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Thinking through prior bodies: autonomic uncertainty and interoceptive self-inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2020

Micah Allen Open the ORCID record for Micah Allen [Opens in a new window] ,
Nicolas Legrand ,
Camile Maria Costa Correa  and
Francesca Fardo
Micah Allen
Affiliation:
Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark. Micah@cfin.au.dk nicolas.legrand@cfin.au.dk correa@cfin.au.dk francesca@clin.au.dk https://the-ecg.org/ Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, 8000Aarhus, Denmark Cambridge Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, CambridgeCB2 8AH, UK
Nicolas Legrand
Affiliation:
Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark. Micah@cfin.au.dk nicolas.legrand@cfin.au.dk correa@cfin.au.dk francesca@clin.au.dk https://the-ecg.org/
Camile Maria Costa Correa
Affiliation:
Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark. Micah@cfin.au.dk nicolas.legrand@cfin.au.dk correa@cfin.au.dk francesca@clin.au.dk https://the-ecg.org/
Francesca Fardo
Affiliation:
Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark. Micah@cfin.au.dk nicolas.legrand@cfin.au.dk correa@cfin.au.dk francesca@clin.au.dk https://the-ecg.org/ Danish Pain Research Centre, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark
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Abstract

The Bayesian brain hypothesis, as formalized by the free-energy principle, is ascendant in cognitive science. But, how does the Bayesian brain obtain prior beliefs? Veissière and colleagues argue that sociocultural interaction is one important source. We offer a complementary model in which “interoceptive self-inference” guides the estimation of expected uncertainty both in ourselves and in our social conspecifics.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e91
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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