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Advance Directives Under State Law and Judicial Decisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

Extract

Three years ago I first surveyed state court decisions and laws governing the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health on June 25, 1990, makes it timely to review again state law developments because a majority of the Court announced in Cruzan that it will leave to the states the question of what legal requirements may be imposed on decisions to discontinue treatment for incompetent patients. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explained that the Court's deference to state decision-making is grounded in the fact that “state courts have available to them for decision a number of sources—state constitution, statutes, and common law—which are not available to US.” Although the opinion makes clear that Missouri might have authorized the family of Nancy Cruzan to decide to terminate medical treatment for her, a majority of the Supreme Court refrained from holding that Missouri is constitutionally required to do so.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1991

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References

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