

ANALECTA ROMANA
INSTITUTI DANICI

XLIV

ANALECTA ROMANA

INSTITUTI DANICI

XLIV

2019

ROMAE MMXX

ANALECTA ROMANA INSTITUTI DANICI XLIV

© 2020 Accademia di Danimarca

ISSN 2035-2506

SCIENTIFIC BOARD

Mads Kähler Holst (*Bestyrelsesformand, Det Danske Institut i Rom*)
Jens Bertelsen (*Bertelsen & Scheving Arkitekter*)
Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt (*Aalborg Universitet*)
Karina Lykke Grand (*Aarhus Universitet*)
Thomas Harder (*Forfatter/writer/scrittore*)
Morten Heiberg (*Københavns Universitet*)
Hanne Jansen (*Københavns Universitet*)
Erik Vilstrup Lorenzen (*Den Danske Ambassade i Rom*)
Mogens Nykjær (*Aarhus Universitet*)
Vinnie Nørskov (*Aarhus Universitet*)
Niels Rosing-Schow (*Det Kgl. Danske Musikonservatorium*)
Erling Strudsholm (*Københavns Universitet*)
Lene Østermark-Johansen (*Københavns Universitet*)

EDITORIAL BOARD

Marianne Pade (*Chair of Editorial Board, Det Danske Institut i Rom - 31.08.19*)
Charlotte Bundgaard (*Chair of Editorial Board, Det Danske Institut i Rom*)
Patrick Kragelund (*Danmarks Kunstmuseer*)
Sine Grove Saxkjær (*Det Danske Institut i Rom*)
Gert Sørensen (*Københavns Universitet*)
Anna Wegener (*Det Danske Institut i Rom*)
Maria Adelaide Zocchi (*Det Danske Institut i Rom*)

Analecta Romana Instituti Danici. — Vol. I (1960) — . Copenhagen: Munksgaard. From 1985: Rome, «L'ERMA» di Bretschneider. From 2007 (online): Accademia di Danimarca.

ANALECTA ROMANA INSTITUTI DANICI encourages scholarly contributions within the Academy's research fields. All contributions will be peer reviewed. Manuscripts to be considered for publication should be sent to: accademia@acdan.it
Authors are requested to consult the journal's guidelines: www.acdan.it

Contents

SIGNE BUCCARELLA HEDEGAARD & CECILIE BRØNS: <i>Lost in Translation: An Introduction to the Challenging Task of Communicating Long-lost Polychromy on Graeco - Roman Marble Sculptures</i>	7
LÆRKE MARIA ANDERSEN FUNDER: <i>Continuity and Reception: The Life of the Spinario</i>	29
CLAUS ASBJØRN ANDERSEN: <i>What is Metaphysics in Baroque Scotism? Key Passages from Bartolomeo Matri's Disputations on Metaphysics (1646-1647)</i>	49
COSTANTINO CECCANTI: <i>"Andre udmærkede Bygmestre": Hermann Baagøe Storck e lo stile toscano nella Danimarca dell'Ottocento</i>	73
<i>Philology. Then and Now</i> <i>Proceedings of the Conference held at the Danish Academy in Rome, 16 July 2019</i>	
INTRODUCTION: <i>Making Sense of Texts: From Early Modern to Contemporary Philology</i>	95
MINNA SKAFTE JENSEN: <i>The Emic-Etic Distinction: a Tool in Neo-Latin Research?</i>	99
ŠIME DEMO: <i>Getting Help from a Daughter: Linguistic Methodology and Early Modern Philology</i>	113
PAOLO MONELLA: <i>A Digital Critical Edition Model for Priscian: Glosses, Graeca, Quotations</i>	135
JOHANN RAMMINGER: <i>Stylometry in a Language without Native Speakers: A Test Case from Early Modern Latin</i>	151
MARIANNE PADE: <i>Imitation and Intertextuality in Humanist Translation</i>	169
JULIA HAIGH GAISSER: <i>Philology and Poetry in the Humanism of Giovanni Pontano</i>	187
KAREN SKOVGAARD-PETERSEN: <i>Philological Pessimism: Henrik Ernst's Treatise on Textual Criticism (1652)</i>	205
TRINE ARLUND HASS: <i>The Meaning of Jul (Christmas) according to Pontanus, Vedel and Worm: Etymology, Controversy, and Foundation Myths of the Danes</i>	217
<i>Report</i>	
JAN KINDBERG JACOBSEN, CLAUDIO PARISI PRESCICCE, RUBINA RAJA & MASSIMO VITTI: <i>Excavating Caesar's Forum: Present Results of the Caesar's Forum Project</i>	239

What is Metaphysics in Baroque Scotism?

Key Passages from Bartolomeo Mastri's *Disputations on Metaphysics* (1646–1647)

by CLAUS ASBJØRN ANDERSEN¹

Abstract. This contribution offers a first-hand impression of Bartolomeo Mastri's *Disputations on Metaphysics*, the single most important work on metaphysics produced in the Scotist school during the Early Modern period. I shall highlight a selection of key passages that convey an impression of this work's historical-literary context, its subject matter, its main motifs, and scientific aims, but also its limitations. Notably, we see Mastri emphasizing the theological aspect of metaphysics, though he in the end refrains from exploring this aspect of metaphysics within his work on metaphysics. I suggest that this discrepancy between Mastri's concept of metaphysics and his practice of metaphysics showcases the difficulty of organizing this discipline during the period of transition from the traditional commentary format, typical of medieval scholasticism, to the Early Modern scholastic *Cursus philosophicus* literature.

Introduction

The Scotist tradition is a transepochal phenomenon. It has its beginnings in the Franciscan friar John Duns Scotus's teaching at Oxford and Paris around 1300 and extends, along with the overall scholastic tradition, far into the post-medieval world of the 17th and even 18th centuries.² Since the recovery of the Aristotelian *curriculum* and its incorporation into the scholastic educational system in the 13th century, metaphysics was one of the standard philosophical disciplines and continued to be so at least until the decline of the scholastic schools during the 18th century. The discipline of metaphysics was, along with theology, one of the most important arenas

for the competition among the traditional scholastic schools: Scotism, Thomism, and Nominalism.

The modest purpose of this present contribution is to enable a first-hand impression of the situation of scholastic and especially Scotist metaphysics in the 17th century. I will do so by presenting a selection of what I deem to be key passages from one of this period's most important Scotist works (if not *the* most important Scotist work) in this field, namely the *Disputationes in XII. Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Metaphysicorum* (henceforth *Disputations on Metaphysics*) by the Conventual Franciscan Bartolomeo Mastri from Meldola (1602–1673).³ The publication of this work

¹ A Danish version of this present article appeared in *Ajgis* 1/2019. In comparison with the Danish text, this English version has numerous modifications, including a different arrangement of the texts presented from Mastri's *Disputations on Metaphysics*. I thank Dr. Robert Andrews (Kristinehamn) for correcting my English and contributing valuable suggestions. An anonymous reviewer made

important suggestions in regard to, among other things, the structure of the article.

² For a survey over the Scotist tradition in its post-medieval phase, see Schmutz 2002; cf. Andersen 2016, with a detailed account of the state of research, 45–64.

³ The standard work on Mastri's life and works is Forlivesi 2002; for a short sketch, see Andersen

in two big *quarto* volumes in 1646 and 1647 marked the completion of the comprehensive *Cursus philosophicus* that Mastri, together with his fellow Conventual Franciscan Bonaventura Belluto from Catania, had been working on since ca. 1630. Mastri alone was responsible for the volumes on metaphysics, though. His and Belluto's *Cursus philosophicus* is a product of their joint teaching career in various Italian study houses of their Order (in Cesena, Perugia, and Padua). The work both testifies to the rich scholastic culture in 17th-century Italy and to the development of the scholastic textbook literature during the very transition from the traditional commentary format to more independent treatises.⁴

The passages that I shall present are concerned with rather general issues: What were the particular challenges for the Scotist tradition more than 300 years after John Duns Scotus's death in 1308? What was the role of metaphysics in relation both to other philosophical disciplines and to theology? Why is it even called "metaphysics"? What is its subject matter? What interest does it have in the concept "being"? How does it treat the various parts of being? Does a consideration of God and the angels belong in metaphysics? And if it does, could this consideration not in fact as well be reserved for theology? The selected texts are not heavily laden with theory; it is not here that we see Mastri minutely arguing for his own positions and extensively debating views held by other people on more specific metaphysical issues. These texts rather provide the framework for such discussions; they should be taken into account by anyone planning on entering Mastri's Baroque labyrinth of metaphysics. However, by providing the framework of

Mastri's metaphysics, these texts at the same time document the problem of organizing the discipline of metaphysics at a time when Aristotle's *Metaphysics* no longer held the structuring function it had enjoyed when writing a work on metaphysics by and large meant commenting (whether closely or loosely) upon Aristotle's text or parts of it (which, with only a few exceptions, had been the case throughout the medieval scholastic tradition).⁵ The red thread throughout these passages, and thus the argument of this present article, is that Mastri initially goes to considerable lengths to incorporate a theological element into his concept of metaphysics, but eventually fails to deliver this promise within his *Disputations on Metaphysics*. The passages presented below thus document the discrepancy between Mastri's concept of metaphysics and his own practice of metaphysics.

There exist neither modern editions nor translations of Mastri's works. This present selection of key texts (being the preface and introductory texts to some of the work's disputations) provides both the Latin text and my own English translation. None of Mastri's works have survived in manuscript. The Latin text has been taken from the 1708 edition of Mastri and Belluto's *Cursus philosophicus*, printed by the Pezzana press at Venice (the text of the 1708 edition has subsequently been compared to the *editio princeps*; there is not a single noteworthy difference between the texts of the two editions).⁶ Punctuation, spelling, and the use of capital letters and italics have been retained as in the Latin original. Only the ligatures "œ" and "æ" have been resolved. In the few cases where the Latin text has patent errors, these have been corrected; this is

2016, 30–38.

⁴ For the Early Modern scholastic textbook literature in general, see Schmitt 1988; for the rise of the scholastic *Cursus philosophicus* genre, see Knebel 2011, 51–60.

⁵ For instance, the newly edited *Quaestiones de ente* by Petrus Thomae may be considered such an

exception, even though Petrus Thomae does not explicitly call this work a treatise of metaphysics.

⁶ The first edition sets itself apart from all later editions by its front matter (most importantly, dedications to Cardinal Luigi Capponi in the first volume and Pope Innocent X in the second); cf. Forlivesi 2002, 365–367.

always signaled in the footnotes. Explanatory notes are attached to the translations, rather than the Latin texts. Each of the selected texts is followed by a commentary supplying background information and philosophical perspective.

The Preface: Challenges for 17th-Century Scotist Metaphysics

Ad lectorem auctor⁷

Post Philosophicum opus jam editum, Metaphysicam in vulgo in duos tomos distributam: prodit nunc primus, ac sine ulla cunctatione immediate post proditurus erat secundus; at quia Impressori nec unus quidem superest tomus Logicus; ne opus Philosophicum mutilum maneat, ac veluti sine capite, cogitur Logicam recudere, antequam posteriorem Metaphysicae partem imprimat. Quaestiones hic fusiores habebis, quam in Philosophia, quia materia foecundior, disputandi campus apertior, Adversariorum occurus frequentior, & Doctor ipse subtilis, ut pote qui inter alias facultates, Metaphysicam praecipue profitebatur ad ingenii acumen exercendum, maiorem doctrinae copiam suppeditat.

Hic Recentioribus occurro, qui in Metaphysicam scripserunt, vel me in opere Philosophico impugnarunt, inter quos praecipuus est P. Poncius Scotista non minus recens, quam eruditus, qui in suo Cursu Philosophico me nomine suppresso pluries sequitur, interdum vero nominatim insequitur praesertim in Logica, & Physica; ejus objectionibus in Physica jam satisfeci in ejusdem Physici tomi recusione, licet breuibis, & suppresso obiicientis nomine, quia tomi moles apertam, & fusioem pugnam non mihi permittebat, qua etiam de causa neque modo in Logicae recusione admodum cum eo disputando diffundar (nisi quantum postulabit respondendi

necessitas) sed totam cum eo exercitationem ad hunc Metaphysicae campum reservavi, ubi materierum diversitas occasionem saepe praestabit ejus placita expendendi, ac mea tuendi jam asserta in Logica, & Physica.

Demum ex antiquioribus Aureolo praesertim respondere nitor, utpote qui in Metaphysicis acutissimus fuit, & principia jecit omnino contraria principiis nostri Doctoris, nec Scotistarum ullus hactenus curavit, nisi obiter, & raro illi⁸ occurrere, cum tamen Doctorem non legerim adeo serio, & solide placita Scotica impugnantem, quo factum est ut non erubescat modo tota Neutralium schola ejus vestigiis inhaerere principia D. Thomae, & Scoti deserendo, quae tamen Progenitores sui fuerant amplexi.

Quamvis igitur praecipuus mei calami scopus fuerit cum Recentioribus congredi Scotum impugnantibus, attamen congressum quoque cum Aureolo (esto viribus meis longe imparem) evadere non potui, ubi se se offert occasio, ut principia Metaphysica Scoti undique stabilirem, & a telis strenui adeo Ducis pro viribus illa tuerer.

The Author to the Reader

Since the philosophical work has already been published, I now make the metaphysics available in two volumes; here is the first volume, and without delay the second volume should have appeared immediately afterwards. However, since the publisher has completely run out of copies of the volume on logic, and lest the philosophical work remain mutilated and, so to speak, headless, he is forced to reprint the logic before the last part of metaphysics is printed. Here you will find more elaborate debates than in philosophy because the subject is more fertile, the intellectual battle

⁷ Mastri, *DM* "Ad lectorem auctor" (1708, IV, unpag. [fol. *a2]).

⁸ Ed. 1708 erroneously has "ille".

field is wider, the adversaries more often clash with each other, and the subtle doctor himself, who of all the disciplines preferred metaphysics for exercising his sharp genius, has here supplied the greatest wealth of doctrine.

Here I confront some recent authors, who either have written on metaphysics, or who have criticized me in their work on philosophy. Among them is first and foremost Father Punch, a Scotist no less recent than learned, who in his *Cursus philosophicus* often follows me without mentioning my name, though he does mention my name when he polemicizes against me, particularly in logic and physics. I have answered his objections regarding physics in the new edition of the volume on physics, though only shortly and without mentioning the critic's name because the vastness of the volume did not allow for an open and extensive fight; for the same reason, I certainly did not wish to engage in debate with him in the new edition of the logic (apart from when necessity prompted a response), so I reserved the whole contention with him to this field of metaphysics, where the variety of topics will often offer occasion to test his views and to defend my own ones that have already been put forward in logic and physics.

Lastly, from among the old authors I am especially keen on responding to Auriol, who indeed was sharp in metaphysics, and who gave formulation to principles entirely contrary to those of our Doctor – and yet none of the Scotists have ever addressed this issue, except in passing or just on rare occasions.⁹ I have seen no other Doctor combat Scotist views so earnestly and thoroughly, which is why the whole school

of the neutral authors does not even blush to follow his path, departing from the principles of Saint Thomas and Scotus that their own ancestors had embraced.

Although the primary goal of my pen was to battle with those recent authors who criticize Scotus, I could not avoid also battling with Auriol whenever there was occasion for it (among my own people,¹⁰ he is the one most unlike myself), and this in order to everywhere strengthen Scotus's metaphysical principles and to shield them from these people's so strenuous leader's arrows.

Mastri's short preface first gives an account of the publishing of the previous volumes of Mastri and Belluto's *Cursus philosophicus*.¹¹ The volumes on metaphysics appeared after the two volumes on physics or natural philosophy. One of these volumes, containing the *Disputations on Aristotle's Physics*, had been published before the volume on logic. Nonetheless, from a systematical perspective, natural philosophy follows after logic. Now, the volume on logic had already sold out and needed to be reprinted lest the whole of philosophy remain "headless" (*sine capite*). It is quite obvious that philosophy in this late stage of Aristotelianism is still seen as a system with parts that correspond to Aristotle's works on theoretical philosophy. None of these parts may be lacking if the system is to be complete. Although this is a common view in most of late scholasticism, what is new in Baroque scholasticism is that the formerly widespread commentary genre is gradually replaced by independent treatises that are only externally structured in accordance with the Aristotelian curriculum.¹² Note that a similar development is found in this period's Catholic

⁹ This critique targets Mastri's Scotist contemporaries; in the 14th century we find an extensive debate with Auriol in Petrus Thomae's *Quaestiones de ente*.

¹⁰ Beyond doubt the Franciscans.

¹¹ For a survey over all editions of Mastri's works,

including those which he authored together with B. Belluto and O. Camerani, I refer to Forlivesi 2002, 443.

¹² Cf. Knebel 2011, 51–60.

theology: During the 16th century the format of commenting upon Peter Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences* was abandoned for more independent works on theology structured after the model of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.¹³ (Nonetheless, in the 17th century we see some Franciscans, among those Mastri, writing works on theology that to some extent are still modelled after Peter Lombard's traditional textbook.)¹⁴

Mastri then deals with the specific situation in Scotism of his time. He and Belluto found themselves in competition with the Irish Observant Franciscan John Punch (†1661) to be the first to publish a complete textbook of Scotist philosophy incorporating the new tendency towards independent treatises within a complete course of philosophy. Beside this, they disagreed with Punch over a long list of philosophical issues, which resulted in a lengthy polemic with replies and counter-replies in the disputants' printed works. As Mastri informs us, he in particular devoted space to the debate with Punch in the *Disputations on Metaphysics*.¹⁵

According to Mastri, however, the debate with Punch was not the greatest challenge for Scotist metaphysics. What instead could that be? Modern readers might now expect a strong reaction from our traditionally minded Scotist against developments in secular philosophy and science. Among Mastri's contemporaries are, for instance, Francis Bacon, Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei, Thomas Hobbes, and René Descartes – the latter's *Meditationes de prima philosophia* appeared just a few years before *Disputations on Metaphysics*, namely in 1641. Mastri had another horizon than ours today, and he was clearly unaware of

Descartes's reform of metaphysics. From Mastri's perspective, it was a particular challenge to refute the nominalistic critique against Duns Scotus's metaphysics launched by the influential 14th-century Franciscan Peter Auriol (†1322). Auriol's works had appeared in print only a few decades earlier. What made the debate with Auriol so important for Mastri was that he saw Auriol as a source of inspiration within the nominalistic current in Jesuit scholasticism, which in its turn had a strong influence on Punch. Mastri, accordingly, called Auriol's thought a "repository for the new authors" (*promptuarium neotericorum*).¹⁶ One of the points of contention was the concept of being, which Auriol thinks is a concept with no corresponding item in reality, wherefore his position is sometimes called "conceptualistic". Scotus and the Scotists, on the contrary, insist that this concept does correspond with some real *ratio* that all entities have in common.¹⁷ From Mastri's perspective, it was two sides of the same coin to respond to the newest attacks on Scotist philosophy from Jesuit scholasticism and to refute Auriol. It must be said, though, that the debate with contemporary scholastics plays a much more prominent role in Mastri's work than the criticism of Auriol – contrary to what one might expect after having read his preface. Although the Jesuits officially (in their *Ratio studiorum*) had chosen to follow Thomas Aquinas in theology, one of the peculiar characteristics of Baroque scholasticism is in fact its strong interest in authors writing in the decades following Duns Scotus. In scholarship, the Jesuit tradition within Baroque scholasticism has aptly been called "the Renaissance of the fourteenth century."¹⁸

¹³ Cf. Schmutz 2018, 223.

¹⁴ Mastri's *Disputationes Theologicae* is divided into four volumes devoted to the topics of the corresponding books of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*.

¹⁵ Concerning the feud between Mastri (with Belluto) and Punch, see Forlivesi 2002, 208–218. Their diverging views on possible creatures' ontological status has been particularly well researched; see especially Hoffmann 2002, 263–304; references to

further literature in Andersen 2016, 259.

¹⁶ Mastri, *DM* disp. 6, q. 1, art. 4, n. 33 (1708, IV, 234b).

¹⁷ Concerning this debate with Auriol, see Andersen 2016, 283–291. Auriol's influence on Jesuit scholasticism has been assessed in a number of contributions, the latest being Heider 2016.

¹⁸ Knebel 2000, 23.

The Introduction to the First Disputation: The Disputations on Metaphysics as a Work and Text

Disputatio I.¹⁹

Disputatio prooemialis In Metaphysicam Postremo loco explicandam aggredimur eam Philosophiae partem, quae frequentiori nomine Metaphysica nuncupatur, & ut caeteris nobilitate praestat, ita honoratioribus titulis prae omnibus insignita, ac decorata est; appellari enim solet simpliciter, & absolute, ac veluti per antonomasiam Philosophia, vel prima Philosophia, & universalis Philosophia; rursus naturalis Theologia, Scientia divina, Supernaturalis Philosophia; Sapientia denique ac Domina, & Regina scientiarum; his, & consimilibus nominibus eam dignatur Aristotel. pluribus in locis 1. Metaph. cap. 1. & 2. & 4. Metaph. tex. 5. & libr. 6. tex. 3. & libr. 11.²⁰ cap. 6. & alibi frequenter; quae quidem nomina ex objectis, & materia, circa quam facultas haec occupatur, sortita sunt,²¹ ut constat discurrenti per singula; ratione enim objecti principalis dicitur supernaturalis Philosophia, & naturalis Theologia, ac divina Scientia, quia de Deo sermonem instituit, quantum naturali lumini fas est, ac caeteris Intelligentiis separatis, & in hoc differt a Sacra Theologia, quae de Deo, & Angelis loquitur juxta revelationem Supernaturaliter factam; ratione vero objecti adaequati dicitur universalis Philosophia, quia in rationibus communissimis versatur ver. grat. entis, & aliorum transcendentium rebus materialibus, ac immaterialibus communium; & eadem ratione Sapientia vocatur, & prima Philosophia, scientiarum denique omnium Regina, & caput, eo quia res altissimas, causas primas, principiaque prima, ac amplissima contemplatur, ex quibus aliarum scientiarum principia pendent; Ratione tandem objecti tum

principalis, tum adaequati, communi nomine Metaphysica dicitur, quod ex Scot. in Prolog. qu. 9. Metaph. est Graecum nomen ex *Meta* compositum, quod significat trans, sive ultra, aut post, vel supra, quasi sit facultas res physicas in superioribus tomis traditas excedens, vel transcendens; quia tractat de Deo, & Intelligentiis, quae sunt abstracta per essentiam, ac de ente, aliisque rationibus transcendentibus, quae sunt abstracta (ut aiunt) per indifferentiam, ratione cujus abstractionis haec omnia rerum omnium physicarum ordinem superant, & in altiori rerum gradu constituuntur.

In hac autem facultate tradenda non praemittimus, ut in aliis observavimus libris, expositionem textus Aristot. eo quia amplissimam, & exactissimam habeamus expositionem textualem in 12. Met. libros Doctoris nostri, quae quidem an genuina sit ejus, vel potius Antonii Andreae ex ejusdem doctrina compilata, ut quidam contendunt Scotistae, parum curamus; nobis sat erit, quod Scotismum redoleat, sitque conformis doctrinae, quam Doctor tradidit in quatuor libr. Sent. & quodlibetis, ad cujus trutinam caetera ejus opera non adeo certa examinari debent; cum qua etiam cautione recipimus quaestiones ejus in Metaphysicam contextas, quamvis enim de illis minus dubitetur in nostra schola, num sint Scoticae, quam de Commentariis; quia tamen multa sparsim continent contraria his, quae docet in libr. Sentent. irrefragabilem, & firmam in schola subtilium auctoritatem facere non debent.

Immo in hoc opere nedum textus expositionem missam facimus, in litera Doctoris a Lectore videndam, sed etiam quaestiones illas mere textuales, quas veteres Metaphysici circa textus explicationem movent, ut v.g. in primo libro, an visus faciat magis scire, quam alius sensus; an prudentia sit in brutis, an ex experimentis generetur ars

¹⁹ Mastri, *DM* disp. 1, n. 1 (1708, IV, 1).

²⁰ Ed. 1708 here adds "capit. 11." which does not

make any sense.

²¹ Ed. 1646 and ed. 1708 erroneously have "est".

&c. Has, inquam, & consimiles quaestiones data opera dimittemus, tum quia proprie ad Metaphysicam non attinent, tum quia suis propriis locis in praecedentibus tomis resoluta fuerunt, tum tandem quia quae non fuerunt alibi discussae, apud Doctorem ipsum videri possunt, aliosque Scotistas, qui Metaphysicam scripserunt. Quaestiones igitur mere metaphysicas tractabimus a Disput. prooemiali inchoantes, ubi de natura Metaph. ejus objecto, ac muneribus disputari solet, quam quattuor absolvemus Quaestionibus.

First Disputation

Introductory Disputation on Metaphysics

At last,²² we shall undertake our explication of this part of philosophy which most often is called “metaphysics” and which through its nobility stands out from the rest, wherefore it is distinguished and decorated with titles of honor. Thus, by custom it is simply and absolutely, through antonomasy,²³ called “philosophy” or “first philosophy” and “universal philosophy”, and also “natural theology”, “divine science”, “supernatural philosophy”, “wisdom”, and finally “the mistress and queen of the sciences”. With these and similar names, Aristotle praises it in several places, cf. *Metaphysics*, book I, chap. 1 and 2, book IV, text 5, book VI, text 3, and book XI, chap. 6, and many other places.²⁴ These names are derived from the objects and topics with which this discipline is occupied, as becomes clear by going through each of

them. It is thus owing to its principal object that it is called “supernatural philosophy” and “natural theology” and “divine science” because it, as far as possible under natural light, facilitates talk of God and the other separate substances, and in this it differs from sacred theology, which talks of God and the Angels in accordance with supernatural revelation. But owing to its adequate object it is called “universal philosophy” because it is about highly general concepts, such as those of being and the other transcendentals that are common to both material and immaterial things. And for the same reason, it is called “wisdom” and “first philosophy” as well as “queen and ruler of all sciences” because it contemplates the highest things, the first causes, and the first and most comprehensive principles, which the principles of the other sciences are dependent upon. But owing both to its principal and to its common adequate object, it is called by the name of “metaphysics”, which according to Scotus, in question 9 of the prologue to *Metaphysics*,²⁵ is a Greek name that is composed of “meta”, which means “over”, “beyond”, “after”, or “above”; for it is that discipline which exceeds and transcends the physical things that were treated in the preceding volumes, because it treats of God and the Intelligences, which are abstract by essence, and of being and the other transcendent concepts, which are (as they say) abstract by indifference, and because of this abstraction all of these

²² “At last” (*postremo loco*); this expression is probably a reminder that this work is the final part of Mastri and Belluto’s *Cursus philosophicus*.

²³ In antonomasy a thing is called by other than its proper name in order to highlight one of its aspects. Cf. similarly Suárez, *DM* disp. 1, sect. 2, n. 28 (1866, I, 22a).

²⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Met.* I,1 982a 2 (“wisdom”); I,2 983a 6–7 (“divine science”); IV,2 1004b 26 (“philosophy”); VI,1 1026a 19–25 (“theology”, “noblest science”, “first philosophy”); XI,7 1064b 3 (“theology”); XI,7 1064b 12–13 (“general science”).

²⁵ The reference is to Duns Scotus, *Quaest. super libros Met.* I, prol., n. 18 (1997–2006, III, 9). Note, however, that the reference is incorrect since Scotus’s prologue is not divided into quaestiones. More importantly, Mastri’s explanation of the name “metaphysics” goes beyond Scotus’s text; Scotus does not connect the name of metaphysics with a double transcendence, but rather only with one kind of transcendence of the physical realm, the one owing to the concept of being and the transcendentals, i.e., the kind of transcendence called by Mastri *per indifferentiam*.

surpass the order of all physical things and are established on a higher level of reality.

Now, we will not let our treatment of this discipline begin with an exposition of Aristotle's text, as we have done in other books, because we [already] have a most comprehensive and accurate textual exposition in our Doctor's *On the Twelve Books of the Metaphysics*. We care little whether this is an authentic work of his or rather is compiled from his doctrine by Antonius Andreae, as some Scotists claim. For us, its scent of Scotism suffices, and that it is in conformity with that doctrine which Scotus has laid down in *On the Four Books of Sentences* and in the *Quodlibetal Questions*, the weight of which is such that it is not necessary to investigate others of his genuine works. With the same caution, we deal with his *Questions on Metaphysics*, although there is less doubt in our school concerning their being by Scotus than is the case with the commentary; however, since here and there they contain much that is contrary to what he teaches in *On the Books of Sentences*, they cannot establish any imperturbable and solid authority within the School of the Subtles.²⁶

Indeed, in this work we not only do not begin with an exposition of the text, which the reader may find in the Doctor's literal [commentary], but we also do not discuss those purely textual questions that occupied the old metaphysicians in their explanations of the text, such as, in the first book, whether sight rather than the other senses results in knowledge, whether there is prudence in animals, whether experience generates skill, etc. Such and similar questions, I say, we shall carefully dismiss because they do not properly belong in metaphysics, and because they were settled at their proper places in the preceding volumes, and also because those that were

not discussed elsewhere may be seen in the Doctor himself as well as in other Scotists who wrote a metaphysics. We shall thus treat purely metaphysical questions, beginning with the introductory disputation where the nature of metaphysics, its object, and its tasks are normally discussed, which we shall do in four questions.

Mastri's work on metaphysics contains 13 disputations. They all commence with a short introduction to their content and situation within the metaphysical system or the "doctrinal order" of metaphysics. Some of these introductions are particularly interesting because they contain observations concerning the very structure of metaphysics. This is especially so with the introduction to the first disputation.

First, the many names of metaphysics are discussed. Mastri draws on the whole catalogue of names given to this science by Aristotle and the scholastic tradition. Some of these names emphasize metaphysics' universal (ontological) aim while others highlight its theological component. The very name "metaphysics" captures both of these aspects, which correspond to both this science's principal and its adequate object (*obiectum principale* vs. *obiectum adaequatum*). The principal object is that object for the sake of whose investigation metaphysics exist. The adequate object on the other hand is that object which covers the whole field of metaphysics' investigation. "Metaphysics", explains Mastri, means "that discipline which exceeds and transcends physical things". Metaphysics' transcendence is achieved both by considering the principal object, i.e., God, and also the immaterial substances, the so-called Intelligences which Mastri identifies with the angels, and by considering the adequate object, i.e., being *qua* being and being's transcendental properties, such as

²⁶ The Scotist school. Duns Scotus had the honorific title *doctor subtilis*, "the subtle doctor".

“one”, “true”, “good”, and others. God and the Intelligences are abstracted by their own essence from physical things’ materiality, while being *qua* being and the transcendentals only are abstracted from materiality by being indifferent as regards material and immaterial things. According to Mastri, the name “metaphysics” both stands for a twofold transcendence and a twofold abstraction. Correspondingly, his metaphysics would seem to encompass an ontological as well as a theological project. However, as we shall see, the consideration of God *per se* does not play any significant role within the *Disputationes on Metaphysics*. This is evidence of a discrepancy between Mastri’s concept of metaphysics and his practice of metaphysics.

In this section, we also witness an important development in the very text of philosophy. Baroque scholasticism is characterized by the development away from the commentary format toward systematical treatises. This was a slow process which already had roots in the medieval scholastic tradition. It resulted in a number of different text models that ensured that the connection with Aristotle’s original text was not (yet) totally abandoned. For instance, Francisco Suárez attached a comprehensive annotated index to his two-volume *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (1596–1597); the index gave a survey over Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and at the same time showed the reader where particular issues from Aristotle’s text were treated in Suárez’s own disputations.²⁷ Mastri and Belluto had employed a similar model in the previous volumes of their joint *Cursus philosophicus*. Their volume on logic was thus preceded by a comprehensive survey over the entire Aristotelian logic (the medieval model for such a survey of logic was Petrus Hispanus’s *Summulae logicae*; Mastri and Belluto’s compendium of logic was first

printed as a separate publication in 1646 under the title *Institutiones logicae, quas vulgo Summulas vel Logicam parvam nuncupant*). Similarly, in their volumes on physics and psychology (in fact a special part of physics), we find expositions of various of Aristotle’s writings (*Physics*, *On the Soul*, *On Generation and Corruption*, *On the Heavens*). These expositions served as an introduction to the respective parts of natural philosophy.

But how about metaphysics? Mastri explains that there is no need for a survey of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* because there already exists such a work, one that may perhaps even be ascribed to Duns Scotus (the *doctor*). Today, we know – and as Mastri says, already in the 17th century some people believed – that the work alluded to by Mastri was in fact written by Antonius Andreae, one of Scotus’s early followers, though not his direct pupil. Antonius’ literal commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* was printed under Scotus’s name in the 1639 edition of Scotus’s *Opera omnia*. Now, both Antonius Andreae and Duns Scotus himself each wrote a literal commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, as well as a more independent treatment of questions arising from this work.²⁸ Mastri knows both of Antonius’s works, though here he only mentions the literal commentary. He also knows Scotus’s *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, i.e., Scotus’s independent treatment of topics from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. He does not know Scotus’s literal commentary, which Scotus probably wrote for merely private use and which has only recently been rediscovered and critically edited.²⁹ Mastri explicitly circumvents the question of the authorship of Antonius’s commentary on the *Metaphysics*; he simply states that it suffices, for him, that the work has a “scent of Scotism” because it is in accordance with Scotus’s doctrines

²⁷ Cf. Suárez 2004. The edition of Suárez’s *Disputationes Metaphysicae* normally used today has the index in front, before the main text; cf. Suárez 1866.

²⁸ For an explanation of the relationship among these

four works, see Pini 2017, LIV–LVII.

²⁹ Cf. Pini 2017, XLVII; for Mastri’s knowledge of Antonius Andreae’s works on metaphysics, see Andersen 2016, 226–234.

in his undoubtedly authentic works, his Oxford commentary (known today as the *Ordinatio*) on Peter Lombard's four *Books of Sentences* as well as the *Quaestiones quodlibetales*. Paradoxically, Scotus's more free treatment of metaphysical topics, i.e., his *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, is not always in agreement with these two works and, therefore, does not possess the same degree of authority.

Mastri has clearly not reflected on the implication of his refusal to comment on, or even just summarize, Aristotle's text. The reason he gives for this omission implies that any future work on metaphysics may equally well omit a summary of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. By the same token, the Scotists writing subsequent to Mastri and Belluto would no longer have to summarize any of Aristotle's works since they could simply refer to Mastri and Belluto's summaries. We in fact hardly find any such summaries in the subsequent Scotist tradition; regarding metaphysics, the only exception I know of is Bonaventura de Cancellaria's *In duodecim libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis* from 1713.³⁰ Mastri and Belluto's attempt at upholding close ties with the Aristotelian textual corpus thus points beyond itself toward another kind of school philosophy, one which is no longer dependent on any special relation with Aristotle's œuvre in spite of still being indebted to the Aristotelian tradition. That is the kind of school philosophy that we encounter in the German university tradition of the Enlightenment period. This tradition may be seen as a continuation of a development that was taking place at Mastri and Belluto's time. Now, whereas Mastri and Belluto did not inspire any significant impact outside of Franciscan milieus, their attempt at holding on to the commentary tradition while

at the same time leaving it behind is highly symptomatic of this development.

When Aristotle's text no longer provides the structure of metaphysics, then which questions should a work on metaphysics discuss? Mastri emphasizes that he will only treat "purely metaphysical questions". Such questions which Aristotle discussed in his *Metaphysics* although they do not really belong within metaphysics are thus dismissed. One will find discussion of them at appropriate places in other parts of the *Cursus philosophicus* – if they are not altogether abandoned on the grounds that "the old metaphysicians" have sufficiently discussed them. In other words, Mastri's *Disputations on Metaphysics* only treats topics that are relevant in relation to his own Scotist concept of metaphysics. This is easier said than done. Mastri and Belluto in fact discussed a whole range of issues in both logic and metaphysics (the doctrine of universals, the doctrine of identity and distinction, the doctrine of *entia rationis*). For practical reasons (such as those of space and time), authors within their realm of influence often had to decide in which of the two disciplines they would discuss a given topic. The tendency was toward a slimmer metaphysics, in that topics traditionally discussed in this discipline were transferred to logic.³¹ Apart from this, Mastri was not always consistent in his dismissal of questions that are only relevant for the interpretation of Aristotle's text. He explicitly calls the discussion of the principle of contradiction such a *quaestio mere textualis*³² and yet he decides to devote a *quaestio* to this most principal of principles; in fact, it turns out that it is not entirely irrelevant for Mastri's demonstrations in the context of the doctrine of transcendentals.³³

³⁰ Cf. the basic introduction to Cancellaria 1713 in Andersen 2016, 928–930.

³¹ As noted by Doyle 1990, 61; in regard to Scotist authors, see Andersen 2016, 844. Mastri and Belluto's doctrines on universals and beings of

reason are analyzed in Heider 2014, 177–300, and Novotný 2013, 138–163, respectively.

³² Mastri, *DM disp.* 3, q. 4, n. 47 (1708, IV, 108b).

³³ Cf. Andersen 2016, 515–519 and 528–530.

The Introduction to the Second Disputation: The Concept of Being

Disputatio II.³⁴

De Natura Entis

Cum in Disp. prooemiali sufficienter explicata sint, quae ad naturam Metaphysicae, ut scientia quaedam est, pertinebant; nunc ejus texturam prosequi volentes; ut eo utamur ordine, qui in disciplinis tradendis magis est congruus, ab iis disputationes inchoabimus, quae spectant ad naturam objecti ejus adaequati, cumque hoc sit ens reale, & per se quatenus ens est, hinc prima omnium Metaphysicarum disputatio erit de natura, seu conceptu entis realis, quod est commune Deo, & creaturae, substantiae, & accidenti, & dici solet ens transcendenter sumptum, ut excludatur ens transcendentissime captum, quod est commune ad ens reale, & rationis, ac proinde in omni schola citra fere controversiam statuitur aequivocum, ut docet Magister formalitatum art. 1. §. *advertendum ulterius*, quae etiam distinctio innuitur a Scoto quol. 3. art. 1.

Verum, quia nomen entis in suo significato duo involvit, essentiam nempe, & existentiam: Initio hujus disputationis solet dubitari, quid praecipue significet, an hanc vel illam; cui dubitationi breviter satisfieri potest per duplicem entis acceptionem, quam Doctor significavit I. d. 36. q. un. ad 1. prin. & I. Periher. q. 8. ad 3. & omnis schola recipit; ens enim, utpote deductum a verbo substantivo *sum, es, est*, quod significat esse, dupliciter sumi potest, primo participialiter, hoc est tanquam participium ab ipso verbo deductum; deinde nominaliter, hoc est tanquam nomen substantivum ab eodem verbo derivatum; quam distinctionem immerito inficiatur Dominic. Soto in Antepaedic. cap. 4. q. 1. quia cum participium consignificet tempus, consequenter significabit exercitium

actualiter essendi, sive existendi; si autem sumatur nominaliter, significat absolute ipsum esse rei, quo aliquid est in se, praescindendo a quacunque temporis differentia, qua ratione Arist. 3. de anim. 9. distinguit inter esse magnitudinis, & magnitudinem esse, dum ait, *quoniam autem aliud est magnitudo, & magnitudinis esse*, alia translatio clarius habet *aliud est magnitudinem esse, & aliud magnitudinis esse*, & denique haec distinctio fundatur quoque in communi usu loquendi, nam de Petro in rerum natura existente dicimus per propositionem de secundo adjacente, quod *Petrus est*, idest, est existens, & pariter etiam nomen entis applicamus rebus non existentibus, dummodo eis esse non repugnet, ut cum dicimus, scientiam esse de entibus realibus, quam tamen certum est abstrahere ab actuali existentia.

Itaque si ens primo modo accipiatur, scilicet participialiter ex vi participii tempus consignificantis, & exercitium existentiae, significat primario existentiam, seu rem actu existentem: sed si sumatur secundo modo, significat essentiam, & quidditatem rei, seu rem habentem essentiam, & quidditatem ex vi nominis concreti, unde hoc modo describitur a Scoto quol. 3. cit. art. 1. in arctiori entis acceptione, quam ibi assignat, ut ab ente rationis discernitur, esse illud, *quod habet, vel habere potest entitatem extra animam*, licet autem Grammaticorum captui prior acceptio entis scilicet participialiter sumpti sit magis prompta, & accommodata, posterior tamen est magis philosophica, & a sapientibus frequentius usurpata, dicunt enim ens esse quidditativum, ac essentiale rerum praedicatum universalissimum, quod sane de ente participialiter sumpto intelligi non potest, quia existentia non est praedicatum quidditativum, nisi solius Dei necessario existentis, ut suo loco constabit; ens, ergo nominaliter sumptum regulariter apud Metaphysicos usurpatur; sicut etiam

³⁴ Mastri, *DM disp.* 2, n. 1 (1708, IV, 25).

apud eosdem absolute sumptum, & sina ulla modificatione non ens rationis, vel in anima, significat, sed ens reale, & extra animam; juxta regulam logicalem, quod analogum in propositione positum stat semper pro potiori significato, ens autem commune enti reali, & rationis est aequivocum analogum, ut infra suo loco; de ente ergo transcender sumpto, & nominaliter, quo pacto est objectum Metaph. disp. instituimus.

Second Disputation

On the nature of being

Since in the introductory disputation it has been sufficiently explained what belongs to the nature of metaphysics, insofar as it is a science, we shall now proceed with its texture. To maintain the order that is best suited when teaching the disciplines, we shall begin with the disputations that deal with the nature of its adequate object, and since this is real and *per se* being insofar as it is being, this first one of all the metaphysical disputations will be about the nature and the concept of real being which is common to God and creature, substance and accident; and it is usually called being taken transcendently to exclude being taken most-transcendentally which is common to real being and being of reason, and which therefore in all schools almost without any controversy is held to be equivocal, as the Master of Formalities teaches in the first article (the passage that begins with “One must furthermore consider”),³⁵ and this

distinction is also supported by Scotus, *Quodl.* 3, art. 1.³⁶

But since the name “being” in its signification involves two, namely essence and existence, a doubt is usually raised in the beginning of this disputation about what it primarily signifies, the one or the other. This doubt can be solved briefly through the double meaning of “being”, which the Doctor signals in Book I, d. 36 [of the *Sentences*], the sole question, responding to the first [principal argument],³⁷ and in the first book of *On Interpretation*, question 8, responding to the third [principal argument],³⁸ and which is accepted in all the schools. For “being”, which is derived from the substantive verb “am, are, is”,³⁹ which signifies “to be”, may be taken in a twofold way, first as a participle, namely as the participle deduced from this verb, and then as a noun, namely as a substantive noun derived from that same verb – which distinction Domingo Soto unjustly dismisses in *Ante-Predicaments*, chap. 4, quest. 1.⁴⁰ For the participle co-signifies time and must consequently signify the exercise of actually being or existing. But if it is taken nominally, it signifies absolutely the very being of a thing, through which it is something in itself, prescinding from any temporal difference. For this reason, Aristotle, in the third book of *On the Soul*, 9, distinguishes between “a magnitude’s being” and “being a magnitude”, when he says, “since a magnitude is something different from the being of a magnitude”;

³⁵ Cf. Sirectus, *Tract. formalitatum moderniorum*, art. 1 (1588, 16). Sirectus’s honorific title was *magister formalitatum*, “master of formalities”, due to his authority among (mainly Scotist) writers of “treatises on the formalities”, thus called after these texts’ focus on Duns Scotus’s formal distinction and related matters.

³⁶ Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaest. quodl.*, q. 3, n. 2–3 (1639, XII, 67–68).

³⁷ Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 36, q. un., nn. 48–49 (1950, VI, 290), where Scotus simply presupposes that “being” may both mean “essence” and “existence”.

³⁸ Duns Scotus, *In primum libr. Perib.*, q. 8, n. 70 (1997–2006, II, 90): “[E]ns potest esse participium et nomen.”

³⁹ Mastri is indebted to Priscian’s textbook of grammar. Priscian calls “is” a “substantial verb” (*verbum substantivum*, as a Latin rendering of the Greek *rhema hyparktikón*); cf. Priscianus, lib. VIII (1855, 414).

⁴⁰ Cf. Soto, *In librum praedicamentorum*, cap. 4, q. 1 (1587, 135aC), as quoted in Andersen 2016, 253. Suárez, *DM disp.* 2, sect. 4, n. 2 (1866, I, 88a), had already discussed Soto’s rejection of the double meaning of “being”.

another translation is more clear: “it is one thing to be a magnitude and another the being of a magnitude”.⁴¹ And besides, this distinction is also founded in the common way of speaking, for about Peter who exists in reality we say, using a proposition “of the second adjacent”⁴² that “Peter is”, i.e., that he is existing; and similarly, we employ the noun “being” in regard to non-existent things when only it is not a contradiction for them to be, as when we say that a science is about real beings, when it is clear that it abstracts from actual existence.

Thus, if “being” is taken in the first way, namely as a participle that by the power of the participle co-signifies time and the exercise of existence, then it primarily signifies existence or the thing that actually exists. But if it is taken in the second way, it by the power of the concrete noun signifies the essence and the quiddity of the thing or the thing that has essence and quiddity. Therefore, “being” taken this way is described by Scotus, in *Quodl.* 3, art. 1 (cited above), as the narrower sense of “being”, which he there explains such that it is separate from being of reason by being that “which has or may have entity outside of the soul”.⁴³ Now, although the first way of taking “being”, which is that of the grammarians, namely when it is taken as a

participle, is more obvious and convenient, yet the second way is more philosophical and more frequent among wise people. For they say that “being” is a quidditative and essential most-universal predicate of things, which is certainly how “being” taken as a participle cannot be understood, because existence is not a quidditative predicate, except for God’s necessary existence, as will be established at the proper place. “Being” is therefore normally used as a noun among the metaphysicians. Among them, it likewise, taken absolutely and without any modifications, does not signify a being of reason that is in the soul but rather a real being that is outside the soul. This is according to the logical rule that the analogon posited in a proposition always stands for what is more strongly signified.⁴⁴ Being that is common to real being and being of reason is equivocally-analogical, as will be shown below at the proper place.⁴⁵ So, let us now begin our disputation on being taken as transcendent and as a noun, such as it is the object of metaphysics.

We have already been informed that the adequate object of metaphysics is being *qua* being, which of course corresponds with what Aristotle says in the beginning of *Metaphysics* IV.

⁴¹ Aristotle, *DA* III,4 429b 10. Even though the phrasing does not altogether fit, the reference is probably to the two Latin translations included in the Giunta edition of Aristotle’s *Opera omnia*, i.e., the “old” translation and the new one provided by Michael Sophianus; cf. Aristotle 1562, V, 155vF. “9” refers to the *numerus* in Averroes’s commentary included in the same volume. Mastri is not here performing any original exegesis of Aristotle’s text, but rather only repeats a point undoubtedly known to him from one of his scholastic contemporaries, Pasqualigo, *DM* disp. 25, sect. 1, n. 1 (1634, 184b). Mastri’s comparison of the two Latin translations indirectly reveals his lack of interest in Aristotle’s Greek text.

⁴² The explanation of propositions called “of the second/third adjacent” belongs among standard topics in scholastic logic. In propositions “of the second adjacent” the verb is predicated of the subject (“Peter exists”); in propositions “of

the third adjacent” a separate predicate is added (“Peter is friendly”). Cf. Mastri & Belluto, *Dialecticae institutiones*, pars. 1, tract. 2, cap. 1, nn. 48–49 (1708, I, 15a) (this is the part of their logic that was also published separately as *Institutiones logicales*, cf. above). For the history of this doctrine, see Nuchelmans 1992.

⁴³ Duns Scotus, *Quaest. quodl.*, q. 3, n. 2 (1639, XII, 67). Mastri seems to quote from an earlier printed edition; cf. Andersen 2016, 256.

⁴⁴ An analogous concept primarily signifies one thing to which another thing has some relation. This seems to be a general “rule”. The Scotist Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 10, art. 1, ll. 164–167 (2018, 265), presents a position according to which the analogous concept “being” primarily signifies God rather than any creature; this, he says, is “secundum regulam de termino pure analogo”.

⁴⁵ This question is dealt with in Mastri, *DM* disp. 2, q. 9, nn. 231–282 (1708, IV, 87a–99b).

In the first disputation, Mastri discusses various epistemological implications of this choice of subject matter.⁴⁶ It is not until the second disputation (“On the Nature of Being”) that he elucidates the concept of being *qua* being as such. Whereas the first disputation only discusses the “nature” of metaphysics, Mastri now proceeds with its content, or rather with its “texture” – thus contrasting metaphysics’ *natura* with its *textura*.⁴⁷ The introduction to the second disputation already indicates the most basic features of Mastri’s understanding of the concept of being *qua* being.

In this text, Mastri in particular draws two important distinctions. The first one is between a concept of being that only covers all real being and a concept of being that covers both real being and being of the mind (*ens reale* and *ens rationis*). The concept of real being is common to, and may be predicated univocally of, God and creatures as well as substance and accident since these are real entities. Mastri calls that concept which they have in common “transcendent”. This reminds us of Mastri’s talk, in the introduction to the first disputation, of a kind of transcendence and abstraction that owes itself to *indifference* regarding materiality and immateriality. At a later point, Mastri also says that a transcendent concept, besides not falling under one of the Aristotelian categories and itself not a category either, is characterized by its *indifference* in regard to the division of being into finite and infinite being. These are the two “intrinsic modes” (*modi intrinseci*) that determine the common concept of being in its primary instances, i.e., God and creatures.⁴⁸ Note that when Mastri explains

being’s transcendence in terms of indifference toward materiality and immateriality, this then is in the context of his discussion of metaphysics’ place among the theoretical sciences which in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition are differentiated according to their objects’ degree of abstraction from matter.⁴⁹ When he says that the transcendent concept of being is indifferent in regard to finitude and infinitude, then it is Duns Scotus’s view of transcendence he has in mind.⁵⁰ Mastri, however, draws a consequence that Scotus did not draw, namely that the concept of finite being cannot be transcendent when a transcendent concept is indifferent as regards finitude and infinitude. According to Mastri, the concept “finite being” (*ens finitum*) is a super-category (*genus supremum*) which ranks above the ten Aristotelian categories and may be divided into these.⁵¹ This is not consistent with Mastri’s statement in the present text that the transcendent concept of being is common to God and creatures as well as substance and accident – since it is not this transcendent concept that is divided into substance and accident, but rather the categorial concept of finite being. Possibly, Mastri expresses himself incautiously in this text because it is only a short introduction to the concept of being, whereas all the technical details are discussed in the subsequent long disputation.

To sum up, Mastri operates with no less than three common concepts of being each with their particular scope: The most-transcendent concept of being (*ens transcendentissime captum*), the transcendent concept of real being (*ens transcendentem sumptum*), which is the object of

⁴⁶ Cf. Andersen 2016, 6–11.

⁴⁷ Cf. also the use of *contexere* in Mastri & Belluto, *DL*, quaestio prooem., n. 1 (1708, I, 60a): “Universalem itaque Philosophiam [...] contexere intendentes [...]”

⁴⁸ Mastri, *DM* disp. 2, q. 1, n. 26 (1708, IV, 33a): “[P]otius transcendentia dicat exclusionem a praedicamento, & indifferentiam ad finitum, & infinitum.” Cf. similarly Mastri & Belluto, *DL* disp. 2, q. 5, art. 1, n. 64 (1708, I, 109b–10a). We shall return to the doctrine of intrinsic modes below.

⁴⁹ Cf. Mastri & Belluto, *DL* disp. 12, q. 3, art. 1, n.

58 (1708, I, 332b); cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In Met.*, prooem. (1935, 2a). The source of this division of the sciences is Aristotle, *Met.* VI, chap. 1.

⁵⁰ The most important passage on the concept of transcendence and the transcendentals in all of Scotus’s œuvre is Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 114–15 (1950–, IV, 206–207); cf. Wolter 1946, 4–12.

⁵¹ Mastri & Belluto, *DL* disp. 6, q. 1, n. 3 (1708, I, 204a–b).

metaphysics, and the categorial concept of finite being (*ens finitum*). Infinite being (*ens infinitum*) is not among them; it only applies to God and thus is not a genuine common concept.

The second important distinction drawn by Mastri in this text is the one between essence and existence. This distinction is often associated with the Islamic thinker Avicenna (980–1037, also known as Ibn Sīnā). In his metaphysics, this distinction marks the difference between God and creatures. It is only within creation that there is a distinction between essence and existence, whereas God is pure existence.⁵² There is a distinction between essence and existence in creatures because they do not necessarily exist *per se*; they only exist necessarily after having been brought into existence by their cause, i.e., ultimately God.⁵³ Avicenna's distinction had a considerable impact on Latin scholasticism.⁵⁴ In 17th-century scholastic literature one still finds extensive disputations on the distinction between essence and existence.⁵⁵ While Duns Scotus himself was never really clear on this distinction,⁵⁶ Mastri has a solution: This is a “formal-modal distinction” (*distinctio formalis modalis*). A formal distinction, as known from Duns Scotus, is one that distinguishes between items, “formalities”, that constitute things but are not things themselves; moreover, a proper *distinctio realis* applies between things. In our special case, one of the items is an “intrinsic mode” of the second item because existence determines an essence to actually exist. This explains Mastri's name for the distinction between essence and existence.⁵⁷

Mastri discusses essence and existence in

the eighth disputation. In our text, his main interest is the concept of being. The reason why he brings up essence and existence is that “being” (*ens*) may signify both, depending on whether it is taken as a noun or as a participle. We learn that Duns Scotus distinguished between these two meanings of “being” and that the Spanish Dominican Domingo Soto († 1560) on the contrary rejected doing so (because to him “being” is never a noun). In Baroque scholasticism the distinction between the two meanings of “being” is quite frequent.⁵⁸ When “being” is taken as a participle, the word signifies something that exists at a given time. When taken as a noun, it signifies things' supra-temporal essence or “whatness” (*quidditas*), which may be said *to be*, i.e., have being, “when only it is not contradictory for them [these things] to be.” For something to be called “being” it suffices that it is possible. By this, purely imaginary items (such as round squares and chimeras) are excluded; they cannot exist and are correspondingly cognized in God's eternal mind as impossible things.⁵⁹ But which of being's meanings is relevant to metaphysics? According to Mastri, any science abstracts from its object's actual existence. This is because the sciences are interested in general and supra-temporal structures. “Being” as a participle thus is not of much use to metaphysics. To understand “being” as a noun is “more philosophical and more frequent among wise people”. Hence metaphysicians “normally” understand the concept “being” in this way, says Mastri.

Unlike Avicenna, but following Duns Scotus, Mastri does not conceive of God

⁵² Cf. Bertolacci 2017, 156–157.

⁵³ Cf. Bertolacci 2017, 158.

⁵⁴ For some references to discussions of Avicenna's distinction in medieval Latin sources, see Wippel 1990, 66–67.

⁵⁵ The classic study of this subject is Di Vona 1968.

⁵⁶ Cf. Wolter 1990, 281.

⁵⁷ Cf. Mastri, *DM* disp. 8, q. 2, art. 4, n. 131 (1708, V, 47a): “[N]on est distinctio formalis ex natura rei

absoluta dicta, sed formalis modalis, cum existentia sit modus essentiae.” Extensive discussions of Mastri's position on this subject in Di Vona 1968, 232–262, and Andersen 2016, 759–765.

⁵⁸ For references, see Andersen 2016, 253–254.

⁵⁹ Cf. Mastri, *DM* disp. 8, q. 1, art. 3, n. 37, (1708, V, 27a): “[A]eque Deus possibilia, ac impossibilia novit”; cf. Hoffmann 2002, 295.

as not having an essence; he rather thinks that God's existence belongs to God's own essence.⁶⁰ For all other things, i.e., for the whole of creation and all individual creatures, existence is only an "intrinsic mode". We learn that in regard to creatures, "existence is not a quidditative predicate" ("existentia non est praedicatum quidditativum"). This brings to mind Immanuel Kant's famous statement in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (B627) that "being is obviously not a real predicate" ("Sein ist offenbar kein reales Prädikat"). Despite the puzzling resemblance of these statements, there is no reason to believe that Kant in this was at all influenced by Mastri (it does, though, testify to Kant's indebtedness to traditional metaphysics). One point of disagreement between Kant and the Scotists, of course, is that for Kant the statement not only applies within creation but also in regard to the creator. A second point is that for Mastri "being" taken in the sense of essence surely is a quidditative predicate, one that is univocally applicable to everything that is able to exist (though may not actually exist).⁶¹

The Introduction to the Seventh Disputation: The Project of the Second Volume

Disputatio VII.⁶²

De Divisionibus Entis

Postquam in superiori tomo, praecedentibusque disputationibus de communi conceptu entis, deque ejusdem principiis, & proprietatibus actum est praescindendo a specialibus rationibus entium: modo in hoc posteriori ad definitas, peculiareque entium rationes, quantum abstractio hujus scientiae, & latitudo objecti ejus nobis permittit, descendere opus est; quoniam autem talis descensus fieri nequit,

quam per varias entis divisiones in sua membra, ideo exordium hujus secundi Tomi sumimus a disputatione de Divisionibus entis.

Hic autem recolere oportet, quod dicebamus supra disp. 4. q. 2. num. 29. 32. quod quidam modi, vel differentiae dividentes ens in communi, ut finitum, & infinitum, necessarium, & contingens, &c. capi possunt dupliciter, vel sic simul sumpta circumscribunt unam entis passionem, & cum ipso adaequate convertibilem; & in hoc sensu de ipsis actum est disp. praeced. vel ut disjunctim important diversos modos intrinsecos, quibus ens contrahitur, & dividitur, & in hoc sensu de ipsis agimus in praesenti disput.

Seventh Disputation

On the Division of Being

After having treated, in the first volume and in the preceding disputations, the common concept of being and its principles and properties in abstraction from any special aspects of beings, now in this last volume the task is to descend, so far as the abstraction of this science and the scope of its object permit us, to the definite and particular aspects of beings. Since such descent cannot come about except by means of the various divisions of being into its members, in this second volume we shall start out with a disputation about the division of being.

Here, however, it is necessary to recall what we said above in the fourth disputation, question 2, nn. 29 and 32,⁶³ namely that some modes or differences that divide common being, such as finite and infinite, necessary and contingent etc., may be taken in a twofold sense: Either such that they

⁶⁰ Cf. Mastri, *Disp. Theol.* I disp. 2, q. 1, n. 2, 11a: "[H]oc ita debet intelligi, ut existentia sit de essentia Dei, & praedicatum ejus quidditativum, uti in creatura est modus duntaxat intrinsecus." For other aspects of Mastri's discussion of God's existence, see Andersen 2016, 458–471.

⁶¹ This is also Scotus's position; cf. Wolter 1990, 280–281.

⁶² Mastri, *DM* disp. 7, n. 1 (1708, V, 1).

⁶³ Mastri, *DM* disp. 4, q. 2, nn. 29 and 32 (1708, IV, 118b–119b).

taken together circumscribe one passion of being that is adequately convertible with it, and as taken in this sense they were treated in the preceding disputation; or such that they disjunctively import diverse intrinsic modes by which being is contracted and divided, and as taken in this sense we shall treat them in this disputation.

Mastri's *Disputations on Metaphysics* consist of two volumes. Having explained the epistemological preconditions of metaphysics in the first disputation and its adequate object in the second disputation, Mastri in the remaining four disputations of the first volume discusses the principles used in the demonstration of being's properties and these properties themselves, i.e., the transcendentals; thus the first volume is structured in accordance with the Aristotelian view that any science is about a subject matter whose properties may be proven by means of principles pertaining to that science.⁶⁴ The transcendentals (quite extensively) treated by Mastri are "one", "true", "good", as well as the following pairs of concepts "actual – potential", "necessary – contingent", and "same – different". The first three transcendentals are standard in any scholastic doctrine of being's properties. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus thus agree that they are "convertible" with the concept of being because any being is one, true (as an object for the intellect), and good (as an object for the will).⁶⁵ Apart from this, Scotus emphasizes that there are pairs of concepts that taken exactly as pairs cover all of being; all beings thus are either necessary or contingent, etc. Mastri's teaching on the transcendentals is clearly inspired by Scotus's approach.

However, Scotus is mostly interested in such aspects of the doctrine of being's properties that are relevant for an account of God's attributes; he therefore also operates with transcendentals that are only predicable of God.⁶⁶ For Mastri, the teaching on the transcendentals rather serves as a structural principle in the first volume of his *Disputations on Metaphysics*, namely insofar as he within his discussion of this doctrine finds space for the treatment of a whole range of metaphysical topics that he would otherwise have to integrate into his work in other contexts; of greatest importance is his long treatment of the doctrine of various kinds of distinctions under the heading "same – different".⁶⁷

The project in the second volume of the *Disputations on Metaphysics* is to descend from the consideration of being and its properties to a consideration of certain regions of being or, as Mastri says in the short introduction to the seventh disputation, "to descend, so far as the abstraction of this science and the scope of its object permit us, to the definite and particular aspects of beings." In this, he is deeply indebted to Francisco Suárez, whose work on metaphysics also consisted of two volumes; the first volume treats being and the transcendentals (as well as the causes of being, a topic that Mastri and Belluto discuss in their volume on physics), whereas the second one descends "to the definite concepts of beings" ("ad definitas rationes entium"). Mastri's debt to Suárez becomes particularly evident when comparing the first part of Mastri's text above with these opening lines in Suárez's second volume:

Haec est secunda principalis pars hujus

⁶⁴ Cf. Mastri, *DM disp.* 4, q. 1, n. 4 (1708, IV, 113a); cf. Aristotle, *APost.* I, 10 76b11–16.

⁶⁵ Cf. the great survey study of the history of the doctrine of transcendentals in medieval philosophy (unfortunately, with no interest in post-Suárez authors), Aertsen 2012.

⁶⁶ These are the so-called "pure perfections" (*perfectiones simpliciter*); cf. Wolter 1946, 162–175.

Concerning the discrepancy between Scotus's and Mastri's interests in the doctrine of the transcendentals, see Andersen 2016, 601–607.

⁶⁷ It is here that Mastri discusses the topics that the aforementioned Sirectus and other "formalists" wrote small treatises about. For Mastri's relation to the Formalist tradition, see Andersen 2016, 659–668 and 685–696.

operis; in qua postquam in priori de communi conceptu entis, illiusque proprietatibus, quae de illo reciproce dicuntur, tractatum est, ad definitas rationes entium descendere, quantum formale objectum, et abstractio hujus scientiae permittit, necessarium est. Hoc autem non potest commodius fieri, quam per divisiones varias ipsius entis, et membrorum ejus, eorumque exactam considerationem.

This is the second main part of this work, in which – after having, in the first volume, treated the common concept of being and its properties that are reciprocally said of it – it is necessary to descend to the definite concepts of beings, so far as the formal object and the abstraction of this science permit us. This, however, cannot happen in a more suitable manner than through the various divisions of being itself, its members, and a close consideration of these.⁶⁸

Mastri follows Suárez quite closely. He too emphasizes that the descent to the consideration of particular things must be in accordance with metaphysics' method of abstraction and the scope of its object. The descent thus cannot proceed further than to what is included under real being (though Suárez, in contrast to Mastri, in fact does find space for a treatment of being of reason, *ens rationis*, in a separate disputation of his work on metaphysics).⁶⁹ The abstraction that must be respected during the descent, and which thus guards the unity of metaphysics, is the double abstraction from matter which

Mastri mentioned in the introduction to the first disputation and which he discusses extensively later in that same disputation. God and the immaterial substances may thus be considered in metaphysics due to their essential (*per essentiam*) abstraction from matter, whereas the physical part of reality only deserves metaphysical consideration insofar as this part of reality belongs within real being that is indifferent (*per indifferentiam*) in regard to materiality and immateriality. To keep focus on our present text, perhaps the most important thing to note is that both Mastri and Suárez suggest the descent must take place via a consideration of the “divisions of being”.

Here, Mastri needs to explain the difference between these *divisiones entis* and the so-called disjunctive transcendentals, those pairs of concepts mentioned above that Mastri discusses in his sixth disputation. Suárez does not have this problem, since in the doctrine of the transcendentals he does not follow Duns Scotus. Suárez rather criticizes Duns Scotus for confounding the divisions of being with its disjunctive properties.⁷⁰ Mastri's solution (expressed in the passage above) is to say that some pairs of concepts in fact may be understood in both ways. Accordingly, they may be discussed in various metaphysical contexts, even though Mastri in fact does not proceed thusly but rather discusses some pairs in one context and others in the second context. In Mastri's Scotist metaphysics, the pair “finite – infinite” is particularly important because it is through these “intrinsic modes” that the common concept “being” is divided into God and creature, which is the first and

⁶⁸ Suárez, *DM* disp. 28, prooem. (1866, II, 1a). Cf. the remarks on the method of division in Suárez, *DM* “Ad lectorem” (1866, I, unpag.). Fuller comparison of Suárez's and Mastri's organization of metaphysics in Andersen 2016, 237–238.

⁶⁹ Cf. Suárez, *DM* disp. 54 (1866, II, 1014b–1041a). Mastri only treats this topic in a subsection; cf. *DM* disp. 1, nn. 233–254 (1708, IV, 87–92). Mastri and Belluto rather relegate a substantial discussion

of being of reason to logic; cf. their extensive discussion in *DL* disp. 3 (1708, I, 118a–143b).

⁷⁰ Cf. Suárez, *DM* disp. 3, sect. 2, n. 11 (1866, I, 110a–b). Already in the generation following upon Duns Scotus, the aforementioned Antonius Andreae had defended Scotus's teaching on the transcendentals against criticism of this kind; cf. Andersen 2016, 608–613.

most fundamental division of everything that exists. As “intrinsic modes”, the concepts “finitude” and “infinitude”, and also “existence” and others, determine being by adding an aspect to it. According to Mastri, they do not, however, properly pertain to being itself, but rather to items that fall within the scope of being, e.g., God (as in the case of infinitude) and creature (as in the case of finitude). The defining feature of an intrinsic mode, according to the traditional Scotist view inherited by Mastri, is that “it does not alter the formal *ratio*” of the thing modified (“*ille est modus intrinsecus qui adveniens alicui non variat rationem eius formalem*”).⁷¹

The project of the second volume thus is a metaphysical consideration of God and all of creation. Since creatures are more easily accessible to us than God, Mastri starts out with an investigation of the metaphysical structure of finite being (in this case he departs from Suárez, who rather proceeds in the opposite direction). In the introduction to the eighth disputation, Mastri explains that the structure of the second volume does not follow the order of nature (*ordo naturae*), in which God is first, but rather the order of learning (*ordo doctrinae*); first in the order of learning is what is easiest accessible to the human intellect.⁷² Mastri’s investigation of finite being includes an examination of created essences’ ultimate dependence on God (in spite of their relative independence), an analysis of the ontological status of universals and their individuation, and the division of finite being into substance and the nine accidents (quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, possession, action, passion), familiar to everyone from Aristotle’s *Categories*.

The Introduction to the 13th Disputation: God and the Angels in Metaphysics – or Rather Still in Theology?

Disputatio XIII.⁷³

De substantiis Spiritualibus Deo, & Intelligentiis

Considerationem substantiarum abstractarum, quatenus naturali lumine sunt cognoscibiles, Aristot. 3. de Anima 36. remisit ad primam Philosophiam his verbis, *utrum contingat aliquid separatorum intelligere, ipsum existentem non separatam a magnitudine, aut non; considerandum est posterius*, & ideo Aristot. de his agit libr. 12 Metaphysic. dictum est autem disputat. 1. Metaphys. quaest. 1. numer. 10. & 11. Intelligentias pertinere ad Metaphysicam nostram quantum ad conceptus proprios ex communibus, & ad Metaphysicam in se quoad conceptus proprios ex propriis; rationes autem proprias, & ex propriis ipsius Dei pertinere ad Theologiam supernaturaliter revelatam; & quidem in hac ultima Disputat. mens erat exacte pertractare de Deo, & Intelligentiis quantum ad praefatos conceptus ad Metaphysicam pertinentes, & de eorum attributis naturaliter cognoscibilibus, ut in Tomo physico in fine de primo Motore pollicitus eram; ceterum quia cognitio de his substantiis, si intra solos naturalis luminis terminos sistamus, admodum debilis est, ac exigua, ut ait Aristot. 2. Metaphys. text. 1. *sicut Vespertilionum oculi ad lumen diei*⁷⁴ *se habent, ita & intellectus animae nostrae ad ea, quae manifestissima omnium sunt*, consultius visum est totam hanc tractationem ad Sacram Theologiam reservare, ac etiam ne volumen hoc secundum Metaphys. nimis excrescat, & mole primum excedat; quare hic perfunctorie solum existentiam, & naturam harum nobilium substantiarum venabimur caetera ad essentiam, &

⁷¹ Mayronis, *Confl.* dist. 42 q. 4 (1520, 120vL). Cf. Andersen 2016, 426–447, for Mastri’s own elaboration on this definition; cf. *ibid.* 471–478, for his view of the modal determination of being.

⁷² Mastri, *DM* disp. 8, n. 1 (1708, V, 19); cf. Andersen 2016, 235–238.

⁷³ Mastri, *DM* disp. 13, n. 1 (1708, V, 308).

⁷⁴ Ed. 1647 and ed. 1708 erroneously have “dici”.

attributa illarum spectantia ad Theologiam reservando exactius pertractanda.

Thirteenth Disputation

On the Spiritual Substances, God and the Intelligences

In the third book of *On the Soul*, 36, Aristotle relegates the consideration of abstract substances, insofar as they are cognizable in natural light, to first philosophy, saying: “Whether or not it is possible to understand anything of the separate [substances], when [the subject] itself does not exist separately from magnitude, must be considered elsewhere.”⁷⁵ And therefore Aristotle treats these things in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*.⁷⁶ However, it was said in the first metaphysical disputation, question 1, nn. 10–11,⁷⁷ that the Intelligences pertain to our metaphysics as regards their proper concepts [with a foundation in] common ones, but to metaphysics in itself as regards their proper concepts [with a foundation in] proper ones, whereas the proper concepts [with a foundation in] the proper ones of God himself pertain to supernaturally revealed theology. Now, in this last disputation, reason should have given an exact treatment of God and the Intelligences in regard to the aforementioned concepts that pertain to metaphysics and of their naturally cognizable attributes, as I promised in the end of the volume on physics in regard to the first mover.⁷⁸ However, since the cognition of these substances, if we keep only to those concepts that lie within natural light, is very weak and petty (as Aristotle says in the second book of the *Metaphysics*, text 1, “Such as it is with the eyes of bats

in regard to light, thus it is also with our soul’s intelligence in regard to those things that are of all most manifest”),⁷⁹ it seems to be wise to reserve this whole treatment for sacred theology, lest this second volume of metaphysics grow too big and surpass the first one in weight. Therefore, we shall here only lightly deal with the existence and nature of these noblest of substances, reserving for theology the closer consideration of what remains concerning their essence and attributes.

The introduction to the thirteenth disputation begins with a reference to the twelfth book of Aristotle’s *Met.* where the “abstract substances”, according to Mastri’s interpretation of a statement in *De anima*, are investigated in accordance with the ability of the human intellect to do so. On Mastri’s reading, *Met.* XII investigates the abstract substances “by means of natural light.” From Mastri’s Christian perspective, this contrasts with the supernatural light of revelation. Thus, Aristotle’s *Met.* XII and Mastri’s own thirteenth disputation are about natural theology. Indeed “natural theology” was one of the names metaphysics earned due to its treatment of “God and the other separate substances” (cf. above).

These substances are the angels. Borrowing from Neoplatonic cosmology, Mastri also calls them “Intelligences”. What is a metaphysics based solely on the “natural light” able to say about them, and about God? Unfortunately, not too much. Human metaphysics, i.e., “our metaphysics” in contrast to “metaphysics in itself”, only has limited access to this part of reality. It must, therefore, construct special concepts for this

⁷⁵ Aristotle, *DA* III,7 431b 16–19. Mastri quotes from the “old” Latin translation included (along with the new one) in Aristotle 1562, V, 174vaD; “36” refers to the *numerus* in Averroes’s commentary included in the same volume.

⁷⁶ Aristotle, *Met.* XII, deals with the first unmoved mover along with other eternal things and their

eternal movements.

⁷⁷ Mastri, *DM* disp. 1, q. 1, nn. 10–11 (1708, IV, 4a–b).

⁷⁸ Mastri & Belluto, *DP* disp. 15, q. 8, art. 3, n. 107 (1708, II, 384b).

⁷⁹ Aristotle, *Met.* II,1 993b 9–11. Mastri quotes from Bessarion’s Latin translation included in Aristotle 1562, VIII, 28rbF.

task. Mastri here draws on his discussion of the epistemology of metaphysics in the first disputation, where he explained that we may grasp God and the angels using complex concepts that via abstraction and negation have been constructed in a departure from our world of experience. Examples of this are concepts such as “infinite being” (God) or “immaterial substances” (the angels). We do not possess any simple concept that originates directly in the essences of God or the angels.⁸⁰ “Metaphysics in itself”, i.e., a metaphysics that is not restrained by the shortcomings of human cognition, could actually grasp the angels using such concepts. God’s particular attributes, by contrast, remain reserved for “sacred theology” that is based on revelation. The reason is that God as an object of cognition decides Himself if and when He is cognized (He is an *obiectum voluntarium*);⁸¹ such cognition takes place through revelation.

Even though he has a clear conception of how God and the angels could be grasped within the boundaries of human metaphysics, and even though the very purpose of his doctrine of the double abstraction from matter was to justify this part of metaphysics, i.e., its inclusion within the unity of this discipline, in the end Mastri abandons the project of a natural theology. Or rather, he postpones this part of metaphysics to theology proper. Subsequent to his *Disputations on Metaphysics*, Mastri composed five volumes *in folio* on theology (a *Sentences Commentary* in four volumes and one volume of *Moral Theology*). In our present passage, he argues that our natural knowledge of the immaterial substances is in any case “very weak and petty”, and besides, an exposition of this knowledge would expand the second

volume and make it exceed the first one in size. Whereas God and the angels are treated quite extensively in theology, as one would expect, Mastri is content with discussing purely epistemological questions surrounding the doctrine of immaterial substances in the thirteenth disputation. His discussion in that disputation eventually amounts to a reflection over what we humans *naturaliter* can know about this part of reality.⁸²

In other words, the presentation of the science of metaphysics as elaborated in the *Disputations on Metaphysics* does not correspond with Mastri’s own concept of metaphysics. Or, to use Mastri’s terminology from the introduction to the second disputation, we can say that there is a discrepancy between metaphysics’ *natura* and its *textura*. From Mastri’s reflections over the structure of his work, we do learn something quite important about the situation of scholastic metaphysics in the 17th century. Mastri was heir to a long tradition and faced the unique challenge of managing his Scotist heritage in a new setting. This task implied reformulating the inherited Scotist philosophy within a comprehensive *Cursus philosophicus*, while at the same time keeping an eye on debates taking place in contemporary non-Scotist scholasticism. To conclude, Mastri’s difficulties in structuring his work on metaphysics (or rather, his failed metaphysical system) more than anything else attest to the sheer complexity of this overall project.

Postdoc Claus Asbjørn Andersen
 Department for Philosophy and Religious
 Studies
 University of South Bohemia
 candersen@tf.jcu.cz

⁸⁰ Cf. Mastri, *DM disp.* 1, q. 1, n. 11 (1708, IV, 4a–b). Mastri is here leaning on the Paduan Renaissance Scotist A. Trombetta, as shown in Andersen 2016, 176–178. Cf. further Andersen 2016, 159–203, for a discussion of Mastri’s use of Scotus’s distinction

between “metaphysics in itself” and “metaphysics in us.”

⁸¹ Mastri, *DM disp.* 1, q. 1, n. 11 (1708, IV, 4b).

⁸² For the titles of the 13th disputation’s four questions, see Andersen 2016, 890.

ABBREVIATIONS

- A*Post. = *Analytica posteriora* (Aristotle)
Confl. = *In Primum Sententiarum Scriptum Conflatus nominatum* (Mayronis)
DA = *De anima* (Aristotle)
DL = *Disputationes in Aristotelis Logicam* (Mastri & Belluto)
DM = *Disputationes in XII. Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Metaphysicorum* (Mastri) / *Disputationes metaphysicae* (Suárez, Pasqualigo)
DP = *Disputationes in Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Physicorum* (Mastri & Belluto)
Met. = *Metaphysics* (Aristotle)
Ord. = *Ordinatio* (Duns Scotus)
Quaest. quodl. = *Quaestiones quodlibetales* (Duns Scotus)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aertsen, J.A.
 2012 *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (*Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters* 107), Leiden & Boston.
- Andersen, C.A.
 2016 *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus. Untersuchungen zum Metaphysikwerk des Bartholomäus Mastrius. Mit Dokumentation der Metaphysik in der scotistischen Tradition ca. 1620–1750* (*Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie* 57), Amsterdam & Philadelphia.
- Aristotle
 1562 *Omnia quae extant opera* [ed. Giunta], ten vols., Venice.
- Bertolacci, A.
 2017 “Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), *Metaphysics of the Shifā*”. In: El-Rouayheb, K. & Schmidtke, S. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy*, New York, 143–68.
- Cancellaria, B. de
 1713 *In duodecim libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis, secundum intentionem Subtilissimi Doctoris Joannis Duns Scoti*, Naples.
- Di Vona, P.
 1968 *Studi sulla Scolastica della Controriforma. L'esistenza e la sua distinzione metafisica dall'essenza* (*Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell'università di Milano XLV/III, sezione a cura dell'Istituto di storia della filosofia* 14), Firenze.
- Doyle, J.P.
 1990 “Extrinsic Cognoscibility: A Seventeenth Century Supertranscendental Notion”, *The Modern Schoolman* 68, 57–80.
- Forlivesi, M.
 2002 *Scotistarum princeps. Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) e il suo tempo* (*Fonti e studi francescani* 11), Padova.
- Heider, D.
 2014 *Universals in Second Scholasticism. A comparative study with focus on the theories of Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548–1617), João Poinot (1589–1644) and Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola O.F.M. Conv. (1602–1673)/ Bonaventura Belluto O.F.M. Conv. (1600–1676)* (*Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie* 54), Amsterdam & Philadelphia.
- Heider, D.
 2016 “The *Notitia Intuitiva* and *Notitia Abstractiva* of the External Senses in Second Scholasticism: Suárez, Poinot and Francisco de Oviedo,” *Vivarium* 54, 173–203.
- Hoffmann, T.
 2002 *Creatura intellecta. Die Ideen und Possibilia bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius* (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge* 60), Münster.
- Ioannes Duns Scotus
 1639 *Opera omnia*, [ed. L. Wadding et al.], Lyon, [Re-

- print Hildesheim, 1968–1969].
- Ioannes Duns Scotus
1950– *Opera omnia*, [ed. C. Balić *et al.*], Civitas Vaticana.
- Ioannes Duns Scotus
1997–2006 *Opera philosophica*, [ed. G.J. Etzkorn *et al.*], New York.
- Knebel, S.K.
2000 *Wille, Würfel, Wahrscheinlichkeit. Das System der moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik 1550–1700 (Paradeigmata 21)*, Hamburg.
- Knebel, S.K.
2011 *Suarezismus, Erkenntnistheoretisches aus dem Nachlass des Jesuitengenerals Tirso González de Santalla (1624–1705). Abhandlung und Edition (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 51)*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia.
- Mastri, B.
1646–1647 *Disputationes in XII. Arist. Stag. Libros Metaphysicorum*, two vols., Venice.
- Mastri, B.
1731 *Disputationes theologicae*, four vols., Venice.
- Mastri, B. & Belluto, B.
1708 *Cursus philosophicus*, five vols., Venice.
- Mayronis, F. de
1520 *In Libros Sententiarum, Quodlibeta, Tractatus Formalitatum, De Primo Principio, Terminorum Theologicalium Declarationes, De Univocatione*, Venice, [Reprint Frankfurt am Main, 1966].
- Novotný, D.D.
2013 *Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel. A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era (Medieval Philosophy, Texts and Studies)*, New York.
- Nuchelmans, G.
1992 *Secundum/tertium adiacens, Vicissitudes of a logical distinction (Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Mededelingen, Afdeling Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 55)*, Amsterdam, New York & Tokyo.
- Pasqualigo, Z.
1634–1636 *Disputationes metaphysicae, quibus, quae ad primam Philosophiam spectant, accurate exponuntur*, two vols., Rome.
- Petrus Thomae
2018 *Quaestiones de ente*, [ed. G.R. Smith], (*Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Series 1, 52, *Petri Thomae Opera 2*), Leuven.
- Pini, G.
2017 “Introduction”. In: Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ioannis Duns Scoti Notabilia super Metaphysicam (Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis 287)*, [ed. G. Pini], Turnhout, VII–LXXII.
- Priscianus
1855 *Institutionum grammaticarum libri XVIII*, vol. 1, [ed. H. Keil], Leipzig.
- Schmitt, C.B.
1988 “The Rise of the Philosophical Textbook”. In: Schmitt, C.B. *et al.* (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Cambridge, 792–804.
- Schmutz, J.
2002 “L’héritage des Subtils, Cartographie du scotisme de l’âge classique”, *Les études philosophiques* 57, 51–79.
- Schmutz, J.
2018 “From Theology to Philosophy: The Changing Status of the *Summa Theologiae*, 1500–2000”. In: Hause, J. (ed.), *Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Critical Guide*, Cambridge, 221–41.
- Sirectus, A.
1588 *Tractatus formalitatum moderniorum*. In: *Quinque illustrium auctorum Formalitatum Libelli*, Venice.
- Soto, D.
1587 *In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias librosque de Demonstratione*, Venice.
- Suárez, F.
1866 *Disputationes Metaphysicae (Opera omnia, vol. 25–26, ed. C. Berton)*, Paris, [Reprint Hildesheim, 1965].
- Suárez, F.
2004 *A Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics or “A Most Ample Index to the Metaphysics of Aristotle”. Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis (Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation 40)*, [ed. J.P. Doyle], Milwaukee WI.
- Thomas Aquinas
1935 *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria*, [ed. M.-R. Cathala], Torino.
- Wippel, J. F.
1990 “The Latin Avicenna as a Source for Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics”, *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 37, 51–90.
- Wolter, A.B.
1946 *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (Franciscan Institute Publications, Philosophy Series 3)*, New York.
- Wolter, A.B.
1990 *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus*, Ithaca & London.