Engaging philosophically with the history of science: two challenges for scientific realism

Authors

  • Theodore Arabatzis National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.27095

Abstract

I raise two challenges for scientific realists. The first is a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), but not of the more common type, which focuses on rejected theories and abandoned entities. Rather, the PMI I have in mind departs from conceptual change, which is ubiquitous in science. Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists. The second challenge is to make sense of successful scientific practice that was centered on entities that have turned out to be fictitious

Author Biography

Theodore Arabatzis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Professor of History and Philosophy of Science

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Published

2018-02-15