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Locke and Sensitive Knowledge
- Journal of the History of Philosophy
- Johns Hopkins University Press
- Volume 51, Number 2, April 2013
- pp. 249-266
- 10.1353/hph.2013.0029
- Article
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This papers considers the well-known tension between Locke’s definition of knowledge and his claim that we can know by sensation of the existence of things without the mind. I argue (in response to recent suggestions by Rickless and Newman) that sensitive knowledge is knowledge (and Knowledge with a capital ‘K’). I then present an account of sensitive knowledge that is consistent with Locke’s definition of knowledge, which gives a central role to the reflective idea of sensation. I conclude by considering whether Locke’s general epistemological framework leads inevitably to scepticism or idealism, arguing that Locke’s response to the sceptic is more interesting--and more robust--than it might initially appear.