Abstract
Caroline Lierse criticizes David Lewis and myself for seeking to uphold the Humean Distinct Existences principle — no necessary connection between distinct existences — but at the same time covertly abandoning it in our discussion of properties. She devotes most of her space to Lewis, who can speak for himself. I plead guilty to using some infelicitous language in my 1978 book on universals, to which she refers, but think I am innocent of the charge she brings.
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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Armstrong, D.M. (1996). Comments on Lierse. In: Riggs, P.J. (eds) Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8607-8_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8607-8_13
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