Abstract
This paper is concerned with connections between scientific and metaphysical realism. It is not difficult to show that scientific realism, as expounded by Psillos (1999) clearly qualifies as a kind of metaphysical realism in the sense of Putnam (1980). The statement of scientific realism therefore must not only deal with underdetermination and the dynamics of scientific theories but also answer the semantic challenges to metaphysical realism. As will be argued, the common core of these challenges is the proposition that a (metaphysical) realist semantics leads to semantic agnosticism in the sense that we are unable to grasp the proper meanings and referents of our linguistic expressions. Having established this, I will focus more specifically on the question of whether scientific realism—in its state-of-the-art account—has the resources to make reference to scientific concepts intelligible such that the semantic challenges can be answered.
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Notes
Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics diverges slightly from (model-theoretic) interpretational semantics in that truth is taken as the basic undefined concept, with the intention to explicate meaning on the basis of the use of the language (Davidson 1984). Hence, in this semantics, truth is not understood as truth under the intended interpretation. Putnam’s model-theoretic argument, therefore, will not apply directly. It is doubtful, however, whether Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics accords coherently with the realist distinction between truth makers of statements, i.e., truth-conditions that obtain, and statements themselves. Once such a distinction is made, truth does not seem to figure as a primitive notion any more. It is easy to see, moreover, that Dummett’s manifestation and acquisition challenge are an issue for Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics.
Operational constraints are also characterised as comprising all measurements of scientific magnitudes. They may even imply information about the outcome of counterfactual measurements.
Dummett himself also advocates the principle of compositionality but under an intuitionistic reading of the logical constants.
It would have been more precise to say that the value of t cannot even partially be determined without accepting some application of T to an empirical system as being successful without any justification, where such an application implies the statement that some axiom of T holds true for this system. But to fully appreciate the content of this formulation, it would have been necessary to give a more fine-grained exposition of the manner in which Sneed employs techniques of the semantic approach to scientific theories. The above formulation presents the core of the problem of theoretical terms.
As for the semantics of non-theoretical concepts and sentences, it is advisable to adopt a verificationist account of meaning in order to block the model-theoretic argument by Putnam.
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I am grateful to an unknown reviewer for very helpful comments on a first draft of this paper.
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Andreas, H. Semantic Challenges to Scientific Realism. J Gen Philos Sci 42, 17–31 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9153-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9153-1