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Some Remarks on “Hearing-as” and its Role in the Aesthetics of Music

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Abstract

Starting from the context in which Wittgenstein thinks of the concepts of “seeing-as” and “hearing-as”, the basic relation is clarified between the question of representation, musical understanding, and the theory of musical expressiveness. The points of views of Wollheim, Scruton, Levinson, and Ridley are discussed, in a re-consideration of the notions of hearing and understanding within Wittgenstein’s “last philosophy”.

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Notes

  1. See Scruton (1998, pp. 174–187); Scruton (1997, Chapt. 2 and 8).

  2. Ridley (2004, pp. 47–69); Levinson (1995, pp. 90–125); Levinson (2006, pp. 91–108).

  3. Wittgenstein (1980b, § 1, p. 2).

  4. See also Wittgenstein (1997, II, XI, p. 212): “Do I really see something different each time, or do I only interpret what I see in a different way? I am inclined to say the former. But why?––To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state”.

  5. Wittgenstein (1980a, b, § 1036, p. 180).

  6. Schæffer (1966, pp. 103–110).

  7. If we want to imagine a melody, we have to “sing it inwardly;” and this will be called an activity, according to Wittgenstein, “just as much as calculating in the head”; Wittgenstein (1980a, §81, p. 16).

  8. Schæffer (1966, p. 103) (my translation).

  9. In French this expression can be understood both in the sense of an intellectual act and of a perceptive synthesis. “Ouïr comme”––close to the German “hören wie,” the English “to hear as,” the Italian “udire come,” and the Spanish “oír como”––refers explicitly to perception but is less common. The French “sentir comme,” while interesting, rather designates the sentimental value of the experience (as in English “to feel” or in Spanish “sentir,” while the Italian “sentire” is more versatile and has inter alia the meaning of “to hear”).

  10. As stressed by Schæffer (1966, p. 104).

  11. See Vicario (2003, p. 134).

  12. Both the perceptual and the metaphysical side of this question have been discussed at considerable length by Scruton (1997, pp. 6–13).

  13. See Bozzi (1993, pp. 71–74).

  14. Among the most celebrated works, we can mention those of Stockhausen, Scelsi and the composers of L’Itinéraire.

  15. See Scruton (1997, pp. 13–15).

  16. Casati and Dokic (1994, p. 5).

  17. See Fontaine (2001, p. 159).

  18. See the thesis about the articulation in a musical sentence sketched in Wittgenstein (1961, § 3.141).

  19. Scruton (1998, p. 99).

  20. Wittgenstein (1980a, b, § 1036, p. 180).

  21. Scruton (1998, pp. 94–97).

  22. Scruton (1998, p. 101).

  23. Scruton (1998, p. 178).

  24. Scruton (1998, pp. 177–178).

  25. Scruton (1998, p. 90).

  26. Scruton (1997, p. 44).

  27. Cumming (1994, p. 18).

  28. Among the most pertinent observations are those of Budd (1999) and Cumming (1994). According to Budd, the idea of applying a capacity of metaphorical transfer is not only unnecessary, but exposes speech to a contradiction: for all metaphor requires interpretation, which takes the form of a “injection” (and not of an “extraction”) of meanings––yet Scruton’s thesis seems precisely to show the superfluous nature of such an interpretation. Cumming, for her part, has highlighted that the distinction between a specific “intentional” nature of the musical object and the “material” nature of objects of scientific knowledge advanced by Scruton involves basically a positivist conception of the metaphor, unsatisfactory when considering carefully the status of descriptions of physical objects.

  29. According to Cumming’s criticism (1994, p. 9 and p. 11).

  30. Cumming (1994, p. 12).

  31. Cumming (1994, pp. 22–23).

  32. It is in a similar way that Nicholas Cook (1990), suggests conceiving the meaning of music’s theories and analytical projects.

  33. We sketched this topic in Arbo (2007).

  34. These metaphors are widely employed in order to describe musical sounds in the writings of Hugues Dufourt (1991), Gérard Grisey (2008) and Tristan Murail (2005).

  35. See Cometti et al. (Cometti et al. 2000, p. 78).

  36. Levinson (2006, p. 95).

  37. More precisely (and, in our opinion, convincingly), Levinson makes a reply to three remarks made by Wollheim in order to support his view of “seeing-in.” About the observation that “see-in” would lend itself better to illustrate states of affairs than the “seeing-as,” he said that in the case of music, we already hear processes or events normally. About the objection that “seeing-as” does not apply to a whole picture but only to a part of it, he says that we normally hear a whole passage of music as expressive of a certain emotion. The third (and widest) of Wollheim’s remarks concerns the fact that with the “seeing-in” we are conscious of both the means of representation and the represented objects. But Levinson observes that the conscience of this duality is not really necessary in the case of music: in short, there is no need to share our attention between, on the one hand, emerging and expressive properties, and, on the other one, the musical characters which create it. See Levinson (1995, pp. 110–112).

  38. Levinson (1995, p. 116).

  39. Levinson (1995, p. 117).

  40. More recent resemblance-based views of musical expressiveness are discussed in Levinson (2006, pp. 96–100).

  41. Ridley (2004, p. 65).

  42. Ridley (2004, p. 67).

  43. Wittgenstein (1980a, b, § 1036, p. 180).

  44. Wittgenstein (1982) discusses this question in §451, p. 60: “Seeing an aspect is a voluntary act. We can tell someone: Now look at it like this. Try again to see the similarity. Listen to the theme this way, etc. But does that make seeing a voluntary act? Isn’t it rather the way you look at something that causes this seeing?”.

  45. Levy (1995, pp. 156–160).

  46. Wittgenstein (1982, § 612, p. 78).

  47. Wittgenstein (1982, § 677, p. 86).

  48. Cf. Scruton (1997, p. 94; 1998, pp. 100–101).

  49. See Benoist (2006, p. 249).

  50. Wittgenstein (1997, p. 197).

  51. By this term we mean a particular system of (musical) relationships about which there was reached some agreement in a human context or relationship. A “music game” could correspond to what it is often called a “style,” but this concept should mainly serve to emphasize how important it is to take into account the factors of context when it comes to explaining the “meaning” of an identifiable musical fragment (whether an interval or a harmonic situation, a sentence, etc.).

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Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Amanda Hascher and Jerrold Levinson for their helpful comments in correcting and improving this article.

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    Alessandro Arbo

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Arbo, A. Some Remarks on “Hearing-as” and its Role in the Aesthetics of Music. Topoi 28, 97–107 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-009-9053-8

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