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The Overall Function of International Criminal Law: Striking the Right Balance Between the Rechtsgut and the Harm Principles

A Second Contribution Towards a Consistent Theory of ICL

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Abstract

Current International Criminal Law (‘ICL’) suffers from at least four theoretical shortcomings regarding its ‘concept and meaning’, ‘ius puniendi’ (supranational right to punish), ‘overall function’ and ‘purposes of punishment’ (For clarification of these basic questions, see Ambos in Oxf J Legal Stud 33:293–315, 2013b. Of course, there are many possible conceptualisations of the basic questions facing any theory of criminal law see, for example, Murphy in Columbia Law Rev 87:509–532, 1987. Yet, taking the perspective of ICL, I would argue that these are the most important conceptual questions today.). These issues are intimately interrelated; in particular, any reflection upon the last two issues without having first clarified the ius puniendi would not make sense. As argued elsewhere (Ambos in Oxf J Legal Stud 33:293–315, 2013b), in an initial contribution towards a consistent theory of ICL, the ius puniendi can be inferred from a combination of the incipient supranationality of the value-based world order and the world citizens’ fundamental human rights predicated upon a Kantian concept of human dignity. On this basis, it is now possible to examine the overall function of ICL. Given the fact that ICL has not yet achieved the status of an autonomous discipline, the inquiry must start with a discussion of national theories of criminalisation. The article focuses on the two most important theories of criminalisation, namely the theories of protection of Rechtsgüter (‘legal goods’) and the prevention of harm (see infra second section). Next, it examines whether and how these national theories can be transferred to ICL (see infra third section).

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Notes

  1. Ambos (2002, pp. 312–323), recently Ambos (2013a, pp. 67–73).

  2. There are, of course, other theories, especially the one focusing on the norm-stabilising function of criminal law (infra note 14), and additional and less controversial elements to a full theory of criminalisation, such as the principle of guilt or the principle of legality (on both, see Ambos 2013a, pp. 87 et seq.).

  3. I shall not further defend this argument here, but its plausibility will hopefully become evident as the argument progresses.

  4. See infra note 44 and main text.

  5. The argument has been made for the international core crimes in Ambos (2013b). As a consequence, there is no room for a relativistic challenge, see infra note 104.

  6. See, in this sense, Pastor (2006, p. 24), stressing the almost impossible task of ICL to coordinate regional cultural values at the international level. Further, the author holds that for this reason ICL is not only a political process of expansion, but also an ‘axiological’ one (p. 25).

  7. Khadduri (1984, p. 135): ‘In Islam, Law (Shari’a) is closely intertwined with Religion, and both are considered the expression of God’s will and Justice, but whereas the aim of Religion is to define and determine goals—justice and others—the function of Law is to indicate the path (the term Shari’a indeed bears this meaning) by virtue of which God’s Justice and other goals are realised.’ See also Alarefi, (2009, pp. 707–708), Kamali (2008, pp. 14 et seq.).

  8. The prohibition (al-haram) on the consumption of alcohol—which also applies to all kinds of intoxicating drugs—can be found in the Koran, Sura al-Maida 5:93, quoted according to Al-Qaradawi (1989, p. 67). Qaradawi (1989, p. 73) points out that the punishment in these cases is foreseen by the Koran itself (the so-called hadd-punishment, as opposed to tazir, which is used in the case of offences that the Koran prohibits but for which it does not prescribe a punishment, instead leaving the regulation to the government). Khadduri (1984, p. 216) contends, on the other hand, that the consumption of alcohol is not necessarily prohibited under threat of punishment by the Koran, but rather that the Koran merely advises against it.

  9. The old critique that Islamic legal scholars in Egypt are reluctant to secularise the criminal code (Khadduri 1984, pp. 214 et seq.) is confirmed by the fact that the most recent (Draft) Constitution of Egypt of 29 November 2012 still provides (as did the former Constitution of 1971) in Art. 2 and 219 for the ‘Principles of Islamic Sharia’ as the main source of Egyptian law (available at http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated, accessed on 5 July 2012); on this so-called ‘Islam reservation’, see Naeem (2008, pp. 77 et seq.).

  10. See, e.g., Jescheck and Weigend (1996, p. 2).

  11. See, for a general discussion, Ormerod (2011, pp. 10–11), Ashworth (2009, pp. 1 et seq.), Roxin (2006, § 2 marginal numbers (mn.) 2 et seq.), Fletcher (2007, p. 37) identifies three potential starting points for the inference that conduct should be treated as criminal: (i) duty, (ii) harm, and (iii) norm.

  12. On the norm-stabilising function of criminal law, see Jakobs (1991, § 1 mn. 4 et seq., 11) (‘The task of punishment is the preservation of the norm as an orientation-model for social contact’; translation from German by the author); recently, Jakobs (2013, pp. 87–89, 93). While Jakobs invokes the Rechtsgut-concept only as a ‘filter of social harmfulness’ (‘Filter der Sozialschädlichkeit’, Jakobs 1991, § 2 mn. 24–25) norms are not protected for their own sake but because they themselves protect something valuable, for example Rechtsgüter. Thus, norm-based theories ultimately must tackle the substantive issue of the material contents of the norms to be protected (for a similar critique, see Roxin (2010, pp. 593–594). On the theories of Sozialschädlichkeit, see infra notes 82 and 98.

  13. Birnbaum had already developed, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, his theory of a violation of ‘goods’ (‘Güter’) as a prerequisite for qualifying conduct as a crime (‘Verbrechen’), rejecting the older theory of a ‘violation of rights’ (‘Rechtsverletzung’) developed by Kant and Feuerbach, see Birnbaum (1834, pp. 149–194); see, on Birnbaum’s approach, Sina, (1962, pp. 19–24), Amelung (1972, pp. 43–51), Hefendehl (2002, pp. 15–18), Swoboda (2010, pp. 27–28). See, on the ‘rights theory.’ Sina (1962, pp. 9–13), Amelung (1972, pp. 16–28), Hefendehl (2002, pp. 12–15), Swoboda (2010, pp. 26–27). It is controversial whether the (older) rights or the (subsequent) goods theory has a more critical, liberal potential with a view to the criminalisation of human conduct, see the recent instructive debate between Guzmán Dalbora (2011, pp. 85–92 et seq.) (defending Birnbaum’s contribution to the Rechtsgut-theory as a liberal project) and Vormbaum (2011a, pp. 96–116, b, pp. 672–673) (considering the rights theory as a more liberal project). In the latter, sense apparently also Kahlo (2003, pp. 29–30) tracing back and linking his definition of Rechtsgut to the rights theory in the sense of a ‘Recht der Subjektivität’; in the same vein, Wohlers (2012, p. 605). See, on this controversy, also Sina (1962, pp. 24–27). Clearly, while the rights theory was based on the idea of a social contract creating citizens’ rights to be protected by the State by means of (criminal) law (cf. Naucke 1997, p. 280), the move to the Rechtsgut-concept entailed severing this link to State theory (in a similar vein Hefendehl 2002, p. 18), although in its critical-liberal variation the Rechtsgut-concept still rests on social contract theory (see infra note 98).

  14. Binding (1872, p. 189) (‘Die Verursachungsverbote lassen sich nur daraus erklären, dass der durch die verbotene Handlung bewirkte Zustand den Interessen des Rechts widerspricht, während der Zustand vor der Handlung diesen Interessen entsprach. Alle diese Zustände, die durch Änderung nicht verdrängt werden sollen, sind für das Recht von Wert: Man kann sie Rechtsgüter nennen.’). See also Sina (1962, pp. 41–47), Amelung (1972, pp. 73–82), Swoboda (2010, pp. 29–30).

  15. von Liszt (1883, p. 19) (‘Lebensbedingungen der staatlichen Gemeinschaft’ as ‘rechtlich geschützte Interessen: Rechtsgüter’); see Sina (1962, pp. 47–54), Amelung (1972, pp. 82–94), Swoboda (2010, pp. 30–32). For a fundamental account on the historical genesis of the concept starting from Birnbaum’s goods theory in the early nineteenth century, see Sina (1962, pp. 14–99), Amelung (1972, pp. 15–329), Vormbaum (2011a, b, pp. 98–113); see, for an English account, Eser (1965–1966, pp. 357–360).

  16. For a brief, yet comprehensive, review of the literature, see Roxin (2010, § 2 mn. 3).

  17. Roxin (2010, § 2 mn. 7–9).

  18. See Roxin (2010, § 2 mn. 3, 66–7) with references.

  19. This critical understanding is still shared by the majority of scholars, see Hassemer (1973, pp. 19 et seq.) (distinguishing between a system-immanent and a critical function); idem (Hassemer 2010, preliminary remark to § 1, mn., 110–115, 113, 2003, pp. 57, 64), Roxin (2006, § 2, mn. 7–12, 50) (who, however, sees a certain ‘Rechtsgut-fatigue’, mn. 120); idem (2010, pp. 573 et seq.) (according to whom the critical function, however, only developed after WWII, p. 576); idem (2013, pp. 433 et seq.; for an English version of this paper, albeit poorly translated, see EurCrLRev 3 [2013], 3 et seq.); Schünemann (2001, p. 29, 2003, pp. 133–134, 154) with various references; Hefendehl (2002, pp. 148–149, 2003, pp. 119, 132); in the result also Vormbaum (2011b, p. 688), Swoboda (2010, p. 50) (after a critical overview of alternative approaches at pp. 37–49).

  20. This has most convincingly been demonstrated by Hörnle (2005).

  21. See the fundamental critique of Amelung (1972, pp. 261–272) (p. 271: lack of clarity of the concept) and Stratenwerth (1998, pp. 378–381) (‘Vielfalt an zumeist nicht näher begründeten Definition’); conc. insofar Roxin (2006, § 2, mn. 2–3); more recently Wohlers (2000, pp. 213 et seq., 2003, p. 281), Hörnle (2005, pp. 11 et seq.), von Hirsch (2003, p. 18), G. Seher (2003, pp. 44, 46), Frisch (2003, pp. 216–218) (‘Relativität, Weite und Vagheit’ (p. 217)).

  22. Cf. Seher (2003, pp. 45–56) (in particular referring to Feinberg and calling for legitimising principles of criminalisation which have to be plausible and generally acceptable); in a similar vein Frisch (2003, pp. 216–227) (limited critical potential not only because of ambiguity but primarily because the Rechtsgut-decision is often pre-determined by the non-criminal legal orders or by other pre-legal value judgments (pp. 219–222) and because the existence of a Rechtsgut falls short of answering the decisive question of the legitimacy of the use of criminal law (pp. 222–226), Seelmann (2003, pp. 261–262) (true criminalisation criteria not provided for), Wohlers (2003, p. 281) (recourse to external standards). Even principled defenders of the Rechtsgut-concept like Roxin (2010, § 2, mn. 7–12) have to take recourse to external factors like the general functions of criminal law and constitutional rights. Summarising the criticism more recently Stuckenberg (2011, pp. 656–658), Vormbaum (2011a, b, pp. 116–117).

  23. Stratenwerth (1998, pp. 388–389), von Hirsch (2003, p. 25), Seher (2003, p. 39), Frisch (2003, pp. 216–222).

  24. Seher (2003, pp. 44, 54), Frisch (2003, p. 222), Hefendehl (2003, p. 119).

  25. For a convincing analytical systematisation of the ambiguous category of the Gefährdungsdelikte (offences of endangerment) see von Hirsch and Wohlers (2003, pp. 198–199) distinguishing between preparatory offences (‘Vorbereitungsdelikte’), cumulative offences (‘Kumulationsdelikte’) and concrete offences of endangerment (‘konkrete Gefährlichkeitsdelikte’) with references to their previous works in fn. 9. On the importance of the offence structure in this regard also Frisch (2003, pp. 227–228), who, however, rightly warns that the findings of a structural analysis do not answer the underlying value questions as to the legitimacy of criminalisation (this is also acknowledged by von Hirsch and Wohlers 2003, p. 199). As to the Gefährdungsdelikte, he only sees a legitimacy problem with those offences of abstract endangerment where the absence of an actual harm to a legal interest is not a pure matter of chance, i.e., in particular in the case of the above-mentioned cumulative offences (pp. 234–238). Crit. with regard to these offences also Roxin (2006, § 2 mn. 80–82) who generally demands a clear connection to a Rechtsgut (mn. 68–69; 2010, pp. 589–590). Kindhäuser (2010, pp. 260–262, 268) provides this connection by convincingly arguing that Rechtsgüter are not only affected by their actual violation (e.g., destruction of property) but also by conduct immediately preceding this violation, i.e, (concretely) dangerous conduct where the occurrence of the actual violation is a pure matter of chance, or where the basic conditions to use the respective Rechtsgut are not guaranteed because of abstract dangers.

  26. For a theory of the Kollektive Rechtsgüter, see Hefendehl (2002, pp. 5–235, 378–386, 2003, pp. 121–132) (distinguishing a grosso modo between those Rechtsgüter which protect the constitutive conditions of the citizens’ liberty and those which protect the State and its institutions, and arguing that their legitimacy depends on the combination of the structure of the Rechtsgut and the offence to be analysed case-by-case). See also Schünemann (2003, pp. 149–153) (arguing the Rechtsgut-concept on the one hand demonstrates its restrictive potential with regard to only ‘apparent’ collective legal interests (see infra note 98), but, on the other hand, also justifies controversial offences like the ones protecting the environment). The personal Rechtsgut-concept (infra note 37) links the ‘Kollektive Rechtsgüter’ to the persons and their individual interests protected by them (see Hassemer 2003, p. 57), Sternberg-Lieben 2003, pp. 67–68, 69). For a fundamental critique, see Stratenwerth (2003, p. 266) arguing that the concept of ‘Kollektivrechtsgüter’ can be dispensed of since either the respective phenomena affect individual interests or the criminalisation decision may ultimately be justified as the protection of conduct norms which are central to the normative consensus in a given society (on conduct norms as expression of a social minimum consensus, see also Stratenwerth 1998, pp. 386–387, 390–391); conc. Hefendehl (2002, pp. 52–59) with regard to the ‘Pönalisierung von Verstößen gegen tief verwurzelte Kulturüberzeugungen’ (p. 56); crit. of the idea of a social consensus in this sense Roxin (2010, pp. 592–593) in favour of the protection of society and State as a prerequisite to protect individual rights and persons Jakobs (2013, pp. 91–92).

  27. See previously Eser (1965–1966, p. 411) calling for a definition ‘broad enough to comprise all types of criminal harms …’.

  28. See, for a critical analysis of this case law, Schünemann (2003, pp 142–149); crit. also Roxin (2006, § 2 mn. 86–87, 89, 2010, pp. 580–582).

  29. Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) Decision 2 BvR 392/07 of 26 February (2008).

  30. BVerfG (para. 39) (‘Strafnormen unterliegen von Verfassungs wegen keinen darüber hinausgehenden, strengeren Anforderungen hinsichtlich der mit ihnen verfolgten Zwecke. Insbesondere lassen sich solche nicht aus der strafrechtlichen Rechtsgutslehre ableiten’). Crit. insofar dissenting opinion Judge Hassemer, para. 80 (‘Das ist in der strafrechtlichen Rechtsgutslehre, die der Senat nur mit spitzen Fingern anfasst, seit langem ausgearbeitet.’); conc. with Hassemer Roxin (2010, pp. 581–582).

  31. BVerfG (para. 35): ‘Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit gebietet … dass eine Strafnorm dem Schutz anderer oder der Allgemeinheit dient.’

  32. BVerfG (paras. 36–37).

  33. BVerfG (para. 37) (‘Schließlich muss bei einer Gesamtabwägung zwischen der Schwere des Eingriffs und dem Gewicht sowie der Dringlichkeit der ihn rechtfertigenden Gründe die Grenze der Zumutbarkeit für die Adressaten des Verbots gewahrtsein ([Verhältnismäßigkeit im engeren Sinn]). Die Maßnahme darf sie nicht übermäßig belasten. Im Bereich staatlichen Strafens folgt aus dem Schuldprinzip und aus dem Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, dass die Schwere einer Straftat und das Verschulden des Täters zu der Strafe in einem gerechten Verhältnis stehen müssen. Eine Strafandrohung darf nach Art und Maß dem unter Strafe gestellten Verhalten nicht schlechthin unangemessen sein. Tatbestand und Rechtsfolge müssen vielmehr sachgerecht aufeinander abgestimmt sein’).

  34. BVerfG (paras. 51–62). Contra dissenting opinion Judge Hassemer (paras. 73–128). The Court’s decision was confirmed by the Eur. Ct. of Human Rights declaring that the criminalisation of incest does not violate Art. 8 of the Convention (ECtHR, Stübing vs. Germany, App. No. 43547/08 (12 April 2012)).

  35. See, in particular, Lagodny (1996, 2003, p. 86), Stächelin (1998), Appel (1998), Hefendehl (2002, pp. 42–110). Combining the constitutional standard with the Rechtsgut-concept Hassemer (2003, pp. 58–64), Roxin (2006, § 2 mn. 86–94, 2010, p. 577–579, 586) (‘Übermaßverbot’), Sternberg-Lieben (2003, pp. 65–82); in particular on the proportionality requirement Hefendehl (2002, pp. 83–107) (drawing heavily on Lagodny 1996), Böse (2003, pp. 91 et seq.), Bunzel (2003, pp. 96 et seq.). The ‘personal Rechtsgut-concept’ (‘personaler Rechtsgutsbegriff’), defended in particular by Hassemer (2010, mn. 131–148), focusing on the interests protected (see previously v. Liszt 1883); crit. Roxin (2010, pp. 591–592) and certainly most appropriate with regard to individual legal interests (as even critics of the Rechtsgut-concept, such as Stratenwerth 1998, p. 388, admit), has also a constitutional grounding since it is predicated on the personal autonomy of the citizens in a Rechtsstaat who need certain ‘Rechtsgüter’ to fully enjoy their freedom (cf. Sternberg-Lieben (2003, pp. 67–68); in a similar vein Roxin (2010, pp. 577–579): peaceful and free co-existence of citizens predicated on the protection of the underlying Rechtsgüter; Kindhäuser (2010, p. 257): making possible the free development of the citizens of a Rechtsstaat). From such a person-focused perspective, however, it is difficult to explain the protection of other non-personal Rechtsgüter. Thus, for example, the widespread protection of animal rights by the criminal law of various western nations (in Germany this protection has even a constitutional grounding, see Art. 20a Grundgesetz; crit. Amelung (2003, p. 161 with fn. 35) can hardly be justified with a personal Rechtsgut-concept (generally crit. Amelung 2003, pp. 161–163); crit. also Hefendehl (2002, pp. 61–67); going beyond his personal Rechtsgut-concept therefore Roxin (2006 13, § 2, mn. 55–59, 2010, pp. 594–596) arguing in favour of the (criminal law) protection of the natural foundations of the environment and the fundamental elements of creation, in particular animals).

  36. Böse (2003, p. 91), Swoboda (2010, p. 36); against this view Schünemann (2003, p. 142); but see also Amelung (1972, pp. 261–273) (demonstrating that the Rechtsgut-theories of the nineteenth century remained largely unaffected by the post-WWII Grundgesetz).

  37. Bunzel (2003, p. 111) (arguing that the legislator benefits from a broad prärogative with regard to the purposes pursued); in the same vein Roxin (2006, § 2, mn. 93, 2010, pp. 584–585) (acknowledging a broad discretion of the legislator (‘Beurteilungsermessen’)), Swoboda (2010, p. 45).

  38. In this vein crit. on the ‘openess’ (‘Offenheit’) of the constitutional value judgments, see also Sternberg-Lieben (2003, pp. 69, 71, 77), Bunzel (2003, p. 111), Frisch (2003, p. 217), Wohlers (2003, p. 282), Swoboda (2010, pp. 36–37, 46–50), Vormbaum (2011b, p. 684).

  39. J. S. Mill (1859, 1948).

  40. Mill (1859, 1948, p. 73). Interestingly, Mill quotes W. von Humboldt’s study on Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen, first published in 1852, in its English translation (The Sphere and Duties of Government. Translated from the German of Baron W. von Humboldt, by J. Coulthard, Jun. 1854) but he does not refer to von Humboldt’s account of the function of the State as guaranteeing the security of its citizens from ‘infringements on others’ rights’ (‘Kränkungen der Rechte andrer’). See, on Mill, also von Hirsch (2003, p. 14), Harcourt (1999, pp. 120–122, 187) (identifying as underlying normative dimensions of Mill’s harm principle a theory of interests recognised as legal rights). Crit. Dubber (2005, pp. 499 et seq.), Kahlo (2003, pp. 33–36).

  41. Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (1957, para. 61); see also para. 257 (‘It is not the duty of the law to concern itself with immorality as such.’).

  42. See, on the one hand, Devlin (1965) and, on the other, Hart (1969, pp. 50–52, 71, 1983, pp. 49, 78) (agreeing with the Wolfenden Report). Hart’s position has subsequently also been adopted by Raz (1986, 1989, p. 420) and Hörnle (2005, pp. 11 et seq., 467 et seq.). For a good discussion of the debate, see Harcourt (1999, pp. 122–134), arguing, inter alia, that it was, in essence, a recapitulation of the earlier Mill-Stephen debate (p. 123).

  43. Hart is not totally clear on that point but it seems that he reluctantly accepts the need for a paternalist criminalisation of conduct which causes harm to oneself. Hart criticises Mill’s harm principle based on free will and consent as ‘fantastic’ (1969, p. 32) since there is a ‘general decline in the belief that individuals know their own interests best’ (p. 32). For that reason, Mill’s theory, according to Hart, must be modified to the effect that ‘harming others is something we may still seek to prevent by use of the criminal law, even when the victims consent to or assist in the acts which are harmful to them.’ (p. 33) Feinberg speaks in this regard of Hart’s reluctant assent of paternalism (Feinberg 1986, p. 4), and he himself only accepts a kind of soft paternalism (cf. infra note 50). Raz (1986) follows Hart in that he understands the harm principle in a broader sense, including harm to self (pp. 412–413) but intervention with self-regarding conduct should be predicated on the respect for the conditions of autonomy (pp. 423).

  44. For the previous discussion linked to J. Hall, G. O. W. Mueller and O. C. Snyder see Eser (1965–1966, pp. 349–355) (in particular pp. 345–355).

  45. Feinberg (1984, 1985, 1986, 1988). For a profound analysis of Feinberg’s theory see Seher (2000); for a methodological critique see Kahlo (2003, pp. 31–32).

  46. Feinberg (1984).

  47. Feinberg (1985). Feinberg basically argues that the effective prevention of a ‘serious offence’ (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor is ‘always a good reason’ for criminalisation (p. 1). Relevant offensive conduct in this sense, however, only constitutes ‘wrongful (right-violating) conduct’, i.e., the so-understood offense principle requires, like harm, an element of wrongfulness; contrary to ordinary language however, it is not necessary that the wrongful act ‘must be taken by the offended person’ as offensive: ‘It is necessary that there be a wrong, but not that the victim feel wronged’ (pp. 1–2). In any case, this narrow concept of (relevant) offensive conduct entails a tricky problem of line-drawing: If ‘offense is surely a less serious thing than harm’ (p. 2), it must be distinguished from it, but then the question arises for what moral reason this remaining, lesser wrong should be criminalised and how it should be distinguished from the punishment of morals, which Feinberg rejects (Feinberg 1988); see crit. Seher (2003, pp. 49–50). Feinberg proposes a nuanced balancing exercise taking into account, on the victim’s side, the seriousness of the offence (intensity and durability of the repugnance produced, the ease to avoid the offensive conduct and the possible willing assumption of risk) and, on the perpetrator’s side, the reasonableness of his conduct (personal and social value of the conduct, the motivation and the circumstances) (Feinberg 1988, pp. 26, 35, 44). In the end, however, there is ‘no automatic mathematical way of coming to a clearly correct decision’, ‘there is no substitute for judgment … the judge or legislator is entirely on his own’ (pp. 45–46). For a critique, see von Hirsch (2000, p. 78, 2003, pp. 22–23) (who overlooks, however, when criticising the offence principle as too subjectivist, Feinberg’s distinction between ordinary language and the technical meaning of the principle), Simester and von Hirsch (2011, p. 91 ff.), Swoboda (2010, p. 39) (arguing that Feinberg does not explain why the sentiments of others should prevail over the general freedom of action).

  48. Feinberg (1986). While not of direct relevance here, it is worthwhile pointing out that J. Feinberg distinguishes between different forms of paternalism (p. 8) and opts, much clearer than Hart, for a liberal ‘soft anti-paternalism’ (pp. 12, 26) concluding: ‘We are thus led to a liberal doctrine which, in its immediate effects, can be confused with paternalism, but which is essentially quite different from it, namely that the State has the right to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct when but only when it is substantially non-voluntary, or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not’ (p. 126). In ‘single-party’ cases, suicide being the most important example, Feinberg rejects criminalisation since ‘[E]ntirely self-regarding and voluntary behavior is none of the criminal law's business’ (p. 143). In ‘two-party’ cases, i.e., where the harm is caused by a perpetrator but the victim consented to it, the same rule applies if the consent was given freely (see ibid., Ch. 23-26 dealing with the possible forms of failures to consent: coercive force, coercive offers, defective belief and incapacity). See, on legal paternalism, also von Hirsch (2003, p 21), Simester and von Hirsch (2011), Seher (2003, pp. 51–52) (differentiated approach).

  49. Feinberg (1988). For a good discussion of different forms of moralism Seher (2003, pp. 52–54) (arguing that moral principles in an ‘impure form’, i.e., protecting moral values with a view to the prevention of harmful consequences, may justify the anticipated criminalisation of not yet harmful conduct, i.e., a criminalisation in the so-called ‘Vorfeld’). Swoboda (2010, p. 39) argues that Feinberg’s approach is ‘more honest’ than the German one of invoking broad Scheinrechtsgüter (infra note 98) which only conceal that, in fact, the criminalisation is based on certain public morals.

  50. Feinberg (1984, p. 33). Feinberg employs, in total, eight verbs to express forms of harm (pp. 51–55) (p. 51: ‘The acts (and sometimes, but not always, the events) that harm people have been said (alternatively) to be those that (1) violate, (2) invade, (3) impair, (4) set back, (5) defeat, (6) thwart, (7) impede, and (8) doom their interests.’).

  51. Feinberg (1984, p. 34) (wrongful setback of interest).

  52. Feinberg (1984, p. 34) Feinberg refers here to moral rights. A moral right is ‘a claim directed against one’s fellow citizens prior to and independent of any claim of enforcement against the state’ (p. 111). It is ‘a claim … addressed to the conscience of the claimee or to public opinion’ (p. 110). Feinberg explains that any interest at all (apart from the sick and wicked ones) is the basis of a moral right; but only welfare interests are also the basis for legal rights (p. 112).

  53. Feinberg (1984, p. 34).

  54. Simester and von Hirsch (2011, p. 52); but see on harm-independent wrongs (pp. 50–51).

  55. See especially Feinberg’s discussion of welfare interests, ulterior interests, and the relation between interests and wants in Feinberg (1984, pp. 28–45).

  56. Feinberg (1984, p. 53).

  57. Feinberg (1984, p. 54).

  58. Ibid.

  59. Raz (1986, 1989, p. 413).

  60. Ibid.

  61. Ripstein (2006, pp. 215–245).

  62. Ripstein (2006, p. 233).

  63. Ripstein (2006, p. 245).

  64. For this and further critique, see Tadros (2011b, pp. 59–64). Tadros himself proposes ‘a more complex principle’ (‘one that permits criminalization of conduct only on condition that the conduct is harmful, or that criminalization of the conduct would prevent harm, or that criminalization would protect people against having their sovereignty interfered with’, p. 64) but in fact only combines the harm and sovereignty principles which he considers, standing alone, insufficient for practical and normative reasons (‘… two important sources of moral demand that lack a single foundation.’, p. 64). But if both principles, on their own, ‘provide independent sources of legitimate criminal prohibitions’ (p. 65) why should it then not suffice to complement the harm with the sovereignty principle?

  65. Simester and von Hirsch (2011, p. 44) (‘Straightforward candidates for prohibition …’).

  66. Feinberg (1984, p. 190): ‘The legislative application of the harm principle must also be based upon empirical generalizations about the likely effects on protected standard interests of various standard kinds of threatening actions. Harm to standard interests must be prevented by prohibiting actions that are likely to invade them, but how probable must the harm be if it is to justify criminal prohibition?’ See also von Hirsch (2003, p. 15), Ormerod (2011, p. 15), critical regarding Feinberg’s definition Ashworth, (2009, p. 28), Fletcher (2007, p. 39), Kahlo (2003, p. 32).

  67. Feinberg (1985, p. 191): ‘The important concept for the legislator, then, is neither magnitude of harm nor probability of harm alone, but rather the compound of the two, which is called risk…. The crucial third factor is the independent value of the risk-creating conduct both to the actor himself, to others directly affected by it, and to society in general.’ See also Feinberg (1985, p. 192) (in favour of the criminal protection of ‘[P]ersons with rare vulnerabilities … against deliberate and malicious attempts to exploit their special weaknesses …’), (p. 195) (prohibition of ‘generally dangerous practice [like handgun possession] … for all except an exceptional few who can shoulder the burden of proving their own special need and competence’).

  68. Feinberg (1984, p. 216).

    1. ‘a.

      the greater the gravity of a possible harm, the less probable its occurrence need be to justify prohibition…;

    2. b.

      the greater the probability of harm, the less grave the harm need be to justify coercion;

    3. c.

      the greater the magnitude of the risk of harm, itself compounded out of gravity and probability, the less reasonable it is to accept the risk;

    4. d.

      the more valuable (useful) the dangerous conduct… the more reasonable it is to take the risk of harmful consequences…;

    5. e.

      the more reasonable the risk of harm (the danger), the weaker is the case for prohibiting the conduct…’.

  69. von Hirsch (1996, 2003, p. 261), see also Simester and von Hirsch (2011, pp. 54–56).

  70. Husak (2008, p. 159) (‘The criminal law is appropriately employed not only to reduce harm but also to reduce the risk of harm’).

  71. Husak (2008, pp. 161–162).

  72. Husak (2008, p. 162) (‘the proscription in question must actually decrease the likelihood that the ultimate harm will occur. I call this ‘the prevention requirement’.’).

  73. Husak (2008 Query, pp. 165–166) (‘the state may not proscribe conduct to reduce the risk of a given harm unless the state would be permitted to proscribe conduct that intentionally and directly causes that same harm.’) For example, if it is illegitimate to prohibit (intentional, direct) reduction of social productivity, it is also illegitimate to base a prohibition on drugs on an alleged risk to productivity.

  74. Husak (2008, p. 174) (this ‘withholds liability from persons who create a risk of harm unless they have some degree of culpability for the ultimate harm risked’).

  75. See, on this distinction, Tadros (2011a).

  76. Arguably, deontological theories may take the consequences into account. Thus, for example, Rawls (1999, p. 26–27) in his theory of justice as fairness posited that it is a deontological theory, which ‘does not interpret the right as maximizing the good’. Persons accept in advance a principle of equal liberty, and they undertake to conform their conceptions of their good to what the principles of justice require, or, at least, not to press claims which directly violate them. In this sense, Rawlsian deontology arguably takes into account consequences as well. This article, however, does not aim to present a comprehensive political philosophy of justice as fairness. In the context of the present argument, it is more straightforward to maintain the strict divide between deontology and utility.

  77. Tadros (2011a).

  78. Husak (2008, p. 3).

  79. See, in this vein, Feinberg's definition of liberalism referring to ‘harm and offense prevention’ as ‘far and away the best reasons … in support of criminal prohibitions’ (Feinberg 1988, p. 323).

  80. Cf. Amelung (1972, p. 10) (arguing that ‘Sozialschädlichkeit’ constitutes the ‘Grundprinzip jeder rationalen Strafrechtslehre’); on the common intellectual roots of the Harm principle and Rechtsgut insofar also Roxin (2010, p. 575). On the historical roots of the theory of Sozialschädlichkeit as a part and consequence of social contract theories and enlightenment philosophy since the mid-8th century, see Naucke (1997, pp. 269 et seq.), see also Hefendehl (2002, pp. 10–11) with further references. See also infra note 98.

  81. See supra note 15.

  82. In contrast, complementing the Rechtsgut-concept with the ‘offence principle’ (in this vein von Hirsch (2003, pp. 22–24), Seher (2003, pp. 49–51)) does not seem to be a promising path given the line-drawing issues mentioned above (supra note 49) and the fact that this principle does not answer the underlying normative issues either.

  83. In a similar vein Eser (1965–1966, p. 413) (‘actual or potential prejudice to socially and constitutionally recognized … factual interests’), who understands ‘Rechtsgüter’ in a dualist sense (pp. 376, 395, 412) being composed of a ‘sociological substratum’ (i.e., a factual legal interest) based on certain (constitutionally rooted) values (pp. 376–382, 394–938) normally provided for by a constitutional legal order (pp. 398–407).

  84. The reference to (legal) interests can already be found in Mill (supra note 42, quoting Harcourt), in Binding (as ‘interests of the law’, supra note 16) and von Liszt (supra note 17). It was later often repeated, e.g., by Feinberg (supra note 52) and in § 1.02 of the Model Penal Code referring to ‘harm to individual or public interests.’ See also Stratenwerth (1998, pp. 379–380), von Hirsch (2003, pp. 16–18) (violation of an interest in the sense of a resource belonging as a right to a person and insofar similar to a Rechtsgut), Seher (2003, pp. 46–48). However, the recourse to ‘interest’ for defining the Rechtsgut-concept has been criticised since ‘interest’ only expresses a certain value which deserves to be protected but does not constitute itself the material ‘something’ which can be violated (Stratenwerth 2003, p. 380); conc. Hefendehl (2002, pp. 30–31). While this criticism is formally accurate (indeed, it has already been made in a similar fashion by Birnbaum (1834, pp. 180–183) with regard to the concept of ‘right’ in Feuerbach’s ‘rights theory’ as opposed to ‘good’ in his subsequent ‘goods theory’ (supra note 15)), it should not be overstated since both concepts (‘Rechtsgut’ and ‘interest’) are ambiguous, and at least in the Anglo-American discussion, the widespread use of ‘interest’ would normally encompass the tangible objects of these interests. In addition, one must not overlook that the ‘Rechtsgut’ also goes beyond mere tangible objects as shown in the discussion about the difference between ‘Rechtsgut’ and ‘Handlungsobjekt’ (physical object of the respective conduct) (see e.g., Hefendehl 2002, pp. 39–41). In any case, the formulation used in the text should pay due attention to the difference between ‘Rechtsgut’ and ‘interest’.

  85. On the emptiness of a ‘simple harm principle’ ignoring the additional normative dimensions and inherent moral qualities Harcourt (1999, pp. 183, 187).

  86. See Fletcher (2007, pp. 40–41), Dubber (2005, pp. 501 et seq.)

  87. The historical process described above (supra note 15) may be interpreted in this dialectic way considering the Rechtsgut-theory as the synthesis of rights and goods theory; in a similar vein Vormbaum (2011a, pp. 110–111).

  88. For a merger of the old rights theory (supra note 15) and the Rechtsgut-theory Vormbaum (2011a, p. 117 with fn. 68). The rights theory must however be ‘updated’ and protected against abuse (crit. on the Nazi equal treatment of rights and the Rechtsgut-theory Amelung (2003, p. 160)) by taking recourse to civil and human rights standards. In this vein Roxin (2006, § 2 mn. 7, 11, 50, 92, 2010, pp. 577–579) focuses on the individual and his right of self-realisation, as embodied in constitutional rights, and agrees, in principle, with a constitutional revision of the Rechtsgut-concept. Lagodny (2003, p. 87) speaks of the ‘directional function of constitutional rights’ (‘kriminalpolitischen Richtlinienfunktion der Grundrechte’). Frisch (2003, pp. 231–238), albeit critical of the theoretical approaches so far, also considers constitutional considerations, namely necessity (‘Erforderlichkeit’) and appropriateness (‘Angemessenheit’), as the most important criteria for assessing the legitimacy of criminalisation. Seelmann (2003, pp. 262–267) invokes Hegel’s theory of the mutual recognition of persons (‘Anerkennungsverhältnis’) from which the degradation of another in his status as a person follows as the fundamental reason of criminalisation. Hörnle (2005, pp. 18–19, 43 et seq., 68–69) wants to ‘materialize’ the Rechtsgut-concept ‘from below’ (‘von unten materialisieren’ (p. 18)) taking recourse to the constitutional rights, especially the general freedom of action in its interplay with the rights of others (crit. Swoboda 2010, p. 41).

  89. Supra note 31 and main text.

  90. See, for the respective critique with regard to the harm principle, von Hirsch (1996, 2003, pp. 259–260), Husak (2008, p. 103); with regard to the Rechtsgut-principle von Hirsch and Wohlers (2003, pp. 196–197) (with regard to drug offences), Stuckenberg (2011, pp. 657–658) (‘illiberal tendency’). Insofar Krüger (2000) identifies a sort of ‘dematerialization’ (‘Entmaterialisierung’) of the Rechtsgut-principle.

  91. See Krüger (2000, pp. 20 et seq., 40 et seq., 45 et seq., 50 et seq.) referring to economic and environmental criminal law, the criminal law of road traffic and against organised crime.

  92. See, for the hijacking of the harm principle in the U.S. since the 1980s to justify the criminalisation of a wide range of conduct (from pornography to drug use), Harcourt (1999, pp. 139–181).

  93. See supra notes 67 et seq. with main text.

  94. For a good definition and examples focusing on the contingency of the harm, von Hirsch (1996, 2003, pp 260–261, 263–265), Simester and von Hirsch (2011, pp. 46–7, 53–4, 57–9, 75–88). This demonstrates the similarity to offences of abstract endangerment (supra note 27), also given by von Hirsch as an example (1996, 2003, pp. 263–264), Simester and von Hirsch (2011, pp. 75–79).

  95. See supra note 27 et seq. (also on the related endangerment offences).

  96. Of course, this tendency shifts the scope of protection of criminal law from tangible (legal) goods to mere Scheinrechtsgüter (apparent legal goods, e.g., the ‘health of the people’ or the ‘public peace’) whose only purpose is to protect conduct norms, predicated on an alleged normative consensus with regard to the values they pretend to protect (on their existence in the Criminal Codes of Chile, Germany and Spain, see Hefendehl (2012, pp. 506–512). Yet, even if such a consensus exists, minority rights may still impede its unrestricted enforcement by way of criminal law (for a critique of these Scheinrechtsgüter and other hypostatisations, see Amelung (2003, pp. 171–176), also Hefendehl (2003, pp. 33–39, 2003, pp. 128–129), Roxin (2006), § 2 mn. 10, 67, 2010, 580), Vormbaum (2011b, pp. 675–676). The requirement of social consensus for the justification of criminal law (see previously Stratenwerth in supra note 28) comes close to theories of Sozialschädlichkeit (social harmfulness) which see the function of criminal law in maintaining and reaffirming a given social order whose cohesion is put at risk by the commission of crimes (see, on the one hand, Schünemann (2003, pp. 137–141) arguing, in line with a liberal, restrictive conception of the Rechtsgut on the basis of social contract theory, that the only function of criminal law is to prevent social harm with regard to ‘the natural or socially produced goods of the members of society’ (‘natürlichen oder gesellschaftliche geschaffenen Gütern der Gesellschaftsmitglieder’); in a similar vein, Roxin (2006, § 2, mn. 7–8, 2010, pp. 578–579, 590). By contrast, see Amelung (1972, pp. 350–395, 367, 388–393, 2003, p. 182) arguing, on the basis of T. Parsons’ sociological systems theory with a view to complement the Rechtsgut-concept, that criminal offences affect the ‘organizational conditions of the living together of human beings’ (‘organisatorischen Bedingungen menschlichen Zusammenlebens’) and thus criminal punishment is needed to protect these conditions; however, he acknowledges ‘liberal limits’ of his theory with a view to the status of a person grounded in human dignity and general freedom. Thus, quite unsurprisingly, the critical, normative potential of his theory is derived from a philosophical, non-systemic concept, since a ‘systems approach’ does not provide for any normative content; in a similar vein Swoboda (2010, pp. 42–43).

  97. On the identification of these underlying normative dimensions in Mill and, above all, Feinberg, see Harcourt (1999, pp. 187–192).

  98. See G. Seher (2003, pp. 45–56) and previously supra note 24 and main text.

  99. For examples of such directives on the basis of a liberal, restrictive Rechtsgut-concept excluding a number of criminalisations, see Roxin (2006), § 2 mn. 13–50, 2010, pp. 579–580).

  100. See, for an explanation in English, von Hirsch (1996, 2003, pp. 265, 269), Simester and von Hirsch (2011, pp. 59–65), Ambos (2007), pp. 2664–2666).

  101. For such a very helpful approach developing criteria of fair imputation with regard to offences of endangerment (supra note 71), see von Hirsch and Wohlers (2003, pp. 200–214) with further references. On the importance of a theory of imputation in this context, see also von Hirsch (1996, 2003, pp. 265–271), Simester and von Hirsch (2011, pp. 59–65), Frisch (2003, pp. 226–227, 228–231) (although cautioning that such a theory only answers the question whether a certain conduct is to be qualified as wrongful but not whether it deserves punishment); Roxin (2010, p. 589), see also Wittig (2003, pp. 240–243) (correctly arguing that the legitimacy of criminalisation does not only depend on the external consequences of a criminal offence but also on criteria of imputation, in particular on the delimitation of the perpetrator’s/victim’s spheres of responsibility).

  102. See, in a similar vein, for example, Perry (1997) (p. 471: ‘Human beings are all alike in some respects that support generalisations both about what is good and about what is bad, not just for some human beings, but for every human being’), Bielefeldt (1998, pp. 10 et seq., at 12–13, 17, 115 et seq., 145 et seq.) (identifying a ‘core of an intercultural, overlapping consensus’); Fisher (2012, p. 61).

  103. For a recent critique of the ambiguous gravity concept and the ensuing expansion of ICL to the detriment of State sovereignty and defendants’ rights, see Deguzman (2012, pp. 22, 24–5, 30, 36 ff.) (reading, however, too much into the gravity concept with regard to the alleged restriction of defendants’ rights and the alleged intentions of the drafters of the ICC Statute).

  104. Ambos, supra note 1.

  105. Thereto Werle (2009, mn. 86 et seq., 627), Triffterer (2002, p. 342), Neubacher (2005, pp. 100 et seq.), Ambos (2006, pp. 111 et seq.), Cryer (2005, p. 4), Cryer and Wilmshurst (2010, pp. 6–7), Melloh (2010, pp. 83, 86, 88–89). This dimension of protection of collective, supranational interests is sometimes underestimated in the literature, for example by Lagodny (2001, p. 803) and Gil (2000, p. 382).

  106. See especially the preamble of the ICC Statute referring to ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole…’ and recognising that ‘such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world’. See, from the vast literature, Bagaric & Morss (2006), pp. 242 et seq.), Haveman (2006, p. 154), Ayat (2007, pp. 394 et seq.), Henham (2007, pp. 449 et seq.), Cryer (2010, pp. 30 et seq., 33), Cornacchia (2009, pp. 136 et seq.), Safferling (2011, p. 69) referring to the UN Charter.

  107. Neubacher (2005, pp. 89 et seq., 113, 289 et seq., 476 et seq.), Möller (2003, pp. 419 et seq.), Melloh (2010, pp. 84–86, 90), Bock (2010, pp. 90 et seq., 97 et seq., 115–116), Safferling (2011, p. 69) referring to fundamental human rights, in particular with a view to protection of minorities.

  108. For a good analysis of human dignity as a protected interests in national (German and Israeli) criminal law see, Kremnitzer and Hörnle (2011, pp. 143 et seq.) (distinguishing between dignity violations by non-speech offences, e.g., rape, hate speech offences (e.g., holocaust-denial), and media content displaying scenes of severe humiliation, e.g, child pornography).

  109. See e.g., Werle (2009, mn. 89, 665, 754, 944) (differentiating, but in the result affirming the protection of individual rights with regard to core crimes), Lee (2010, pp. 34 et seq.) (pointing out that the relevant part of ICL is not fundamentally about collective entities, such as humanity as a whole or States, but about ‘the harm done to individuals who are killed, persecuted, or denied their group identity in genocidal acts’ [p. 35]); Gropengießer & H. Kreicker (2003, pp. 115 et seq., 154 et seq.) (‘only’ regarding individual rights as protected by crimes against humanity and war crimes); similarly Triffterer (2008, mn. 21).

  110. Cf. Lüders (2004, pp. 43 et seq., 166), Melloh (2010, pp. 90–91), Bock (2010, p. 92). For another view, Gropengießer & Kreicker (2003, pp. 96 et seq.) (only group).

  111. See Luban (2004, pp. 86, 120, 159–160); conc. Ambos (2011, pp. 281–282), Bock (2010, pp. 97, 101–102), see also Melloh (2010, pp. 91–92).

  112. Melloh (2010, p. 92), Bock (2010, pp. 115–116).

  113. Cf. May (2005, pp. 80–95). This international harm principle operates as the second element of a twofold justification of international criminal prosecutions; on the first element, the ‘security principle’, see May (2005, pp. 63–79) (especially pp. 68–71).

  114. May (2005, p. 89).

  115. May (2005, pp. 82 et seq.).

  116. See, for example, Arnold (2004), Proulx (2004, p. 1009).

  117. Drumbl (2002, pp. 341–342). Drumbl further suggests a number of pragmatic considerations in favour of coneceiving terrorism as a crime against humanity. While these are undoubtedly important, I shall not discuss them here.

  118. On this issue, see Boister (2003, p. 953).

  119. On the distinction, see Ambos (2013b, pp. 295–296, 2014, pp. 223, 226–8).

  120. However, arguably, terrorism is a particularly serious treaty-based crime being at the verge of becoming a ‘true’ international crime, cf. Ambos (2014, pp. 228 et seq.).

  121. Drumbl has been one of the vocal proponents of conceptualising terrorism as an international offence. See Drumbl (2002, p. 323).

  122. For a critical analysis, see Ambos (2010, pp. 493–497).

  123. See, for the foundations of such a pure or absolute theory of universal jurisdiction, Ambos (2009, pp. 443–444) with further references.

  124. Compare Renzo (2012).

  125. Along the same lines, Renzo has forcefully argued that torture may be considered a crime against humanity. See Renzo (2012, p. 443).

  126. This approach to human dignity ties in well with the tripartite distinction of human dignity that Feldman makes into the dignity of the individual, the dignity of the social group and the dignity of the human race as a whole. See Feldman (1999, 2000).

  127. Ambos (2013b).

  128. Cf. Ambos (2013a, pp. 68–73). Crit. Pastor (2006, pp. 70 et seq., 94 et seq., 115 et seq.), who considers this purpose as an expression of a ‘certain ethical arrogance’ (‘cierta soberbia ética’, p. 70) and as a plainly ‘obscene hypocrisy’ (‘obscena hipocresía’, pp. 94–95).

  129. See also Bagaric and Morss (2006), Haveman (2006, p. 154), Ayat (2007), Henham (2007), Cryer (2010, pp. 24 et seq., 28), Murphy (2010, pp. 236 et seq.); Judgment, Prosecutor v. Orić (IT-03-68-T), Trial Chamber, 30 June 2006, § 721, states, however, that other purposes of punishment such as rehabilitation, social defence and restoration have not yet achieved the same importance as retribution and deterrence in the sentencing history of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and that only limited weight has been attached to them.

  130. For Drumbl (2007, pp. 173 et seq.) expressivism means that the purpose of punishment is to strengthen faith in the rule of law among the general public, and the pedagogical dissemination to the public of historical narratives is viewed as a central goal. He is, however, critical of this concept. See also Sloane (2007, p. 44) stressing the ‘expressive dimensions’ of international punishment which ‘can contribute most effectively to world public order as self-consciously expressive penal institutions’ and encourage the ‘legal and normative internalization of international human rights and humanitarian law.’ Fisher (2012, pp. 51, 56–63, 65) calls for a mixed ‘retributive-expressive justification’ considering the ‘message conveyed’ as the primary purpose and the retributive (or even deterrent) effect as ‘secondary or supportive of this goal’ (p. 58); the communicative message is addressed to both the society affected and the international community (p. 65). For Stahn (2012, pp. 279–80) expressivism contributes to ‘a broader vision of the function of proceedings’ and relies ‘on the power of transparency and persuasion of international criminal courts to denounce the wrong and reinforce society’s norms.’

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Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to the Institute for Advanced Studies of Hebrew University of Jerusalem for the support received during his sabbatical as Senior Research Fellow during winter 2011/12. I thank Profs. Andrew Ashworth, Andrew von Hirsch and Victor Tadros (all from England) and in particular the anonymous reviewers of the Journal for their critical and helpful comments. My special thanks goes, however, to Dr. Liat Levanon Morag (London) whose help to bring the paper into its final form was indispensable.

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    Kai Ambos

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Ambos, K. The Overall Function of International Criminal Law: Striking the Right Balance Between the Rechtsgut and the Harm Principles. Criminal Law, Philosophy 9, 301–329 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-013-9266-1

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