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A modal view of the semantics of theoretical sentences

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Abstract

Modal logic has been applied in many different areas, as reasoning about time, knowledge and belief, necessity and possibility, to mention only some examples. In the present paper, an attempt is made to use modal logic to account for the semantics of theoretical sentences in scientific language. Theoretical sentences have been studied extensively since the work of Ramsey and Carnap. The present attempt at a modal analysis is motivated by there being several intended interpretations of the theoretical terms once these terms are introduced through the axioms of a theory.

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  1. University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

    Holger Andreas

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  1. Holger Andreas
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Correspondence to Holger Andreas.

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Andreas, H. A modal view of the semantics of theoretical sentences. Synthese 174, 367–383 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9458-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9458-3

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