Nash-Marshall rightly insists, can and will exist in Heaven *sans* the possibility of sin, for its owners lacking the *opportunity* to offend God, as a reward for their hard-won saintliness. It does not become therein a new power, but, as established above, is afforded a fortuitous change in circumstances, *viz*., full**,** rather than partial, participation in the life of God.[[54]](#footnote-55) Blessedness need not involve the loss of will**dH**, to insure against sin, volitional mutilation as it were. In Paradise there must rather be only the certainty that a conflict between two wills**d** can no longer arise as the opportunityto sin.[[55]](#footnote-56) Saints will simply no longer find themselves tempted to will**e** the will**chm>ijm** in Eternity, while still possessing the dualistic conatus that made sin possible when will**2** arose in their lives on Earth. Becausethere, as St. Augustine assures us, our hearts (wills**a**) will finally have rest in Him within whom justice and happiness must be one*.*[[56]](#footnote-57)

**Conclusion**

We see that St. Anselm’s definition of free will**a** is based upon the Aristotelian notion of rational appetitive power. The former, I have further shown, may be elucidated in other Aristotelian *cum* Scholastic terms. Free will**a** is self-determinative, effectively free of the past and its circumstances. Human agency is based upon two primal attractions. Will**a** imposes, in, self-exercise, volitional form, choice, upon the passive actualization of one of those desires, as an inclination to seek its object *via* an intellectually determined means thereto. This exercise is, like any other generation, a reduction of potency to act. To self-conform to will**u**,remaining free,will**a** must forego any action promising Happiness, should it preclude doing Justice, never actualizingwill**chm>ijm,** which, given its satisfaction of PASC, is always avoidable**.** Free will**a**is, thus, the invincible power to choose to preserve will**u** for its own sake, unto eternal Happiness. Sin, on the other hand, is the perditious nill**c** thereof.

1. Richard Sorabji, in his magisterial *Aristotle on Necessity, Cause, and Blame* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006) 26, cites W.D. Ross' contention that “Aristotle comes closest to positing free will, without actually doing so, in Book III, Section 5 of the *Nicomachean* *Ethics*.” (*Aristotle*, London: Meridian Books 1923, ch. 7) This claim raises an interesting question about the validity of the concerns behind Aristotle’s putative reluctance here, which the present work is meant to obviate. Albrecht Dihle, in The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1982, 48-68) also concurs with the present author that Anselm's definition is at least consistent with the Aristotle's views on volition and rationality. Ditto E.J. Lowe, but for his denial of self-actualization on the part of the will (willing, according to him, being an undetermined, 'spontaneous' act on the part of the will). *Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action*, Oxford University Press, 2008. Archibald Alexander treats him as an 'intellectual determinist', who still posits a distinct faculty of choice: *Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy*, NY: Scribners, 1898. Calvin Normore has Aristotle cum Anselm eschewing intellectual determinism in favor of a will empowered to choose one's reasons for a choice, nullifying all competing considerations. “Freedom, Contingency, and Rational Power,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 81 (November 2007): 49-64, especially 55. Michael Frede (Will and Free Will in Antiquity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, chs. 1 and 2) maintains that it is possible to account for Aristotle's belief in moral responsibility without saddling him with any notion of free will, a construct, in his opinion, of later antiquarian philosophers. Pamela Huby, in an exceedingly instructive article, echoes Frede in attributing a naïve “libertarianism” to Aristotle. She sees it as born of his failure to see the threat posed to freedom of the will, of the sort required to ground his belief in moral responsibility, by the deterministic aspects of his philosophy. "The First Discovery of the Freewill Problem," Philosophy, 42 (1967) 353-62.

   [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. The inspiration for this essay is Father Joseph Owens’ *Gradations of Being in Metaphysics E-Z,* South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2007. In this pellucid work, Father Owens details the hierarchal analogy of being, showing how being *qua* being/God Almighty is the ultimate perfection of the category of substance. Other beings are substantial to the extent to which they participate in the Existence thereof (which is His essence). It occurred to me that Anselm’s various senses of volition exist in the same manner: as gradations of the Divine Will. This essay is dedicated to his memory. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Aristotle posits these four causes of being in *Physics* II, 2, 194b17–20 and *Posterior Analytics* I, 2 71b9–11; 94a20. All references to the Aristotelian *corpus* are taken from *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard McKeon. NY: Random House, 1941. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 2 1112a15. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Though it is true, as Father Owens points, out that in so explaining accidents, powers, and events, we must conceptualize them as if they were substantial, *Gradations of Being in Metaphysics E-Z*, 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. *On Free Will* (*OFW*) Section # 7, in *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works*, ed. Brian Davies and G.R. Evans, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, henceforth *AC*).*Concordia* 3.11 draws a similar distinction. Also in *AC*. See also Jeffrey Brower, “Anselm on Ethics”, in *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*,edited by Brian Leftow and Brian Davies, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 33.A significate, in Anselm’s semantics, is that which is brought to mind by the use of a term. For explication of Anselm's theory of reference seePeter King,“St. Anselm's Philosophy of Language”, in *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*, 84-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. *Metaphysics*, VI, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. *De Anima* X initially posits two 'sources of (human activity): appetite and (practical) mind.' The various objects of the former, in 'stimulating' the latter, are its origin. The two are then treated as a single power given their concomitant operations. Nevertheless, self-control and appetitive restraint are possible because mind can evaluate current appetite/”desire” based upon an atemporal “principle of reason.” Appetite itself is then left to determine on its own which one's object is to be pursued. E. J. Lowe discusses the distinction Aristotle draws between natural and rational powers in *Personal Agency* 6-8, 149-51, 155-7 and 176-9. For a much more thorough presentation of Aristotle's views on free agency, see Sorabji, *Aristotle on Necessity, Cause, and Blame*. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. *OFW*, #7. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. *On the Fall of the Devil* (henceforth *OFD*), #27 in *AC*. Peter King also stresses the importance of the reason-cause distinction in regards to free will. See his article “Augustine and Anselm on Angelic Sin,” in *A Companion to Angels and Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Tobias Hoffmann. Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition. (Leiden: Brill 2012), 280. See also E.J. Lowe, *Personal Agency,* 188-90; 197-98. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. *Concordia*, #11. *OFD*, #12 and #13. See also Peter King, “Scotus' Rejection of Anselm: The Two-Wills Theory”, in *Archa Verbi*, *Subsidia* 5: *Johannes Duns Scotus 1308-2008: Investigations into his Philosophy,* ed. Ludger Honnefelder *et al*. (Munster: Aschendorff 2011), 359-378.Theeudaimonic value here is also called by Anselm 'advantage' or 'well-being**.'** His other names for the potency itself are 'affection' and 'disposition'. Will**dJ** should not be viewed as merely the 'second-order desire' to temper the will**dH**, *a la* Rogers. Though such a higher-order preference plays a critical role in free will, as discussed below, it simply could not be formed *sans* the first-order attraction to justice itself. See Karen Rogers*, Anselm on Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 61-2. Will**dJ**, as we shall see,can temper will**dH** by becoming actualized concomitantly therewith, creating volitionalimpasse. Brower, “Anselm on Ethics”**.** 34, also has Anselm distinguishing between justice as the “habit’ of “self-regulation**”** and will**dJ**. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. *OFD*, 12 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 2, 1111b26 and *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 3, 1113b15. Frankfurt terms inherent attractions “volitional necessity.” See his “Concerning the Freedom and Limits of the Will”, *Philosophical* *Topics* 17 (Spring 1989): 119-130. But a pre-condition for any type of volition at all should not be taken to entail the impossibility of free will. Volitional leeway is provided for by will**a**’sattraction to *both* Justice and Happiness**.** See Brower, “Anselm on Ethics”, 28: “Not surprisingly, (Anselm) says that reason is capable of making two main kinds of value judgment or discrimination, one corresponding to each of the two fundamental types of value he takes to exist in the world—namely, goodness and rightness. The will, in turn, is capable of responding to each of these types of value—or better, to objects presented by reason as possessing these types of value.” [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. See Bernd Goebel, “Anselm's Theory of Universals Reconsidered”, *Insights* 2 (2009): 1-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. *OFD*, 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. *OFD*, #12 and #13. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Michael Frede, Will and Free Will in Antiquity, lists Alexander of Aphrodisias as the first ancient proponent of PAP.He insists that no such principle is to be found anywhere in the Aristotelian corpus. That is just wrong. Aristotle certainly accepts it in regarding the agents of compulsory actions as beyond reproach. ‘He had no choice but to A’ is considered by him to be the form of a valid excuse. *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 1. *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 5 also clearly endorses such a requirement for responsible agency: those with the power to voluntarily perform an action *ipso facto* are capable of refraining therefrom. Harry Frankfurt (“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”,*Journal of Philosophy* 66 (1969): 829-839) has occasioned a now 50 year old debate on the role of choice in human freedom. **My contributions to it are: ...** It should be unsurprising that PAP is biblical: “Who hath been tried thereby and made perfect? ... He that could have transgressed and hath not: and could do evil things and hath not done them.” *Ecclesiasticus*, 31: 10 I would add: Who sins? He who is capable of good, but eschews it in favor of evil. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. See Brower, “Anselm on Ethics”**.** 22-3.A**s** Brower puts the point, the requirements for rectitude maintenance by will**a** may “come apart from the conditions” under which human beings flourish in other ways, that is, fulfill the rest of their nature. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. See Richard Campbell, “Freedom as Keeping the Truth:The Anselmian Tradition”, in Anselm Studies II, ed. J.C. Schnaubelt *et al*. (Kraus International, White Plains NY), 287-308. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Robert Kane treats this predicament as the occasion of what he calls “self-forming actions,” the performance of which are necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility. He takes the resolution of a volitional crisis, however, to be uncaused, despite the effort of the will it calls forth, instead of being an effect of the will itself, as below. See *The* *Significance of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 74-9 **and my ... for commentary.** [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. *OFD* 12, 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Kane termswill**chm1 > hm2** “prudential choice,”contrasting it with “moral choice”:will**cjm > hm**  *The* *Significance of Free Will***,** 125-144, 156-158, 201, 206. Will**cjm1>jm2** or *vice-versa*corresponds to the conflicts between *prima facie* dutiesdiscussed by W.D. Ross in *The Right and the Good*(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 21. I shall not discuss here the interesting question of whether or not rectitude loss is possible in such a case. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 5 1113b15. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. *OFW*, #7, #8, and #9. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Sweeny, *Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire for the Word*, 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. *Concordia* #3. Grace is given, not for anything done, which would be Pelgaianism. It is a pure gift. All will**a** can do is leave unhindered its reception by avoiding sin. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. “Basic Actions,” Arthur C. Danto, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 141-148. As noted in Footnote 1, Lowe, *Personal Agency*, 124, treats basic acts as 'spontaneous' choice formations by the will, uncaused volitional exercises resulting in intentions: Anselm's view minus will**a** as willing's**e** efficient cause. But given the close conceptual connection between responsibility and efficient causation, it seem philosophically undesirable to leave volitional exercise inexplicable. Richard Taylor, 117-19, in *Action and Purpose* (New Jersey: Humanities, 1973) denies that there are “volitional acts” functioning as the origin of what he takes basic acts to be: simple bodily movements such as moving one's hand. See also “C. A. Campbell's Effort of Will Argument”, Phillip D. Gosselin, *Religious Studies* 13 (Dec., 1977): 429-438, “Volition and Basic Action”, Hugh McCann, *The Philosophical Review* 83 (Oct., 1974): 451-473, “Must There Be Basic Action?”, Douglas Lavin, *Nous* (June 2013): 273-301, and “How Basic Are Basic Actions?”, Julia Annas, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 78 (1977 - 1978): 195-213. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. PASC and PAP should be seen as distinct, but mutually entailing, principles of human agency. The first corresponds to its Autonomy, the second to its Contingency. See *Nicomachean Ethics*,III, 1, 1110a 15, *et passim***: “N**ow*,* he wills the **a**ct **a**t the time; for the c**a**use **w**hich sets the limbs going lies in the **a**gent in such cases*,* **a**nd wher**e** (and only where) the c**a**use l**i**es in the a**g**e**n**t*,* it rests with him to d**o** or not to do.” The parenthetical insertion is justified by purpose of the definition: to delimit self-determination over and against all the other sources of bodily movements (viz. ‘Nature, Necessity, and Chance,’ *Nicomachean Ethics*, III, 3, 1112a 30). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Agent causalists take their cue from Aristotle’s famous example of a human unmoved mover, cited above: “The stick moves the stone, the hand moves the stick, but the man moves the hand.” See. Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, 5. Thomas Reid is most closely associated with this philosophy of action in modernity. See his Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), IV, 1. The two best known contemporary advocates of it are Taylor, *Action and Purpose*, 120 *ff*. and Roderick Chisholm: *Person and Object* (IL: Open Court, 1976), 69-72. Randolph Clark surveys other recent versions of agent-causalism in *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). See also John Bishop, “Agent-Causation,” *Mind* 92 (January 1983): 61-79, William Hasker, *The Emergent Self* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), and E.J. Lowe, *Personal Agency*, 6-7, 151-4, 162-3, 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. Sorabji, *Aristotle on Necessity, Cause, and Blame*, 227-288. Ignorance forecloses voluntariness, hence, responsibility precisely because one cannot cause that which one does not know. *Nicomachean Ethics*, III, V 8, and VII 1-10 explore the connections between voluntariness, responsibility, and knowledge, with the Ch. III discussion being considered by Sorabji as definitive. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. To wit: “If we are responsible… then we have a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen.” Roderick M. Chisholm, “Freedom and Action”, in *Free Will*, ed. Derk Pereboom (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2009), 172-184. And St. Gregory of Nyssa: “All things subject to change and to becoming never remain constant, but continually pass from one state to another, for better or worse….Now human life is always subject to change; it needs to be born ever anew….But here birth does not come about by a foreign intervention, as is the case with bodily beings…; it is the result of a free choice. Thus we *are,* in a certain way, our own parents, creating ourselves as we will, by our decisions.” *De vita Moysis,* II, 2-3; cited in *Veritatis Splendor,* 71 and in William E. May's “Free Choice,” http://www.christendom-awake.org/pages/may/free-choice.htm. See also Peter van Inwagen's “A Definition of Chisholm's Notion of Immanent Causation”, *Philosophia* 7 (1978): 567-581. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. *OFS* #27. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. William Wood (in “Anselm of Canterbury on the Fall of the Devil: The Hard Problem, the Harder Problem, and a New Formal Model of the First Sin”, *Religious Studies* 52: 223-245) applies consumer preference theory to the case of primordial sin, in order to account for the ‘subjective rationality’ of that act. While this perspective yields a coherent account of Satan’s deliberation leading to his choice of disobedience, it only begs the question of why he even began plotting against the Almighty, which, as King points out, is the sinful genesis of his initial illicit choice: calculating when it came to morality. Explanations must end somewhere: and, in this case, we are ultimately left with the fact that Satan caused himself to prefer his own advantage to justice (as explicated below) in both choice and deliberation. See Peter King “Augustine and Anselm on Angelic Sin”, 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Aristotle posits relative identity in *Topics*, *I***,** *Physics I 7, 189b30-190a31, Generation and Corruption I 4 319b25-32, and Prior Analytics I 33, 47b29, Metaphysics VI 2.* In all, there are forty-one references in the Aristotelian corpus to the polyadic relation: identity in respect of C**1**, but diversity as C**2**, where C**1** and C**2** are categories of being or types of causes. See John Bowin, “Aristotle on Identity and Persistence”, *Apeiron* 41 (2008): 63-88. Anselm discusses this relation in connection with the substantial unification of the three divine persons of the Holy Trinity**.** See *On the Incarnation of the Word*, in *AC.*See alsoChristopher Hughes Conn, “Anselm, the Holy Trinity, and the Relative Identity Thesis”,*TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology* 3 (2019): 31-56. <https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v3i2.1026> They are said by the relative identity theorist to be one God in the way that (using Anselm’s analogy) Nile source, stream, and mouth are Nile River: not as parts, but as united, interactive, though relationally distinct, *per se* substantial entities therein. Peter Geach is the most prominent modern defender of the notion. See “Identity Theory,” in *Logic Matters* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 238-47. See also Nicholas Griffin, *Relative Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). Cf. David Wiggins, *Sameness and Substance Renewed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 21-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. *On Generation and Corruption* VI. See also *Physics*, III, 2**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. Roderick Chisholm, *Person and Object*, 53-84 is the most prominent example of a recent philosopher who stresses the importance of both PAP and PASC for an understanding of free will, while overlooking that faculty's normative aspect.The soft-determinists Fisher and Ravizza, though eschewing PASC and positing an attenuated sense of PAP, are noteworthy for emphasizing the connection between human freedom and standards of reason. See *Responsibility and Control,* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-91. Susan Wolf is to be credited for forcing contemporary free will theorists to recognize not only this connection, but the one between morality and free will. She unfortunately eschews PASC and controversially believes PAP applies only to blameworthy agents- her “asymmetry” thesis. See *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). **See also my ...** [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. *OFD***, #**14**.** See my **….** Cf. Neil Levy, “Contrastive Explanations, the Structure of the Will, and Robert Kane's Dilemma”, *Synthese* 197 (2018): 1225–1240. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. “When a will was initially given to the rational nature, it was, at the same time as that giving, turned by the Giver himself to what it ought to will—or rather, it was not turned but *created* upright. Now as long as that will remained steadfast in the rightness in which it was created, which we call “truth” or “justice”, it was just. But when it turned itself away from what it ought to will and towards what it ought not to, it did not remain steadfast in the original rightness (if I may so call it) in which it was created.” *OFD*, #9. See also Brower, “Anselm on Ethics”,35. Again, *per* Frankfurt’s discussion of volitional limitations, just as inherent attractions do not render will**a**unfree, neither does their instilled prioritization. See footnote 14 above. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. *OFW* #3. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. *OFD* #13. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. *OFW* #10; *Why God Became Man* Book 2, #s1-6, in *AC*. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. For Anselm, one's identity is that which is signified by a definite description of the form ‘The human being born of such and such parents, in whom accidental universals a1, a2, a3, etc. either have inhered or are inhering.’ See *On the Incarnation of the Word*, #11. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 5, 1114a-b details the relationship between choice, habit, and character. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. For a discussion of the role of reflective assent in character formationseeHarry G. Frankfurt's seminal article “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5-20. The secondary literature on this piece is wide-ranging. A good place to start is: Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). See also Brower, “Anselm on Ethics”, 33-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. *Summa Theologica* I, Question LXXXII, Article 1 posits eternal happiness as our sole end, the ultimate good for which human nature strives. He derives his axiological monism from *The Nicomachean Ethics* I, 4-12. See C. R. S. Harris, “Duns Scotus and his Relation to Thomas Aquinas”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 25 (1924 - 1925): 237-240. Here we have the third, and ultimate, case of Frankfurtian volitional necessity: yet another orientation not to be confused with subjugation in the form of lack of self-control, that is, willa failing to satisfy PASC. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. “For if he gives no reward to the one who loves him, he who is most just does not distinguish between the one who loves what ought to be supremely loved and the one who disdains it; nor does he love the one who loves him—or else it does no good to be loved by him. But all those things are incompatible with his nature. Therefore, he rewards everyone who loves him perseveringly”: that is, in times of trial, when the means to happiness must be forsworn. *Monologion*, #70 and #80, in *AC*.

    “Thus, it is certain that rational nature was made for the purpose of loving and choosing the supreme good above all other things.” *Why God Became Man***,** 2.1, in *AC*.

    As Brower (“Anselm on Ethics”, 23-4) understands the matter:

    “Rational creatures cannot possess, much less enjoy, God unless they first love him in the right way. Fulfillment of this purpose, however, is not to be understood as that in which happiness consists, but rather as a pre-condition for happiness. Indeed, to judge by passages such as the following, Anselm regards happiness as an external reward, something that a good God is simply constrained by his nature to bestow on creatures who love him We must not be misled by Anselm’s way of speaking here. Although it rightly emphasizes that creatures who receive happiness are worthy to receive it, and that their actually receiving it requires some action on God’s part, it also obscures the close connection that exists between the fulfillment of rational nature, on the one hand, and happiness on the other. According to Anselm, happiness partly *consists* in loving God, since enjoyment is just the possession of an object one loves. Moreover, once the rational creature loves God, and so is in a position to enjoy him, Anselm thinks that God is finally able to give what he intended to give it all along.” [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Nicomachean Ethics II, 7, 1098a13;II, 10, 1101a10. David Wiggin**s, “**Deliberation and Practical Reason”, Proceeding**s** *of the Aristotelian Society* 76 (1975-1976): 29-51+viii, argues convincingly that Aristotle held that “specifying” Happiness in deliberation is a task of practical reason, in addition to efficiency discernment. Sadler, (unpublished, <https://felicianethics.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/what-kind-of-moral-theory-does-anselm-hold.pdf> ) for his part, establishes that Anselm treats virtues as volitionally stabilized forms thereof and guides thereto. That is, will**sjiJ** is analogous to will**bJ=H**: pending sanctity. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. Father Owens, *Gradations of Being in Metaphysics E-Z*, 9-13, 50-54, 88-89, 173-77.Saint Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics, Trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961), I.9.138-9. Summa Theologiae, I, 16.6. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. Siobhan Nash-Marshall, “Free Will, Evil, and Saint Anselm”, *The Saint Anselm Journal* 5.2 (2008): 1-23. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Nash-Marshall, “Free Will, Evil, and Saint Anselm”, 23. Sweeney, on the other hand, holds that PAP is satisfied by 'finite/created' wills. Sweeney, *Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire for the* Word, 196-7. Frede (Will and Free Will in Antiquity, 81-2) following Chrysippus concurs with Nash-Marshall: “To say that an action is not necessitated, on their view, is only to say that it is inexplicable in terms of a 'natural law.” But this understanding of contingency in human affairs only begs the question: why wouldn't an agent acting independently of natural laws satisfy PAP? Despite this disagreement with Professor Nash-Marshall, I highly recommend her rigorous and insightful treatment of Anselm's work. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. **See my …** [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. See *De Grammatico* #12 for this distinction, in AC. See also Peter King, “St. Anselm's Philosophy of Language”*,*11-13 and Sweeney, *Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire for the Word*, 88-92. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. Nietzsche discusses his version of ethical egoism throughout his writings. It receives its most sustained treatment in *Beyond Good and Evil*. See also Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche's Morality* (London: Routledge, 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. See Gergely Klima, “The Primal Choice: An Analysis of Anselm's Account of Free Will”, *Sapientia et Doctrina* 1 (2004): 5-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. Klima, 13, writes “God rewarded (the Good Angel's) adherence to justice by making them so perfect in rectitude that there was nothing that they would want to will that they did not already possess.” I take myself here to be explaining this lack of opportunity on their part: the two things that they *do* will**d** will never be found apart and will be eternally enjoyed by them in the Beatific Vision of their common Source. See Sweeney, *Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire for the Word*, 237. See also Brower, “Anselm on Ethics”, 32: “Anselm says that God made the good angels perfectly happy, and thus removed the possibility of their ever sinning again—since one can sin only by acting against justice, but one could never act against justice except by willing something advantageous that one does not already have … God did not thereby remove their freedom—rather he insured the continued uninterruption of their self-initiated will for justice.” [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. St. Augustine, *The Confessions*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-57)