Abstract
In Paradox in Christian Theology (2007) I argued that the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are paradoxical—that is, they appear to involve implicit contradictions—yet Christians can still be rational in affirming and believing those doctrines. Dale Tuggy has characterized my theory of theological paradox as a form of “positive mysterianism” and argues that the theory “faces steep epistemic problems, and is at best a temporarily reasonable but ultimately unsustainable stance.” After summarizing my proposed model for the rational affirmation of theological paradox and considering whether my proposal is indeed a form of “positive mysterianism” as Tuggy defines the term, I address the two main criticisms raised in Tuggy’s paper: first, that the doctrine of divine incomprehensibility cannot bear the weight required by my defense of paradox; and second, that my proposed model is afflicted with epistemic instability. I conclude that Tuggy has failed to show that a mysterian stance with respect to paradoxical Christian doctrines is in principle unreasonable, unnatural, or unsustainable.
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Notes
Anderson (2007).
Tuggy (2010).
I define a paradox as “a set of claims which taken in conjunction appear to be logically inconsistent.” Anderson (2007, pp. 5–6).
Anderson (2007, pp. 31–59, 80–106). I should acknowledge here that theologians have understood the paradox of the Trinity in different ways. For some, it is not so much about reconciling the oneness and threeness of God as about accounting for real relations between God and that which is not God. (This is especially the case for those who hold that the trinitarian distinctions are somehow a consequence of God’s relation to the world.) This paper is written from the vantage point of a more traditional understanding of the paradox of the Trinity, but my model is generic enough that it can be applied to other formulations. I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
Plantinga (2000).
Plantinga (2000, pp. 241–266).
Anderson (2007, pp. 199–209).
For a helpful overview of the concept of defeaters in contemporary epistemology, see Sudduth (2008).
For examples of non-theological MACRUEs, see Anderson (2007, pp. 222–224, 230).
Anderson (2007, pp. 233–236). I note in passing that Tuggy’s paper neglects to mention the contribution of the doctrine of analogy to my defense of theological paradox.
I employ the following definition of mystery: “A mystery is a metaphysical state of affairs the revelation of which appears implicitly contradictory to us on account of present limitations in our cognitive apparatus and thus resists systematic description in a perspicuously consistent manner.” Anderson (2007, p. 245). Note that a mystery can serve as a defeater-insulator as well as a defeater-defeater. Anderson (2007, pp. 246–255).
Anderson (2007, p. 260).
Tuggy (2010, p. 209).
Tuggy (2010, p. 210).
I argue that the contradictions are implicit rather than explicit. Anderson (2007, pp. 108–109).
This is one important respect in which my theory parts company with negative mysterianism.
Anderson (2007, pp. 241–243).
A mathematical analogy will illustrate the point. Imagine a man—call him Integral Ian—who lacks altogether the concept of fractional numbers. He can think only in terms of whole numbers. Suppose that Integral Ian is asked to accept, on very good authority, the following four claims: (1) Town A is 8 miles from Town B; (2) Town B is 9 miles from Town C; (3) Town A is 16 miles from Town C; (4) Town B lies on the straight line between Town A and Town C. As Ian sees the matter, these four claims appear to be inconsistent (assuming Euclidian geometry!). But the source of the claims knows that they were approximate statements. More precisely, Town A is 7.7 miles from Town B, Town B is 8.7 miles from Town C, and Town A is 16.4 miles from Town C. The statements weren’t really inconsistent; they were only imprecise, rounded to the nearest whole number. Integral Ian not only lacked this additional information, he also lacked the conceptual framework to grasp that information. He was therefore unable to perceive how the four claims could cohere.
For some criticisms of apophatic theology, see Anderson (2007, pp. 133–135).
Tuggy (2010, p. 214).
Compare Peter van Inwagen’s “concluding meditation” on the limits of metaphysics (1983, pp. 200–201).
Cf. Tuggy (2010, p. 214).
Note that we don’t need to be able to specify how they would have interfered in order to reasonably conclude that they would have done. I should mention in passing (for those who care about such matters) that the notion of a design plan for humans isn’t incompatible with a evolutionary view of human origins, provided one allows for a providentially directed or guided evolution (as theistic evolutionists often do).
Tuggy (2010, pp. 214–215). Some of these reasons would also apply to other areas of study, such as philosophy and science.
According to Tuggy, the positive mysterian “by definition posits persistent and irresolvable apparent contradictions.” Tuggy (2010, p. 215). I maintain that the paradoxes of the Trinity and the Incarnation have not yet been resolved, and that we have no reason to assume that they will be resolved in the future, but I have never argued that the paradoxes cannot or will not be resolved. Rather, I argue that it can be rational for Christians to affirm theological paradoxes while they remain unresolved, whether or not they can be resolved in principle (by us) or will be resolved at some future date. Anderson (2007, p. 287, fn. 34).
Anderson (2007, pp. 254–255).
Here’s another illustration of the point. Suppose that a crime is committed, and the only DNA found at the scene of the crime (other than the victim’s) matches Don’s. Based on rigorous forensic work, the police are convinced beyond doubt that the DNA belongs to the perpetrator. Yet dozens of reliable witnesses testify that Don was at a conference thousands of miles away at the time of the crime. One rational explanation for this apparent contradiction is that Don has an ‘identical’ twin brother who committed the crime. While monozygotic twins are statistically rare (around 1 in every 250 births) this live possibility can still serve as an undercutting defeater for the conclusion that either (a) the DNA test was flawed or (b) all the witnesses were lying or mistaken.
This paper is not the place to review the exegetical arguments for the deity of Christ, etc. However, Tuggy’s claim about the lack of biblical support for the catholic doctrines certainly raises the question of how those doctrinal traditions could have gained such momentum in the first place, particularly when (as Tuggy believes) they are crippled by apparent contradictions.
Tuggy (2010, p. 219).
Anderson (2007, pp. 246–261).
See footnote 12 for my definition of mystery. In Paradox in Christian Theology I point out that if S’s belief in D is sufficiently warranted, that belief may be intrinsically insulated against defeat by the paradoxicality of D, even in the absence of any consideration of divine incomprehensibility. Anderson (2007, pp. 248–250). Nevertheless, I grant that the potential defeater would still diminish S’s warrant for believing D to some degree. For this reason I will assume that S must also rely on other defeater-defeaters or defeater-insulators.
For the record, I acknowledge in my book that defeaters can be doxastic or non-doxastic. Anderson (2007, p. 211).
In the case of some doctrines, e.g., the Trinity, the paradox is the product of more than two claims. However, Tuggy’s analysis can easily be extended to cover those cases.
Tuggy (2010, p. 219).
Tuggy and I agree that a belief must be held fairly firmly in order to count as knowledge; it follows that if a belief B is held on the basis of one or more seemings, those seemings must be sufficiently strong for B to qualify as knowledge (assuming that the other necessary conditions for warrant are satisfied).
Tuggy (2010, p. 223).
Tuggy (2010, p. 224).
One thinks here of the relationship between Newtonian physics and Einsteinian physics. The former isn’t so much false as it is a simplification of the latter, a simplification that is more than adequate for most engineering purposes.
As I understand it, this is precisely what string theorists hope to accomplish. A “theory of everything” wouldn’t replace quantum mechanics and general relativity; rather, it would incorporate refined versions of both theories within one unified framework.
Compare this epistemic situation to that of “Integral Ian” (see footnote 20).
We can further assume that Cathy has studied various attempts to reconcile P and Q (e.g., Thomas Morris’s two-minds model) but has not found any of them to be entirely satisfying; that is to say, it still seems to her that P and Q are implicitly inconsistent.
Dale Tuggy suggested this objection to me in correspondence.
See, e.g., Tuomela (2000).
I suspect Jerry Coyne’s book Why Evolution Is True would not have had quite the same impact if it had been titled Why Evolution Should Be Accepted As If True.
Van Fraassen (1980, p. 9, emphasis added). According to the version of antirealism defended by van Fraassen, acceptance of a scientific theory still involves some belief, specifically belief in the observable content of the theory. It’s fair to say that only the most radical antirealists hold that we shouldn’t believe any of the deliverances of science.
I refer here to the PhilPapers Survey of professional philosophers carried out in November 2009 (see http://philpapers.org/surveys for details). For target faculty across all specializations, 75% favored realism compared with 11.6% favoring antirealism (931 respondents). For target faculty specializing in philosophy of science, 59.5% favored realism compared with 15.9% favoring antirealism (94 respondents).
I suppose the objector might respond that scientists are (or ought to be) selective antirealists. Well-established scientific theories that face no theoretical or empirical objections may be believed, but if there are unresolved conflicts between well-supported theories—as in the case of quantum theory and relativity theory—those theories should be merely accepted and not believed (at least until the conflicts are resolved). I do not find this qualified objection any more cogent than the original. First, it seems that the main arguments given for and against scientific realism apply across the board if they apply at all, leaving little room for a selective antirealism. Secondly, if two scientific theories appear to be inconsistent, it’s hard to see that merely accepting them as if true offers any advantage over believing them to be true (or more precisely, believing them to be approximately true and reconcilable in principle on the basis of further insight and refinement). For regarding both theories as if true amounts to regarding a contradiction as if true. Why would that epistemic stance be any more rational or intellectually fruitful than the qualified beliefs of scientific Simon?
Tuggy (2010, p. 219).
Of course, there may be more or less sophisticated forms of mysterian stance. My only point here is that the less sophisticated forms can be just as rational.
I wish to thank Dale Tuggy and Hans Halvorson for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Anderson, J.N. On the rationality of positive mysterianism. Int J Philos Relig 83, 291–307 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-018-9668-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-018-9668-z