Abstract
Following Schelling (1960), coordination problems have mainly been considered in a context where agents can achieve a common goal (e.g., rendezvous) only by taking common actions. Dynamic versions of this problem have been studied by Crawford and Haller (1990), Ponssard (1994), and Kramarz (1996). This paper considers an alternative dynamic formulation in which the common goal (dispersion) can only be achieved by agents taking distinct actions. The goal of spatial dispersion has been studied in static models of habitat selection, location or congestion games, and network analysis. Our results show how this goal can be achieved gradually, by indistinguishable non-communicating agents, in a dynamic setting.
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Alpern, S., Reyniers, D.J. Spatial Dispersion as a Dynamic Coordination Problem. Theory and Decision 53, 29–59 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020891631738
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020891631738