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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2009
More than three decades after its introduction as a legal requirement for medical treatment in the clinical setting, informed consent continues to be viewed with skepticism as to its need or effectiveness. Some maintain that it is not required because the ordinary individual believes that doctors can be trusted to behave In the best interests of their patients. This issue will be discussed in a later portion of this article. Others are persuaded that informed consent is an unattainable ideal given the limited capacity of the ordinary individual to understand the relevant information. This view is supported by studies intended to show that satisfactory understanding on the part of patients cannot be achieved. In rebuttal, Apple-baum, Lidz, and Meisel observed that:
Such statements are easily refuted by reference to studies of situations in which reasonable comprehension actually has been achieved. A sounder interpretation of all these studies might be that patients and subjects can attain a good level of understanding in many cases, but that several factors — including the manner in which disclosure is made as well as patients' limitations — may get in the way.
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