The Journal of Nietzsche Studies

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26 (2003) 79-90

The Ethical Possibilities of the Subject as Play:
In Nietzsche and Derrida

Nicole Anderson

In "The Ends of Man," when talking about a deconstructive process of writing, Jacques Derrida says that "what we need, perhaps, as Nietzsche said, is a change of "style," and if there is style, Nietzsche reminds us, it must be plural" (in Margins: Of Philosophy, 135). On his debt to Nietzsche, Derrida remains elusive, although it is obvious that there are many manifestations of Nietzsche's presence throughout Derrida's writings. As this quote suggests, if there is not a similarity in style between Nietzsche and Derrida, there are some definite similarities of approach and intent. While their arguments are far more intricate than the similarities on which this article will focus can communicate, I will argue that Nietzsche's concept of 'perspectivism' could perhaps be seen as a paradigm for Derrida's concept of 'différance.'

The aim of this article, then, will be to argue that in 'perspectivism' and 'différance,' a notion of "play" problematizes the traditional concept of the subject, but in doing so it allows for ethical possibilities. These issues will be explored in two parts. The first section, "The Subject as Play," argues that in Nietzsche's 'perspectivism' and Derrida's 'différance' there is a refusal to hypostasise the subject, and this refusal is evidenced in both Nietzsche's and Derrida's playing with the "proper name." In the second section, "Ethical Possibilities," in contradistinction to critical readings of Nietzsche and Derrida that label their writings—because of their switching of styles and their manipulation of the subject—irresponsible and nihilistic, I will argue that it is precisely because of their subversive techniques that ethical possibilities are generated.

The Subject as Play

I shall start by quoting a passage from Beyond Good and Evil that I believe epitomizes Nietzsche's view of metaphysics, and as I will go on to discuss, it also sets the scene for an understanding of his concept of the subject. He argues [End Page 79] that metaphysicians "concern themselves" with a knowledge that they believe, or have at least "baptized," "the truth." However, Nietzsche challenges this concept of "truth," defined by metaphysicians, as "the faith in anti-thetical values." He says that "it may be doubted, firstly whether there exists any antithesis at all, and secondly whether these popular evaluations and value anti-thesis, on which the metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps foreground valuations, merely provisional perspectives . . ." (BGE I 2). This is fighting talk! We have not only a challenge to antithesis constituting metaphysical knowledge, but Nietzsche then says that the faith in antithetical values is simply one of many interpretations and evaluations. That is, he is arguing against "the truth" as interpretable from only the viewpoint of antithetical knowledge, and instead, puts forth his idea of the plurality of meaning, which is generated by multiple interpretations—what he calls 'perspectivism.' ¹

In this challenge to metaphysical language, Nietzsche problematizes the concept of the humanist subject. For Nietzsche, the subject perpetuated by metaphysics is a subject that is constructed by antithetical language. Even the title of his book, Beyond Good and Evil, hints at the dichotomous structure of Western metaphysics, but the title also suggests that the concept of the humanist subject, itself structured by "antithetical values," is a subject that evaluates and acts prescriptively and normatively. Implicitly then, Nietzsche attacks the prescriptive ethical evaluations perpetuated by this antithesis. In the second section, I will develop this in more detail.

Meanwhile, in The Will to Power, Nietzsche declares that the "world with which we are concerned . . . is not a fact . . . it is 'in flux,' as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for—there is 'no truth'" (616). If there is no absolute truth but only interpretation and evaluation, then his idea of multiple interpretations—through which the subject as a state of becoming appears—permeates his writings...